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ABSTRACT
THE RECONCILIATION OF FAITH AND REASON IN THOMAS AQUINAS
MAY 2004
CREIGHTON J. ROSENTAL, B.S., HARVEY MUDD COLLEGE
M.A., CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
Thomas Aquinas has long been understood to have reconciled faith and reason.
Typically, he is understood as having provided justification for faith by means of proof,
particularly, that the Five Ways prove the existence of God. Under this interpretation,
laith becomes a species ot justified belief, and the justification for faith rests upon the
success of the Five Ways (or, alternatively, on the success of other justificatory
evidence). In this dissertation, I argue that Aquinas’s account of faith is not one of
justified belief, at least as it is understood in contemporary philosophy. Instead. I argue,
faith has its own basis for epistemic “reasonableness” - a reasonableness that does not
derive from ordinary evidence nor proof. Rather than requiring evidence accessible to
the natural light of reason. Aquinas holds that faith has its own soil of “evidence” - that
which results from the light of faith. Aquinas “Aristotelianizes” faith and argues that
faith has the Aristotelian epistemic virtue of certitude, and in so doing reconciles faith
and Aristotelian reason, at least as Aristotle was understood by Medieval philosophers.
This reconciliation resolves important tensions between Aristotelian science and
Christian doctrine. Further, I examine three contemporary accounts of what counts as
v
an epistemically "responsible" belief (namely, justified belief.
warrant) and argue that under Aquinas's account, faith should
and in an important, though modified sense, as justified.
practical rationality and
be counted as rational.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FAITH AND REASON
1.1. The problem of faith and reason
I hat there might be some sort of "problem ot faith and reason is perhaps easier
to recognize than it is to formulate — certainly there is some sort ot tension between the
two, even if it is only superficial. Part of the difficulty in explicating the nature of this
tension resides in the fact that opinions about what constitutes faith and what constitutes
reason have changed over the last 2,000 years, and the tension has been observed for
nearly as long as there has been Christian faith. Is the tension between faith and reason
in the 2
1
st
century the same as in the 2
nd
or the 1
3
th
? A further difficulty is that what
counts as an acceptable solution has also changed, and such changes are not completely
explicable in terms of changing accounts of faith and/or reason. For instance, some
contemporary philosophers or theologians (e.g., contemporary creation science
advocates) may hold that the beliefs of faith are “rational” because they meet the
standards of modem science; however, to Medieval theologians who had very different
standards for “science” such a solution would be unacceptable.
Even though there is no uniform account of faith amongst religious believers,
we shall try to limit the scope of the problem of faith and reason by constraining our
consideration of faith to Christian faith (even though there is also much disagreement
among Christians about the nature of faith). And though it seems that nearly every
theological or philosophical text that surveys accounts of faith has its own metric for
categorizing accounts, we shall further limit the scope of the problem by following John
Hick in observing that there are fundamentally two types of Christian faith: the first,
from the Latinfiducia, is a trusting and confident attitude towards God, the second,
from fides, is identified with a cognitive act or state in which one is said to know God or
have knowledge about Him. 1 We shall take as a minimum criterion for any account of
faith that it encompass either one or both of these meanings.
A common response to the tension between faith and reason is to find one side
at fault and to excoriate it. Early critics of Christianity accused Christians of all sorts of
moral failures related to their faith (including drinking babies" blood, orgies, and
incest!). Later secular critics found moral fault with Christianity in that faith was held
to prevent Christians from achieving true or real goods. Karl Marx, for instance,
exemplifies this later view when he claimed, “[Religion] is the opium of the people.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real
happiness.”
3 On the part of early Christians, reliance on philosophical reasoning was
perceived as a diminishment of trust in God (faith as fiducia), and contributed to
viciousness. Tatian (c. 1 50-170) exemplifies this position when he says, “What noble
thing have you produced by your pursuit of philosophy? Who of your most eminent
men has been free from vain boasting?”4 And he continues, providing a list of notable
philosophers and their vices, implying that the practice of philosophy in each case has
contributed to moral turpitude. And, of course, Christians have always held that
salvation requires faith, so that if one, as a result of reasoning loses or tails to have
fiducia
,
one would also fail to be saved.
2
Of more interest, perhaps, to philosophy are the arguments that reject either faith
or reason on epistemic rather than moral grounds. Early Christian writers criticized
reason precisely because (they argued) it yielded an intellectual failure. Tertullian (c.
200) observed that reason, (exemplified by Greek philosophy with its dialectical
methods) conflicted with faith as fides because its conclusions were incompatible with
what was known or claimed to be true about God.
... Indeed heresies are themselves instigated by philosophy. From this source
came the Aeons, and I know not what infinite forms, and the trinity of man in
the system of Valentinus, who was of Plato's school. ... Then, again, the opinion
that the soul dies is held by the Epicureans; while the denial of the restoration of
the body is taken from the aggregate school of all the philosophers; also, when
matter is made equal to God, then you have the teaching of Zeno; and when any
doctrine is alleged touching a god of fire, then Fleraclitus comes in. The same
subject-matter is discussed over and over again by the heretics and the
philosophers; the same arguments are involved. Whence comes evil? Why is it
permitted? What is the origin of man? and in what way does he come? . .
.
Unhappy Aristotle! who invented for these men dialectics, the art of building up
and pulling down; an art so evasive in its propositions, so far-fetched in its
conjectures, so harsh, in its arguments, so productive of contentions
—
embarrassing even to itself, retracting everything, and really treating of nothing!
Not only did Tertullian recognize that philosophical reasoning produces heresies, but he
noticed that Scripture recognized this as well, and that the exercise of philosophy was
explicitly proscribed therein:
From all these, when the apostle would restrain us, he expressly names
philosophy as that which he would have us be on our guard against. Writing to
the Colossians, he says, “See that no one beguile you through philosophy and
vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy
Ghost.” He had been at Athens, and had in his interviews (with its philosophers)
become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth,
whilst it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by
the variety of its mutually repugnant sects. What indeed has Athens to do with
Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What
between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from "the porch of
Solomon,” who had himself taught that "the Lord should be sought in simplicity
of heart.” Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic,
Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after
3
possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith.
we desire no further belief. ...
According to Tertullian, there is a problem of reason and faith because the operation of
reason that is philosophy often yields conclusions that contradict the propositions that
are to be believed under taith. Faith as fide
s
and philosophical reasoning are
incompatible becausefides holds certain propositions to be true whereas philosophy
rejects them, or vice versa. Tertullian’ s recommendation: abandon Greek philosophy in
favor of Christian fides.
1 he tension between philosophy andfides identified by Tertullian represents an
attitude that has persisted among a subset of Christians throughout the history of
Christianity. Etienne Gilson, in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages
,
identifies
Tatian, St. Bernard, and Peter Damiani as also holding Tertullian’s position. 7 and in
more contemporary times, the rejection by some Christians of scientific “theories” such
as evolution is a result of a perception of tension between a product of reason (in this
case, a scientific theory) and fides. Just as Christian philosophers have found there to
be a conflict between faith and the products of philosophy and/or science, so too have
philosophers and scientists found a similar conflict. Philosophers and non-Christians
have long argued that the articles of faith should not be accepted because they cannot be
true. There is an extensive philosophical tradition in which problems such as the
problem of evil, the incoherence of the Trinity, and the problem of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom have been advanced to demonstrate that the articles
of faith are, in fact, false. Scientific accounts of evolution, cosmology and geology are
also often advanced to disprove specific claims of faith made in Scripture.
4
A second sort ot epistemic tension between faith and reason does not involve
identifying faith and/or reason to have produced false beliefs, but rather, to have
produced beliefs that tail to be formed according to acceptable epistemic nonns. A
famous early attack of this sort on faith was made by Celsus (c. 175). In his work On
the True Doctrine
,
we find a substantial and systematic attack on Christian faith in
which he criticizes Christians for their failure to abide by the epistemic norms of reason:
Now I would not want to say that a man who got into trouble because of some
eccentric belief should have to renounce his belief or pretend that he has
renounced it. But the point is this, and the Christians would do well to heed it:
One ought first to follow reason as a guide before accepting any belief, since
anyone who believes without testing a doctrine is certain to be deceived. ... Just
as the charlatans of the cults take advantage of a simpleton’s lack of education to
lead him around by the nose, so too with the Christian teachers: they do not want
to give or to receive reasons for what they believe. Their favorite expressions
are “Do not ask questions, just believe!” and: “Your faith will save you!” “The
wisdom of this world,” they say, “is evil; to be simple is to be good.”8
William Clifford is perhaps a paradigmatic later example of this view, when he argues
that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence.”
9
Clifford has in his sights faith in the existence of God that does
not depend on evidence nor strive to find any. He continues:
If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of
afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his
mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call
into question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot
easily be asked without disturbing it - the life of that man is one long sin against
mankind. 10
Clifford even warns that favoring the form of faith that isfides to reasoning can itself
put in jeopardy the trust one places in God, that is, thefiducia form of faith. He quotes
Coleridge: “He who begins by loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by
loving his own sect or Church better than Christianity, and end loving himself better
than all.” Views held by many contemporary philosophers and scientists are often as
5
extreme as Clifford’s, if not more, and the attitude expressed by Richard Dawkins in
this following passage is common:
But insofar as theology studies the nature of the divine, it will earn the right to
be taken seriously when it provides the slightest, smallest smidgen of a reason
for believing in the existence of the divine. Meanwhile, we should devote as
much time to studying serious theology as we devote to studying serious fairies
and serious unicorns. 1
The views expressed by Celsus, Clifford and Dawkins call for rejecting faith for
different reasons than I ertullian s call to reject philosophy. According to Tertullian,
philosophy should be rejected because it yields false conclusions; on the other hand.
Celsus, et. al. have not claimed (at least in these passages quoted) that faith involves
accepting false premises as true. Instead, these secular views argue that faith fails some
sort of epistemic norms for belief. Some Christians, on the other hand, have held that
reasoning about matters pertaining to the divine without having faith is itself
epistemically irresponsible. Augustine (and many Christians following him) famously
held that, due to sin, our reasoning faculties were damaged and could only be repaired
through faith. For instance, “The eye of the mind is healthy when it is pure from every
taint of the body, that is, when it is remote and purged from desire of mortal things.
And this, faith alone can give in the first place. It is impossible to show God to a mind
vitiated and sick. Only the healthy mind can see him. But if the mind does not believe
that only thus will it attain vision, it will not seek healing.”
These examples provide three ways in which the tension between faith and
reason about divine matters can be identified. First, either having faith or reasoning
about divine matters could be held to be morally bad (or at least dangerous). Second,
either having faith or reasoning about divine matters (or matters relevant to claims
about the existence of God or veracity of Scripture) could be held to involve adherence
6
to false propositions. Finally, either having faith or reasoning about divine matters
could held to be epidemically irresponsible. Let us dub the position which holds that
either faith or reason has failed in any of these three ways the incompatibilist position.
Secular incompatikilists will hold faith at fault for the tension, and theist
incompatibilists will hold reason at fault. Further, secular moral incompatibilists claim
that believing on faith is morally bad (or at least dangerous), theist moral
incompatibilists claim that reasoning about the divine is morally bad (or at least
dangerous), secular truth incompatibilists claim that the articles of faith are false, theist
truth incompatibilists that reasoning about divine matters (or matters relevant to claims
about the existence of God or veracity of Scripture) leads to falsehood, secular
epistemic incompatibilists claim that believing on faith is epistemically irresponsible,
and finally, theist epistemic incompatibilists claim that believing on the basis of
reasoning about the divine is epistemically irresponsible.
No Christian will accept secular moral or truth incompatibilism, for these
positions would imply that Christianity is either immoral or false. Some Christians
could, however, accept secular epistemic incompatibilism, as long as epistemic
"irresponsibility” is understood correctly. James Kellenberger presents a model of faith
discussed by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. This model of faith, rather than hold
that belief in or about God is certain, holds that faith is precisely uncertain and doubtful.
Under this view, faith is explicated as follows: “It cannot be, all reason is against it; yet
I believe!” This provides the grounds for one response to the tension between faith
and reason - at least for some varieties of faith, the faithful can concede that there is a
tension between faith and reason when it comes to epistemic norms and as a result, faith
7
is irrational, but simultaneously, the faithful can hold that faith is worthwhile and the
propositions believed are true. On the other hand, no non-Christian (that is, someone
who rejects the truth ot the Christian faith) would accept theist truth incompatibilism,
for this position entails holding that the beliefs of Christian faith are true, and that any
contradicting evidence (scientific or otherwise) is false. Most non-Christian scientists
and philosophers would similarly not accept theist epistemic incompatibilism (which
implies that our reasoning faculties cannot function reliably about matters relevant to
the divine). 14
A typical passage from Scripture that is often adduced in support of claims of
the moral danger ol reasoning (in this case, philosophy) and thus in support of theist
moral incompatibilism is Colossians 2:8, “Beware lest any man spoil you through
philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world,
and not after Christ. A theist moral compatibilist could try to explain away scriptural
passages such as this that are appealed to in support of the incompatibility of faith and
reason, or alternatively, could use competing scriptural passages to diminish support for
the incompatibilist position, such as this one from Romans 1 :20, “For the invisible
things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead...” In a similar vein, one
could argue that reason does not in fact lead to heresy nor to behavior that diminishes
trust in God. Arguments in support of these positions could be philosophical,
theological, even historical: one might show that all the arguments that yield heresies
are actually fallacious; one might argue theologically that reasoning in fact promotes or
at least does not diminish Christian virtue; one might argue historically that good
8
philosophers in the past were, in fact, not drawn away from virtue as a result of their
practices ot philosophy. What these approaches all have in common is that they argue
that the products ot reason do not, in fact, yield morally problematic conclusions or
behavior. Theists, therefore, needn't be moral incompatibilists. On the other hand.
non-Christians could, in principle, accept theistic moral incompatibilism. Non-
Christians, despite believing that the articles of Christian faith are false, might accept
nonetheless that Christians, in believing them (and perhaps also by living in accordance
with them) are behaving morally. One might also further claim that non-Christians,
lacking the moral structure that accompanies Christian belief, behave badly, or at least
are at risk of doing so.
Truth compatibilism is slightly more complicated to explicate, for it is not
immediately obvious how to hold that the claims of faith and of reason are both true,
particularly when science or philosophy often draw conclusions which seem clearly to
contradict matters of taith. 1 ruth compatibilism holds that there is no tension about the
truths discernible by faith and by reason because faith (when real) discovers the truth,
and reason (when correct) does so as well. Apparent contradictions between the
conclusions ot reason and matters of faith then need to be explained away somehow.
Consider the theory of evolution - a product of reason that seems to contradict a
number of beliefs of faith, including, in particular, the story of the creation of humans in
Genesis. One approach is to impugn the reasoning involved that produced results
incompatible with faith. Creation scientists, for instance, argue that other scientists
made errors in reasoning (namely in interpreting data, e.g., the fossil record) when they
concluded that humans evolved from other species. The creation scientists argue that
9
proper scientific reasoning would not yield the theory of evolution, and hence would not
result in a contradiction with taith. A second approach is to interpret Scripture in such a
way that apparently categorical faith claims that contradict scientific findings are not
interpreted literally. The Christian tradition has left room to interpret Scripture both
literally and figuratively. Even so-called “literal” interpretations of Scripture, as, for
instance, can be found in Augustine’s De genesi ad litteram
, contain interpretations that
do not seem to be particularly literal (i.e., “upholding the exact or primary meaning of a
word”) at all - for instance, in Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created the heaven
and the earth.”), Augustine holds that the use of the term ‘earth’ is not meant to refer
either to dirt or to our planet, but to unformed matter (the use of ‘earth’ in this passage
helps suggest a pliable substance analogous to unformed matter). With each of these
approaches to truth compatibilism, one assumes that all the products of reason and of
faith are compatible, as long as the reasoning is sound and the matters of faith are
properly interpreted. It would be possible, under this view, for any matter of faith to be
proved by reason, and any apparent incompatibility would be due to a particular failure
of reasoning or of scriptural interpretation.
A different, and perhaps more radical, approach to truth compatibilism would be
to hold that faith and reason cannot contradict each other because certain truths of faith
are in principle unattainable by reason. The Christian Mysteries are commonly held to
be of this sort. Thus, any attempt to reason about the nature of the Trinity, and any
scientific or philosophical conclusion that would appear to contradict claims about the
Trinity, must be wrong. Truth compatibilism is achieved by restricting the scope of
what can properly be known by reason so that reason can never be found to yield
10
(correctly drawn) conclusions incompatible with matters of faith. Under this approach
some matters ot faith could still be known by reason - so even though the Mysteries
would be beyond the scope of reason, the existence of God might not, and could
perhaps be knowable by a successful proof (e.g., by one of Aquinas’s Five Ways).
15
In this dissertation, I want to focus on epistemological solutions (in particular
one solution - Aquinas s) to the problem of faith and reason, and so I am not
particularly interested in resolutions to the problem of faith and reason mentioned thus
far (viz., those that rely on embracing some form of moral or truth
incompatibilism/compatibilism). The Kierkegaardian solution to the problem that
embraces secular epistemic incompatibilism, seems, to me, to be primarily theological
in nature, and not particularly epistemological. Similarly, it seems to me that solutions
that depend on moral compatibilism, though they do resolve at least some of the tension
between faith and reason, are solutions that ultimately require practical ethical
determinations that are not primarily concerned with reason, rationality, justification
and other epistemological concerns. On the other hand, solutions that rely, at least in
part, on truth compatibilism do appear to be somewhat epistemological. Approaches
taken by creation scientists and non-literal interpreters of Scripture are not particularly
philosophical, and so I am not concerned with them here. On the other hand, much has
been written of philosophical interest about whether the articles of faith are in fact,
true, and whether or not they have been proven by reason. This is a centuries-long
discussion, and much has been written about proofs or disproofs of matters of faith, and
I have little to add in the attempt to answer this question. I shall not be particularly
concerned with whether or not the beliefs of the Christian faith are true. That said, I
1
1
have indicated that my interest in writing this dissertation is to examine Aquinas’s
epistemological solution to the problem of faith and reason. One aspect of the solution
of truth compatibihsm is relevant to my interests, namely, the approach which limits the
scope ol what reason can possibly know about divine matters. Approaches to
establishing epistemic compatibihsm are, of course, of particular interest. 1 turn now to
these approaches.
1.2. Epistemological approaches to solving the problem of faith and reason
Many texts in contemporary philosophy of religion seem to be primarily
concerned either with the truth or falsity of religious claims, or of the rationality (or
justification, etc.) or irrationality of believing such claims. Both truth and epistemic
incompatibilism are explanations of the tension between faith and reason - explanations
that are of particular interest to those who study the philosophy of religion. These
explanations, though related, are separable: even if religious claims turn out to be false,
it is possible that believing those claims can be rational or justified. Since epistemic
concerns about belief are separable from truth claims, I will focus primarily on attempts
to resolve the tension between faith and reason that try to close the epistemic gap
between the two (i.e., solutions that try argue for epistemic compatibihsm), while, for
the most part, I shall disregard arguments that attempt to prove some matters of faith to
be false and their apologetic counterparts that refute them or attempt to prove matters of
faith to be true. Instead I want to examine whether or not a particular solution - that
offered by Aquinas - is one of epistemic compatibihsm, and further, I will examine how
12
adequate such a solution is for resolving the tension between faith and reason. In order
to understand any solution of epistemic compatibilism, however, we must understand
what it means to say that having faith in some proposition is epistemically responsible
or irresponsible. Alvin Plantinga, in his Warranted Christian Belief, provides a nice
survey of a number of possible accounts for what I have described as epistemic
responsibility. In trying to develop an account of epistemic responsibility, I shall
largely follow Plantinga’s lead .
16
1.2.1. Being epistemically responsible = having rational justification
As we saw earlier, William Clifford made the rather strong assertion that “it is
wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient
evidence.'’ Let us interpret the claim epistemically rather than morally (though I am not
claiming that Clifford himself had this in mind) and understand 'wrong' as
‘epistemically irresponsible’ so that to believe on insufficient evidence is to fail to live
up to one’s intellectual or epistemic duty. This seems to provide us an apparently
simple criterion for evaluating the epistemic responsibility or irresponsibility of any
given belief. Following philosophical tradition. I shall call this view Evidentialism . 17
In short, the Evidentialist position can be characterized as follows:
(E) For any belief P held by S: S's belief that P is epistemically responsible
18
if and only if there is sufficient evidence for P.
Epistemic responsibility is acquired by means of having sufficient evidence, and
when understood this way, philosophers will often say that such propositions are
13
rationallyjustified, or, simply, justified. Many philosophers hold the Evidentialist
thesis to be incomplete, for it seems to be insensitive to the difference between two very
different sorts of “evidence”. My beliefs that Paris is the capital of France and that (to
borrow an example from Plantinga) 32 x 94 = 3008 are justified because I have
sufficient evidence tor each belief. This evidence depends on other beliefs that I have,
so for example, I believe 32 x 94 = 3008 because I also believe that 4x2 = 8. 4x3 =
12, 8 + 2 - 10, etc. But these latter beliefs are themselves not believed on the basis of
further evidential beliefs, they are ‘basic' or foundational. Foundational beliefs do not
seem to require evidence in the ways that non-basic beliefs do; they seem to be justified
as soon as I apprehend them. They must, of course, be apprehended in the right way to
count as properly basic, that is, as proper justificatory grounds for other beliefs. This
division, of beliefs into basic and non-basic, then, constitutes what Plantinga calls
Classic Foundationalism. I have slightly modified Plantinga's formulation of the view
to match the terminology I have been using, but in essence, the formulation is his: 19
(CF) S's belief that P is epistemically responsible if and only if there is
sufficient evidence for P. There is sufficient evidence for P if and only if
either:
(1) P is properly basic (i.e., P is self-evident, incorrigible or evident
to the senses for S), or
(2) P is believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are
epistemically responsible and that support P deductively,
20
inductively or abductively.
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C lassie Foundationalism provides several ready solutions to the problem of faith
and reason. Philosophers or others who wish to impugn the epistemic responsibility of
the faithful (secular epistemic incompatibilists) need merely to argue that there is not
sufficient evidence for any given matter of faith - that is, that these beliefs are neither
properly basic nor evidentially dependent (whether directly or indirectly) on properly
basic beliefs. We see such an approach among those who argue against the soundness
of proofs for the existence of God, an approach which seeks to eliminate one source of
sufficient evidence tor faith. Hume takes a similar incompatibilist approach when, for
example, he writes on miracles in the Enquiry and argues that evidence in favor of
miracles is insufficient in light of other evidence against them. 21 Compatibilist
solutions under Classic Foundationalism seem to fall into one of two main categories.
One approach is to argue that faith does have sufficient evidence so that belief in
matters of faith should count as justified (successful proofs of the existence of God are
taken to be one form of this sort of evidence)." - A second compatibilist approach is to
argue that many ordinary claims that we take to be justified (for example, that I have
two hands) do not require a great deal of evidence — the bar for sufficiency of evidence
is taken to be fairly low. Faith, it is then argued, has sufficient evidence, under this
attenuated understanding of sufficient. Plantinga provides just such an argument in his
God and Other Minds
,
when he argues that though our beliefs in other minds have only
a minimal amount of evidence in favor of them, the beliefs are counted as justified, and
since faith seems also to meet such minimal standards, it should also be counted as
justified.
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1.2.2. Being epidemically responsible = being praetieally rational
A second way in which a believer might be counted as epidemically responsible
would be if that person believing a proposition were counted as being practically
rational. William Alston, in Perceiving God
. advances such a position. 23 Alston
considers some socially common belief-forming practices that people have - for
instance, the practice of forming beliefs on the basis of perception of objects in our
environment. (Other common practices include, for instance, forming beliefs by way of
reasoning [both deductive and inductive] and forming beliefs on the basis of memory.)
Alston believes that these practices cannot be shown to be reliable; however, he argues
that a believer can be counted as practically rational to engage in them. Alston provides
two arguments supporting why beliefs formed according to these sorts of practices
should be counted as practically rational.
According to the first ... because (1) those ways do not lead to massive
inconsistencies, (2) there is no reason to think them unreliable, (3) we know of
no alternative doxastic practices whose reliability we could demonstrate in an
epistemically noncircular fashion, and (4) changing to some other practice
would be massively difficult and disruptive. According to the second argument,
any socially and psychologically established doxastic practice that meets certain
other plausible conditions is prima facie rational (i.e., such that it is primafacie
rational to engage in it); such a practice will be all-things-considered rational, if.
as far as we can see, there is no reason to abandon it. 24
What makes belief based on these sorts of doxastic practices rational? Let us stipulate
that action will count as practically rational if I am behaving in the right ways (i.e.,
behaving rationally) in attempting to bring about the goals for which such action is a
means. So, for instance, if I am hungry and my goal is to eat, it would not be practically
rational for me to go where 1 do not believe there is food or where I do not believe 1
could get food (for example, the bank or a closed supermarket). If, on the other hand.
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someone were hungry and went to an open restaurant (and had money, etc.), we would
say that such an action was quite appropriate for achieving the desired goals, that is. that
the person s action was practically rational.
Consider now our social doxastic practices. If we could show that they were
reliable (Alston thinks we cannot), then we would know that beliefs formed on the basis
of such practices would turn out to be true. If our goal is to believe what is true, then, in
order to behave rationally, we ought to believe on the basis of only reliable practices.
However, it our standard social doxastic practices, for example, the practice of
believing on the basis of sense impressions, cannot be shown to be reliable, what then
follows from this? According to Alston, and motivated by the two arguments above,
believers can still be counted as rational, even if their belief-fonning practices cannot be
shown to be reliable. Consider again the analogy of someone who is hungry. When 1
am hungry, I have the practice of going to the kitchen to get food. In the past, this
practice has been a very reliable method of achieving the goal of satiating my hunger.
However, I cannot show that going to the kitchen is a reliable means of ending my
hunger, because I cannot be sure my housemate (or rats, etc.) has not eaten all the food
(or that the food isn t rotten, or that 1 haven t forgotten to go shopping, etc.). Despite
my inability to show the reliability ot going to the kitchen in securing food, we would
still count my action of heading to the kitchen as practically rational, as long as: ( 1
)
going to the kitchen has typically been successful, (2) I have no reason to think that
going to the kitchen would be unreliable, (3) I don t know of any other way of securing
food that 1 can show to be reliable, and (4) changing my food-securing routine would be
unnecessarily disruptive and difficult. Our social doxastic practices (as well as my
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lood-securing practices) count as practically rational because we have no reason to
Ihink that they will fail to yield the desired goal (in this ease, securing truth) and
because there is no reason to operate under another practice in preference to the current
one. Thus, though still susceptible to skeptical worries, believing according to such
practices counts as rational, that is, as epistemically responsible.
It is not difficult to see how this account of epistemic responsibility can be
employed to advance either the epistemic compatibilist or incompatibilist positions,
hpistemic compatibilists (like Alston) will argue that the believing practices associated
with faith are rational because faith is one of those doxastic practices for which the two
arguments quoted above apply. 25 Though Alston does not take the following position. I
suppose one could also try to argue that neither faith nor any other ordinary doxastic
practices pass the criteria specified above, and thus no doxastic practices should be
counted as rational. In this way. there would be no tension between faith and reason
because believing something on laith would be no more irrational that believing
something on the basis of reason-based doxastic practices. On the other hand, secular
epistemic incompatibilists will explain the tension between faith and reason by arguing
that though ordinary (secular) social doxastic practices should be counted as practically
rational, the practice of faith should not be so counted. Faith might not be counted as
practically rational because, for instance, it failed to satisfy ( 1 ), in that faith leads to
massive inconsistencies. Any reader of Christian Scripture quickly finds a number of
inconsistencies therein, and church schisms and different denominations also yield
significant inconsistencies.
26
Another incompatibilist approach would be to hold that
alternative doxastic practices (e.g., those of the natural sciences) might be thought to be
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more reliabie than faith, and thus believing as a result of the practice of faith should not
be counted as practically rational. 27
1.2.3. Being epistemically responsible = having warrant
A third notion of epistemic responsibility is one introduced by Plantinga in his
three books on warrant. In Warranted Christian Belief, he summarizes his view:
Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief isproduced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no
dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate to S’s kind of
cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth.
e must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does
enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the
belief the firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the
centra core ol our concept of warrant; there is a penumbral area surrounding the
central core where there are many analogical extensions of that central core- and
beyond the penumbral area, still another belt of vagueness and imprecision, a
host ol possible cases and circumstances where there is really no answer to the
question whether a given case is or isn't a case of warrant.28
Having warrant in what one believes yields epistemically responsible beliefs because
the belief-forming process is fundamentally rational - that is, the belief-forming
mechanism is functioning properly, and in the proper circumstances, and is the sort of
mechanism that is aimed at forming true beliefs. In this sense, to believe rationally is to
have a properly functioning belief-forming process. As Plantinga indicates, proper
function involves three components; (1) cognitive faculties that function properly in (2)
the appropriate environments, and (3) aimed at truth. Properly functioning cognitive
faculties are essential to any attribution of rationality or epistemic responsibility. If
someone formed beliefs on the basis of insane ramblings or hearing voices, we would
not consider such beliefs to be rational. Plantinga argues that if our cognitive faculties
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are functioning properly, that is, if they yield rational beliefs, then the beliefs that are
formed will be internally rational, that is, we will: have coherent beliefs, draw
appropriate inferences from our beliefs when the occasion demands, choose the
appropriate sorts of actions given our beliefs, and exhibit a preference to believe what is
truer So, for instance, we would normally not count someone as rational who believed
both that she were flesh and blood and immune to the harmful effects of fire; nor
someone who believed that one cannot breathe underwater but did not infer that deep-
water diving without oxygen was dangerous; nor someone who would choose to eat
something poisonous, while believing that it was deadly; nor someone who never
looked for evidence of the truth of one’s belief, when such searching was appropriate.
Roughly then, someone counts as being epidemically responsible in forming
and holding beliefs when he or she is warranted in holding those beliefs. Those that fail
to have warrant fail to function properly in forming his or her beliefs. As with the other
notions of epistemic responsibility, the notion of warrant allows three obvious solutions
to the problem of faith and reason. The secular incompatibilist solution, similar to the
solutions for justification and practical rationality, argues that faith lacks warrant.
Plantinga takes the sort of complaint against faith advanced by Marx that was quoted
earlier to be a complaint that faith lacks warrant
.
30
Plantinga interprets Marx as holding
that a perversion in the social structure yields the dysfunctional cognition that is faith.
Alternatively, one could argue that faith lacks warrant because a capitalist society
represents a hostile environment for proper cognitive function (citizens in a capitalist
society believe in tales of God as a coping mechanism for the conditions of capitalism),
so that second condition of the warrant of faith (appropriate environment for proper
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cognitive functioning) is no, me,. Compatibilist solutions could, as before, either argue
that faith has warrant, and is thus epistemically responsible.31 or that we never (or
nearly never) have warrant, and thus that faith is no more epistemically irresponsible
than any other manner of belief. 32
1.3. Goals and outline of this dissertation
In this paper, I shall examine the reconciliation of faith and reason as pursued by
Thomas Aquinas. My approach falls under the history of philosophy - I am interested
in looking closely and caretully at the account Aquinas actually provided, and thus I
shall avail myself primarily of his writings rather than of interpretations by Thomists or
of the Catholic Church. My approach falls under philosophy in that I am interested in
the torce of his philosophical arguments, particularly his epistemological solution to the
problem of faith and reason. Though Aquinas's own theological arguments based on
scriptural interpretations as well as historical arguments provided by others which
utilize the context in which Aquinas lived and worked can both be helpful in
understanding Aquinas's position on the reconciliation of faith and reason, these are
only of secondary concern to my project. Of primary concern are the philosophical
arguments which can largely be understood independently of historical context and
theological training. Since I hold Aquinas to have attempted to reconcile faith and
reason, I hold him to have been a compatibilist, and in this dissertation I will closely
examine exactly how Aquinas finds faith and reason to be compatible. I believe that
Aquinas thinks that faith and reason have moral, truth, and epistemic compatibility 1
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shall discuss the first two forms only when necessary for exploring my primary interest:
his solution to the epistemic compatibility of faith and reason. Most of the dissertation
will attend to this solution.
Any examination of historical solutions to the problem of faith and reason runs
the risk of being anachronistic. Part of this risk is due to the fact that accounts of faith
and reason, and of the loci of the tension between the two. have changed over time. For
instance, early Christian theologians were often concerned with Greek philosophy and
its tension with Christian faith - both because Greek philosophy drew conclusions that
apparently contradicted faith and because Greek philosophy advocated an .deal way of
hte that could be seen as an incompatible alternative to the Christian way of life. Many
contemporary Christians, in contrast, do not commonly find the threat of reason to be
situated in the conclusions of philosophy but in those of the natural sciences, and the
moral threat not to be in philosophical ethical theories, but in the prevalent "secular
humanist lifestyle of post-Enlightenment Western society. It would be a mistake to
understand I crtullian's concerns in exactly the same way as those of modern creation
science advocates, and similarly the concerns of Richard Dawkins are not exactly the
same as those of C'elsus. In surveying the problem between faith in reason in the last
section. I have considered general ways in which reason and faith have been found to be
(or not to be) in tension - these can give us an idea of the nature of the general problem,
and help categorize and understand potential solutions. However, any treatment of an
historical solution should carefully examine the nature of faith, reason and the tension
between the two as was understood at the time.
22
In chapter 2, 1 carefully examine Aquinas's account of reason. The particular
problem of faith and reason of the 13* century was the result of the introduction of
Aristotelian science and philosophy to the Latin West in the 12 th century. Most of the
Aristotelian corpus (with the exception of some of the texts on logic) was not translated
or available to Latin scholars until the 12
th
or 13* century. 33 The reception of Aristotle
among C hristian scholars was uneven, and certainly not without controversy. At the
University of Paris, for example, in 1215. reading and teaching Aristotle's natural
philosophy and metaphysics was explicitly forbidden, though teaching his texts on logic
was acceptable. 34 In 123 1
,
philosophy texts were supposed to be purged of errors
before being taught, but by 1255 (during Aquinas's first tenure there), uncensored
works of Aristotle's natural philosophy and metaphysics were explicitly assigned for
study. By the mid- 1 3* century, the study of Aristotle was widespread among scholars,
though many Aristotelian conclusions (particularly those derived from Averroes'
commentaries ot Aristotle) caused problems for Christian theologians. In 1 270 and
again in 1277, authorities in Paris condemned those advocating a variety of specific
Aristotelian positions (or positions attributed to Aristotle by Averroes). The problem of
reason and faith in the 13 th century, then, was a problem of reconciling the recently
discovered Aristotelian philosophy with Christian views of the time. Aquinas,
following a widespread trend among Christian scholars, adopted an Aristotelian account
of reason, as well as many of Aristotle's philosophical positions. In order to understand
Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason, we must first understand
Aquinas s account ot reason. This is done is chapter 2, in which I discuss in detail
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Aqumas's general aecount of reason and its ideal product scieruia, as well as the means
lor achieving it, namely, demonstration.
Understanding Aquinas's account of faith is of particular importance, since, as I
argue m chapter 3, h.s account has been commonly misunderstood. Some accounts of
Aquinas's reconciliation of faith and reason suffer from anachronism because they
understand faith under the common contemporary notion of unevidenced or unjustified
beiiei (where knowledge is commonly taken to be some sort ol'evidenced or justified
belief). Aquinas's account of faith is substantially different from this, as I argue in this
chapter. He provides an account of Christian faith, while trying to maintain a consistent
spirit with the Aristotelian account of reason described in chapter 2. 1 discuss this
account ol taith in some detail, paying attention to the roles of the will, charity, and
grace, aspects ol Aquinas's account of faith that are often overlooked.
In chapter 4, we begin to build towards Aquinas’ solution of the problem of faith
and reason. In this chapter, we examine Aquinas’s position on the limitations of reason
in divine matters, looking in particular detail at his treatment of the eternity of world as
a case study. Aquinas holds that reason is incapable of achieving any demonstration
about certain matters relevant to faith (for example, whether the world is eternal or
finite in duration, also, whether God is Triune, etc.), which is one compatibilist
approach to the tension between taith and reason, as was surveyed in the last section. 1
also examine Aquinas's position on divine matters that are accessible to reason, looking
in particular at his presentation of the Five Ways, his proofs for existence of God.
Fhese proofs have been commonly seen as offered in order to show that faith is justified
and is thus epistemically responsible (and thus these proofs serve the goal of
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establishing epistemic compatibilism) - however. I argue that these proofs are no.
intended by Aquinas for this purpose - he achieves his epistemic compatibilism by a
different means.
In chapter 5. 1 provide the full account of Aquinas' solution of the problem of
laith and reason. I also examine Aquinas' solution in the context both of other
Medieval theologians as well as later Christians and philosophers, in order to
understand the extent to which Aquinas' solution was considered philosophically sound
(or at least plausible). I also examine a number of epistemological consequences and
concerns surrounding Aquinas' solution that, though they might not have explicitly
been of concern to Aquinas, arc of particular interest to contemporary philosophers of
religious epistemology. Finally, I also consider and respond to a number of objections
to Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason.
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matters of Christian faith are false (i.e. secular truth incompatibilism).
15 As with the previous approach to truth compatibilism, errors of reasoning or
errors of scriptural interpretation could be the grounds for some apparent contradictions
between faith in reason. Unlike with the previous approach, which holds that once the
26
thTsrnLTh2
d
s',h?t'
reaSOn and faith yield C0rrect and compatible answers,
yield rright ansten
ma',erS °f
'^ reas°" "» , correctly
r. . .
,
Not
D
e
;
however
> that there are approaches to the supposed epistemic failure ofta.th both in Plantinga s book and elsewhere that I do not survey below What 1 discussbelow ,» .mended to be an initial and informal survey into various ways in w eht
, is
( bel,eve) commonly thought to fail to be epidemically responsible. The explanations 1d.scuss below cover enough possibilities that they provide us with a useful vocabulary
ofisrr 1 SCher l0r ,understandinS A <l ui nas's particular resolution of the problemtailh and reason. Note also that while I survey several explanations for the possible
epistemic irresponsibility attached to faith, Plantinga thinks that the only correct
explanation for the perceived epistemic irresponsibility of faith is that related to faithfailing to have warrant. He may well be right; however, this does not change the facthat a number of philosophers and others have identified (and still do identify) each ofthe lai lures below as the root cause of the epistemic irresponsibility of faith.
17
Locke is frequently identified as the progenitor of this view.
1
8
1 have tried to leave thesis (E) ambiguous between two senses. Each sense
has its advocates for what properly counts as justification - I do not wish to try to
choose one here. Rather, I will simply identify them:
Internalist Evidentialism holds that S’s belief that P is justified if and only if S
has (is aware of, etc.) sufficient evidence for P.
Externalist Evidentialism holds that S s belief that P is justified if and only if
theie is sufficient evidence for P, whether or not S is aware of such evidence. (Stephen
Wykstra (1989) seems to argue for a version of this view.)
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This formulation from Plantinga (2000), p. 84-5.
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I should also note here that a number of variations on Classical
Foundationalism have been proffered. Plantinga (2000), surveys them in pages 102-3.
2 1 xNumerous philosophers (including those quoted in the first section of this
chapter) have argued that faith lacks sufficient evidence. Plantinga (2000) cites a
number of recent philosophers who hold this position on p. 89-90.
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CHAPTER 2
AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF REASON
2.1. Reason in Aquinas
Along with many other Medieval philosophers, Aquinas held that reasoning is
what differentiates us from other animals. Humans are, by the Aristotelian definition,
rational animals. We are distinct from other rational beings (viz., angels) because we
are animals, but are also distinct from other animals because we are the only animals
who have the power to reason. Reason, for Aquinas, “denotes a transition from one
thing to another by which the human soul reaches or arrives at cognition
(cognoscendum ] ) of something else.”2 In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics
,
Aquinas is a bit more specific, saying that reason “pertains to bringing principles to
their conclusions.”3 This “transition” or “bringing” is often described by Aquinas
metaphorically as “movement (movari)
4
—reason is the power picked out by the
movement from one cognition to another.
A simple transition from one thought to another is not enough to characterize
reason uniquely. The two cognitions must be epistemically linked in order to count as
an instance of reasoning. Aquinas describes this act of reason as “[advancing]
(<discurrere) from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known
(notum ) one comes to a cognition (cognitionem ) of the unknown (ignoti).”
5
In order to
have an act of reasoning, we must not only move from an initial to a later thought, but
29
the first thought should somehow bring it about that we have a cognition of the second.
In the prologue to the commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas teases out the
various ways in which the epistemic relation between the two cognitions can obtain, by
means of an analogy:
It should be noted that the acts of reason are in a certain sense not unlike the acts
of nature: hence so far as it can, art imitates nature. Now in the acts of nature
we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature acts from
necessity, i.e., in such a way that it cannot fail; in others, nature acts so as to
succeed for the most part, although now and then it fails in its act. Hence in this
latter case there must be a twofold act: one which succeeds in the majority of
cases, as when from seed is generated a perfect animal; the other when nature
tails in regard to what is appropriate to it, as when from seed something
monstrous is generated owing to a defect in some principle.
These three are found also in the acts of the reason. For there is one
process of reason which induces necessity, where it is not possible to fall short
of the truth; and by such a process of reasoning the certainty of scientia is
acquired. Again, there is a process of reason in which something true in most
cases is concluded but without producing necessity. But the third process of
reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which
should have been observed in reasoning was defective
.
6
How exactly this analogy is supposed to work is, at first glance, not entirely clear. If
cases in which nature acts from necessity is deterministic causation, are cases in which
nature acts “so as to succeed for the most part” cases of what we would today consider
probabilistic causation? In order to understand the analogy, we must first understand
the three cases of natural causation that Aquinas describes, and then look at what
reasonable analogue from causes to reasoning acts can be drawn.
In On the Principles ofNature, Aquinas explains what he means by cause: “But
cause is said only of that prior thing from which the later being follows; hence a cause
is defined as that from whose being another follows .” 7 Causes don't merely precede
their effects, they generate them - something counts as a cause just in case it makes its
effect come to be. For this reason, the builder of a house is called its cause, and the
30
house the eftect - the builder is the cause because he or she brings it about that the
effect exists. With this very rough and simple sketch of causation, we can understand
the threefold division of natural causation from the passage above. Aquinas explains
that when nature acts from necessity, it acts in such a way that it cannot fail. In the
passage from the Posterior Analytics above, Aquinas does not provide an example of
this sort of causation, but examples can be found in his commentaries on the Physics
and the Metaphysics. In Physics II, for instance, he gives the example of the alternation
of day and night being necessarily caused by the motion of the sun . 8 When the sun is
up, it cannot tail to be the case that it is day (for presumably ‘day’ is simply ‘when the
sun is up ), and when the sun is down, it cannot fail to be the case that it is night. The
sun s being up causes it to be day, and causes it necessarily. The sort of necessity here
is absolute: “Absolute necessity arises from causes prior in the way of generation,
namely matter and the agent, just as the necessity ol death comes from matter s
disposition to join with contraries. This necessity is called absolute because it has no
impediment: and it is also called the necessity of matter.”9 When nature acts from
necessity, these are cases of causation in which, given the cause, the effect must follow,
because nothing can impede the cause from bringing about the effect.
The second type of causation is one in which “nature acts so as to succeed for
the most part, although now and then it fails in its act" and Aquinas further divides this
into those acts of nature that succeed “in the majority of cases” and those acts “when
nature fails in regard to what is appropriate to it.” To illustrate these two types of cases
Aquinas gives the example of a seed “succeeding” in producing a perfect animal versus
the case of a seed “failing” to do so, and instead producing something monstrous.
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These cases ot causation are to be marked off from necessary causation because the
cause does not always bring about the effect. So. for instance, though most men grow
beards, simply being a man will not necessarily result in growing a beard, and though
taking medicine often cures people of what ails them, taking medicine does not
necessarily produce health. Aquinas explains:
”• lt does not follow that because this has taken place, namely, that he has drunk
the medicine, that this will be, namely, that he will be cured. For it has already
been established that a cause which necessarily infers its effect is simultaneous
with its effect.
. . . Therefore, having posited what is prior, the subsequent does
not follow of necessity in those cases in which the effect of causes can be
impeded.
In cases of natural necessity, the cause cannot be impeded from bringing about the
effect, but, in contrast, there are cases in which causes, though they may sometimes
bring about effects, can be impeded from doing so. So, for instance, seeds have within
them the ability to generate animals, but in some cases this causal ability is impeded, so
that monstrous things are instead generated. In cases like the latter, in which the seed's
causal power fails to produce an animal, it is not the seed, but some other, impeding
cause that produces the monster. These impeding causes (whatever they may be)
Aquinas terms as 'fortune' or 'chance .' 1
1
Why chance occurs to produce an accident in
a particular case is perhaps the purview of empirical study, though Aquinas does
identify three general circumstances in which a cause may fail to produce its normal
effect:
First, because of the conjunction of two causes one of which does not come
under the causality of the other, as when robbers attack me without my intending
this; for this meeting is caused by a twofold motive power, namely, mine and
that of the robbers. Second, because of some defect in the agent, who is so weak
that he cannot attain the goal at which he aims, for example, when someone falls
on the road because of fatigue. Third, because of the indisposition of the matter,
which does not receive the form intended by the agent but another kind of form.
This is what occurs, for example, in the case of the deformed parts of animals.
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This second type of causation, in which effects can be impeded and are thus not
absolutely necessary, is causation in which the effect is merely contingent. What makes
a cause and effect relationship necessary or contingent is ultimately a matter of what
God wills - He chooses whether or not certain effects will follow from a given cause of
necessity or only contingently
.
13
In cases ot natural causation then, we have two main types: causes which
necessitate their effects because the cause cannot be prevented from bringing about its
effect, and causes which do not necessitate their effects because the cause can be
prevented. Of this latter type, things of a kind (e.g. seeds) are considered causes of
certain effects (e.g. grown animals) if, as a general rule, those things bring about the
specified effects. In a particular case, some particular seed may fail to produce an
animal, and instead a monster is generated - in cases such as these, there is no causal
connection between the seed and the monster — some other, chance cause is responsible
for producing the monster. In cases when the seed does succeed in producing an
animal, there is a sort of necessity, though it is not absolute. Aquinas calls this
conditional necessity: “Conditional necessity arises from causes posterior in generation,
namely form and end, as we say that conception is necessary if a man is to be generated.
This is conditional because for this woman to conceive is not absolutely necessary, but
under a condition: if a child is going to be bom. This is called the necessity of end .'’ 14
Seeds are conditionally necessary for animals - if there is to be an effect that is the
production of an animal, there must be a seed which causes it . 15
Reasoning is, like natural causation, a movement from one thing to another. So,
analogous to the three types of causal relation between cause and effect, Aquinas
33
identifies three types of epistemic relation between the first cognition and the second.
Acts of reason, Aquinas claims, can be divided into three kinds that are analogous to the
three kinds of natural causation: the first “induces necessity, where it is not possible to
fall short of the truth'’, in the second “something true in most cases is concluded but
without producing necessity”, and the third “fails to reach a truth because some
principle which should have been observed in reasoning was defective.” Perhaps an
initial and straightforward interpretation of Aquinas would be to correlate natural
necessity, natural contingency and causal failure (causation by chance) with analogues
in the movement ol reason. Under this interpretation, natural necessity corresponds to a
deterministic movement of the reason: necessarily, ifA (the first thought) occurs, B (the
second thought) occurs. But this interpretation cannot be right, for under this
interpretation there would be no actual instances of the kind of reasoning that is
analogous to natural necessity. For though it may happen often, and even every time,
that for any given reasoner, cognition of some particular first thought invariably yields
cognition of some particular second thought, it cannot be the case that this movement is
absolutely necessary - for it is always possible that, between the instances of the having
of the first and second thoughts, the thinker could die. So it seems that reasoning,
though a movement, should not be considered a straightaway analogue to other forms of
natural movement.
A preferable interpretation of Aquinas's analogy would be to hold that the three
cases of reasoning are analogous to the three cases of natural causation because of the
nature of the connection between the two thoughts. In the cases of natural causation,
the three kinds of causation can be distinguished by the nature of the connection
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between cause and effect. For natural necessity, the cause absolutely necessitates the
effect - they are essentially bound. For for-the-most-part successful causation, the
cause is only contingently linked to the effect, and for chance causation, the purported
cause (e.g. the seed) is not causally linked to the effect at all. So. perhaps the analogue
lor reasoning should not be necessarily, ifA (the first thought) occurs, B (the second
thought) occurs but rather a simple logical entailment: D(A -> B) (where A and B are
the propositions that are successively cognized). So just as there is an absolutely
necessary connection between cause and effect in natural necessity, so would there be
an absolutely necessary connection between the first and second thoughts in reasoning
(i.e., I(A -> B)). The second and third cases of reasoning would also correspond nicely
to causation: with for-the-most-part causation the cause is contingently connected to the
effect, and the analogue for a reasoning act would be that it is contingent that (A B);
and corresponding to causal failure, in which the event under consideration as cause and
the effect are not actually connected, so with reasoning failures: the first thought does
not imply the second. So the analogy, under my interpretation, works as follows:
Natural Causation Movements of Reason
A absolutely necessitates B A logically necessitates B
A contingently causes B A contingently implies B
A does not cause B A does not imply B
Though the modal connection between cognitions in the movement of reason
makes for a neat correspondence with types of natural causation, Aquinas also has a
particular interest in the start and end states of reasoning acts. If we look back at the
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original passage at the beginning of section 2.1, we see that Aquinas alludes to a second
component in acts of reason, namely, the epistemic states of reasoners. Aquinas clearly
seems to be referring to the epistemic states of reasoners when he talks about how the
first kind of act “induces’' necessity and the “certainty (certitudo
)
of scientia" is
“acquired"; of the second kind of act he also refers to “concluding" truths and of the
third kind of act he discusses “failing to observe" principles of reason. On the one
hand, reasoning acts resemble natural acts in that the modal connections of the
propositions that are reasoned about correspond to similar connections between events
in natural causation. On the other hand, reasoning acts also include some reference to
epistemic states ol reasoners. This should not be surprising, for in order to distinguish
the movements of reason from other natural movements we must appeal to what makes
reasoners different from other causal entities capable of having states - and this would
seem (at least in part) to be that our reasoning states are epistemic and not simply
causal. Part ot our task in understanding Aquinas’s account of reason is to examine just
how these two aspects of reasoning fit together. This we shall pursue both in the
remainder ol this section and throughout the remainder of the chapter.
These three types of reasoning acts produce several different sorts of epistemic
states. For simplicity, I shall refer to the three kinds of reasoning acts as follows: those
that correspond to natural necessity (i.e., there is a necessary connection between the
two thoughts), I shall refer to as acts ofnecessity. Those that correspond to for-the-
most-part causation (i.e., there is a contingent connection between the two thoughts), I
shall refer to as acts ofcontingency. Those that correspond to causal failure (i.e., there
is no logical connection between the two thoughts), I shall refer to as reasoningfailures.
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According to Aquinas, Aristotle divided up his logical treatises according to the
epistemic states that are related to these three types of reasoning acts.
An act of necessity is called “judicative
... because it leads to judgments
possessed ol the certitude (certitudine
)
of scientia.” 16 Aquinas observes that three sorts
of epistemic states are concerned with acts of necessity: scientia with conclusions, 17
understanding (intellects
)
with principles, and wisdom (sapienta) with highest
causes. 1 he Analytics are concerned with judicative reasoning—the Prior Analytics
concerns the form of such reasoning, the Posterior Analytics concerns the content. 19
Acts of contingency are called “investigative” (inventiva). From investigative
reasoning, one of several epistemic states may result, with diminished certitude in the
truth of the conclusion. Investigative reasoning that yields a fairly high degree of
certitude in the conclusion produces the epistemic state of opinion
,
an epistemic state in
which one believes the truth of the proposition but fears that it may be false—the Topics
is concerned with this sort of reasoning. If the reasoning process fails to produce even
belief in the conclusion, one has suspicion
,
which is merely an inclination to believe
that the proposition may be true (or false), but no belief as such. The Rhetoric is
concerned with this epistemic state. As opposed to suspicion
,
if by mere fancy or
personal taste (and without any certitude) one is inclined to accept the conclusion then
the Poetics is the applicable text.
Finally, reasoning failures are sophistry and is the subject of On Sophistical
Refutations.
In sum, Aquinas (following Aristotle) holds that reason is a power of the mind.
This power is characterized by its ability to effect the transition from the cognition of
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one proposition to the cognition of another. Some acts of reason can produce certitude
of the conclusion (sciential others produce belief with fear that what is believed is false
( opinion
)
or merely an inclination to believe {suspicion). Still other acts of reason are
mere sophistry in which premises fail to produce knowledge of or belief in the proper
conclusion. Though I have not yet considered Aquinas's account of faith (I do this in
chapter 3), it seems quite clear that some acts of reason are irrelevant to any problem of
faith and reason. One whose reason leads him to accept a proposition on the basis of
sophistry or poetry certainly will be in no epistemic bind should she also believe
contradictory propositions on the basis of faith. If Mary believes on faith that God is
triune, and is persuaded by a lovely piece of wordplay that God is not triune this may
lead to a conflict in Mary’s determination of what to accept about God but it does not
create the sort of epistemic worry for faith that a proof against a triune God would. Of
the remaining epistemic states, scientia
, opinion and suspicion, Aquinas devotes most of
his attention to scientia (he wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics, which is
concerned with this), but relatively little is said about opinion and suspicion (he
apparently did not comment on the Topics or the Rhetoric). In the next section and the
remainder of the chapter, I shall turn my attention to Aquinas’s account of the acts of
reason that produce scientia. In chapter 3.1, 1 will address the reasoning act that
produces opinion.
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2.2. The account of ideal scientia in the Posterior Analytics1"
Among the epistemic states identified as products of reasoning, scientia is of
particular interest if we are to examine Aquinas’s reconciliation of faith and reason.
With epistemic incompatibilism, it is the products of reasoning that are held to
contradict the matters of faith that are to be believed. Among Medieval philosophers.
scientia was held to be the product of proper philosophical reasoning. Thus, if
philosophy were to produce conclusions that contradicted matters of faith, those
conclusions would ideally be forms of sciential Thus scientia, as a perfection of
philosophical reasoning, must be examined in more detail if we are to understand how
faith might be reconciled with it.
As we saw at the end of the previous section, scientia, the cognition of a
conclusion of an act of necessity, is the epistemic state that results from a judicative
reasoning act. According to Aquinas, reasoning that produces scientia is covered in the
Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, and it is to this text that we turn to understand both
what scientia is and how one might come to have it. After the Posterior Analytics was
translated into Latin in 1 1 59, and the first full commentary of this text was made by
Robert Grosseteste sometime around 1225, the account of scientia presented in the
Posterior Analytics was the ground for nearly all Medieval accounts of knowledge of
necessary truths. However, Medieval writers varied somewhat in interpreting
Aristotle’s determination of exactly what constituted scientia, though many of these
authors presented their unique accounts as faithful to Aristotle’s. Throughout his
works, Aquinas appears to be concerned to present an Aristotelian notion of scientia.
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even though his account of scientia in works outside his commentary on the Posterior
Analytics differs in some important ways from the account covered in his
commentary. In this section, we shall examine the basic account of scientia that
Aquinas presents in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics.
In book I, lecture 4 of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Aquinas
defines his account of scientia :
... to know something scientifically (scire) is to cognize (cognoscere
)
it
completely, which means to apprehend (apprehendere) its truth perfectly. For
the principles of a thing’s being are the same as those of its truth, as is stated in
Metaphysics II. Therefore, the scientific knower (scientem). if he is to cognize
(cognoscens) perfectly, must cognize (cognoscat
)
the cause of the thing known
scientifically (scitaef hence he says, “when we think that we cognize
(cognosceret
)
the cause.’ But if he were to cognize (cognosceret) the cause by
itself, he would not yet cognize (cognosceret
)
the effect actually - which would
be to know (scire) it absolutely (simpliciter) - but only virtually, which is the
same as knowing in a qualified sense (scire secundum quid) and incidentally
(quasi). Consequently, one who knows scientifically (scientem) in the full sense
(simpliciter) must cognize (cognoscere) the application of the cause to the
effect; hence he adds, “as the cause of that fact.”24
To have scientia that P is to have a perfect cognition ot P (perfecte cognoscere ), which
amounts to having a perfect apprehension of the truth of P (perfecte apprehendere
veritatem). Following Aristotle in Metaphysics II, he goes on to say that a perfect
apprehension of the truth of P amounts to the same thing as knowing the ground or
cause of the truth of P. That is, a perfect apprehension of the truth of P, if actually
perfect, would include apprehension of why P is true, which requires both knowing the
cause of the truth of P and knowing that the cause of the truth of P actually did cause P
to obtain. ~ After providing this condition, Aquinas adds that scientia also involves
complete certitude.
Note that the notion of scientia here is stronger than one merely of complete
certitude. In segregating reasoning acts into three groups, Aquinas noted that in one
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type of reasoning act the premises email the conclusion, and further, of these types of
acts, namely the judicative, concerns complete certitude of the necessity of the
conclusion. This account of scientia. however, adds a second condition, one of perfect
apprehension of the truth of a proposition. Let us characterize the account of scientia
presented here as perfect scientia 26 We can define perfect scientia as follows:
S_has perfect scientia that P =df ( 1 ) S cognizes P; and
(2) S has complete certitude that P; and
(3) S has a perfect apprehension of the truth of P.
In order lor the first condition to be met, S must have had a thought that P, though
cognizing P does not in itself involve any attitude concerning the truth or falsity of P.
The second and third conditions will be considered in detail in the following
subsections.
2.2.1. The certitude criterion
In the initial account ofjudicative acts provided in section 2.1, these were so
called because they led to “judgments possessed of the certitude (certitudine
)
of
scientia." Investigative acts are differentiated from the judicative because “they are not
always accompanied by certitude. Hence in order to have certitude a judgment must be
tormed ...”“ He goes on to say that investigative acts achieve only “more or less
perfect certitude,” similar to how various for-the-most-part cases of natural causation
are closer to or farther from natural necessity. This notion of certitude seems closely
bound with the judicative act, appearing to be what distinguishes the judicative act from
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the investigative. At several points in the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas asserts that
scientia is certain (certa) cognition of something. 28 This certitude seems to be key to
categorizing an epistemic state as one which involves cognition of necessary truths.
Thus, we can reasonably infer that the certitude of a cognition somehow maps onto its
necessity.
A natural interpretation of certitudo would be to interpret it as synonymous with
necessity — thus, judicative acts by definition involve cognition of certain, that is,
necessary truths. Under this interpretation, judicative acts would be a species of acts of
necessity - for all acts of necessity, the first cognition entails the second (i.e., D(A -»
B)), and judicative acts are those acts ot necessity tor which the conclusion is also
necessary (i.e., 1 B). Investigative acts are distinguished from judicative acts both in
that they do not involve cognition of necessary (certain) conclusions and that the
premises do not entail the conclusions. However, this interpretation of certitudo is
problematic. In the previous paragraph, we saw that Aquinas allowed that investigative
acts result in “more or less” certitude, which is difficult to understand if certitude is
simply necessity. Also cited in the previous paragraph, Aquinas says that “in order to
have certitude a judgment must be formed” which also does not seem to fit with the
interpretation that certitude just is necessity. Finally, Aquinas seems to hold that the
necessity of a proposition is a necessary condition of its certitude, thus that certitude
could not simply be the same as necessity: “because scientia is also sure and certain
cognition of a thing, whereas a thing that could be otherwise cannot be cognized with
certitude, it is further required that what is scientifically known could not be
otherwise.”
29 From these passages, it seems clear that certitude is a property of a
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cognizing act. not the property of a cognized proposition: (a) certitude can be had in
degrees; (b) it requires the forming of a judgment; and (c) certitude requires that its
object cannot be otherwise.
Aquinas does not define certitude in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics
;
he does, however provide definitions in his Commentary on the Sentences ofPeter
Lombard
... it must be said that certitude is nothing else than the determination of the
intellect to one thing.”31
... it must be said that the firmness of the adherence of the cognitive power to
its knowable object is properly called certitude .”32
From these passages, and the passages from the Posterior Analytics, we can arrive at the
sense of certitudo used in connection with judicative reasoning. From the Sentences we
see that certitude is a determination to one thing, also a firmness of adherence to an
object. From the Posterior Analytics we know that certitude results from a judgment.
What we seem to have in the case of scientia are two propositional attitudes conjoined -
first, the cognition, or apprehension of the proposition; second, a judgment that results
in a determination concerning that proposition. What does “determination to one thing”
mean in this context? We need certitude to map closely to necessity, for judicative
reasoning (which results in necessary conclusions) yields scientia, which involves
complete certitude. I suggest that what Aquinas has in mind here is that certitude of
cognition amounts to a second, conjoined apprehension: that the proposition is
necessary. When cognizing a proposition, we can judge whether or not its contradictory
is possible. If we judge that we cannot conceive of any possibility but the truth of the
proposition (that is, if we cannot conceive that what we cognize could be otherwise),
then we have determined and firmly adhered to the one option left - that the proposition
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is necessarily true. 34 Thus scientia is the epistemic state that cognizes a necessarily true
conclusion and also includes a determination that the proposition is necessarily true. 35
At this point the reader may wonder how certitude, if it is a recognition that the
conclusion is necessary, could possibly apply to cognitions of contingent propositions,
and how to a “more or less" degree. Here I believe that Aquinas has in mind an
analogous sense of certitude - not complete certitude, but certitude-to-a-degree. He sets
up the analogy as follows: “But just as in the works of nature which succeed in the
majority of cases certain levels are achieved - because the stronger the power of nature
the more rarely does it fail to achieve its effect - so too in that process of reason which
is not accompanied by compete certitude certain levels are found accordingly as one
approaches more or less to complete certitude.”36 In nature, there is a sort of hierarchy
concerning natural necessity: some causes necessitate their effects, which means that
they bring about those effects 100% of the time. But of those causes that don't
necessitate their effects, some yield their effects more often than others (ranging,
suppose, from 1% of the time to 99%). Thus, those causes that bring about their effects
more often are most similar to necessitating causes. The epistemic analogue here is that
some reasoning (namely, acts of necessity) can yield complete certitude that the
conclusion is necessary, but of other sorts of reasoning (acts of contingency), some
yield conclusions that seem more likely to be true than others. Those that are most
likely to be true seem to have some kind of certitude greater than that of those
conclusions much less likely to be true. For more on this see, section 2.3.1
.
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2.2.2. The perfection criterion
There is a another cognition involved in perfect scientia, and that is a perfect
apprehension of the truth of the conclusion. As we saw earlier, Aquinas introduces this
cognition as a necessary condition ofperfect scientia as follows.
... to know something scientifically is to cognize it completely, which means toapprehend its truth perfectly. For the principles of a thing's being are the same
as those of its truth, as is stated in Metaphysics II. Therefore, the scientific
nower, if he is to cognize perfectly, must cognize the cause of the thing known
scientifically; hence he says, “when we think that we cognize the cause.” But if
e were to cognize the cause by itself, he would not yet cognize the effect
actually - which would be to know it absolutely - but only virtually, which is
the same as knowing in a qualified sense and incidentally. Consequently, onew o knows scientifically in the full sense must cognize the application of the
cause to the effect; hence he adds, “as the cause of that fact.”3^
From the observation that the principles of a thing's being are the same as those of its
truth, Aquinas notes that there are two necessary conditions for perfect apprehension of
the truth of a conclusion: first, we must apprehend the cause of it; and second, we must
not merely apprehend the cause ot the conclusion, but apprehend how the cause brings
about the conclusion.
Aquinas says that the principles of a thing s being are the same as those of its
truth. In order to understand this, we must take a quick look at the grounds for the
truth ot a thing (res). Though Aquinas talks in terms of the truth of things, which
makes it seem that objects can be true, this is just a loose and casual way of speaking
(see endnote 25). That truth does not attach (at least properly speaking) to objects is
clear from what he says in his commentary on the Metaphysics VI:
... when the intellect forms a concept of mortal rational animal, it has within
itself a likeness of man; but it does not for that reason cognize (cognoscit) that it
has this likeness, since it does not judge that “Man is a mortal rational animal.”
1 here is truth and falsity, then, only in this second operation of the intellect.
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it and
truth is not
and
according to which it not only possesses a likeness of the thing understoodintellectae
)
but also reflects on this likeness by cognizing (cognoscendo)
y making a judgment about it. Hence it is evident from this that the
lepall
‘"8S y ^ the mind ' ”d tHat “ depends UP°" “mbillon
Truth and falsity properly attach to our judgments and no, the things (objects) about
which we judge. Thus, the object man is neither true nor false, but the judgment
is a mortal rational animal” can be true or false. From this it is clear that for Aquinas
the things which are true or false are the judgments themselves, that is, that the
propositions about which we form judgments are themselves true or false. But this
introduces a new question - what does “the principles of a thing’s being (esse)” refer
man
to?
What Aquinas has in mind here is that the being of a thing, that is the object
itself, is the ground for the truth of any proposition about that thing. He says that “a
thing s being is the cause of any true judgment which the mind makes about a thing
...” Briefly, Aquinas’s theory of truth is this: a judgment of a proposition can be
counted as true only if the content of the proposition resembles the state of affairs that it
is purported to represent
.
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Aquinas says:
Now it must be noted that any kind of cognition (cognitio ) attains its completion
(perficatur ) as a result of the likeness of the thing cognized (cognitue) existing
in the cognizing subject (cognoscente). Therefore, just as the completion
(perfectio) of the thing cognized (cognitae) depends upon this thing having the
kind of form which makes it to be such and such a thing, in a similar fashion the
completion (perfectio
)
of the act of cognition (cognitionis) depends upon the
cognizing subject having the likeness of this form. ... truth and falsity designate
perfections of cognition (cognitionum). 4 '
What we conceive when we form and judge propositions are likenesses of objects - we
don't have a man in the mind when we judge that “man is a mortal rational animal” -
instead, we have a likeness of a man, and when we judge that man is a mortal rational
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animal, we judge that our likeness of man is such that it contains mortality, rationality
and animality. This proposition counts as true if the state of affairs represented by the
likenesses in the mind correspond to the state of affairs of actual men. So though truth
and falsity are properties of propositions, the ground of the truth or falsity of a
proposition are the objects (or perhaps the state of affairs) that the propositions
represent.
We're now prepared to understand what Aquinas meant when he said that “the
principles of a thing's being are the same as those of its truth.” The principles of a
thing’s being are those causes (principles) that bring about the state of affairs in which
the thing exists. These principles, since they cause the state of affairs, also serve as the
epistemic ground (or cause) of the truth of any proposition that represents that state of
affairs. We now turn to how this observation yields the two necessary conditions
specified by Aquinas for perfect apprehension of the truth of a conclusion: first, that we
must know the cause of it; and second, that we must not merely know the cause of the
conclusion, but how the cause brings it about that the conclusion obtains.
As observed above, the truth of a proposition depends on its resembling that
state of affairs to which it refers. The cause of that state of affairs is thus the cause of
that by which a proposition can be counted as true. In his commentary on Metaphysics
V
, Aquinas holds “perfect ' and “whole" (totum ) to be synonymous
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— perfect
apprehension of the truth of a proposition amounts to apprehending the whole truth,
which involves apprehending not only the state of affairs but its cause. Thus,
apprehending the cause of a thing is a necessary condition for having a perfect
apprehension of its truth. However, simply apprehending the cause of the conclusion is
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not sufficient for perfect apprehension of its truth. One also needs to apprehend that the
cause does indeed bring about the effect. For instance, we can't know why a car
crashed simply by knowing that the brake cable was cut - it is only when we know that
it was because the brake cable was cut and how this resulted in a crash that we start to
have a more perfect apprehension of the truth concerning the car crash. Thus, in order
to have a perfect apprehension of the truth of a conclusion, we must apprehend three
things: ( I ) the grounds tor the truth of the conclusion (i.e„ the state of affairs referred to
by the conclusion), (2) the cause of those grounds (i.e., the principles), and (3) that (and
more importantly, how) the principles caused the state of affairs referred to by the
conclusion.
2.2.3. Perfect scientia — summary
Aquinas defines perfect scientia as follows.
S_has perfect scientia that P =df ( 1 ) S cognizes P; and
(2) S has complete certitude that P; and
(3) S has a perfect apprehension of the truth of P.
In order for the first condition to be met, S must have a thought that P, though cognizing
P does not in itself involve any attitude concerning the truth or falsity of P. In order for
the second condition to be met, P must be necessary and S must have determined that P
is necessary. In order for the third condition to be met, S must know the grounds for the
truth of P, and that and how such grounds actually result in the truth of P. Aquinas does
note that there are various kinds of scientia, differing in both the degree of certitude and
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the presence or absence of perfect apprehension of the truth of P. but that the sciemia
that satisfies the conditions above is the "proper and perfect" form (proprius et
perfectly).43 In addition to this notion of sciemia, Aquinas also considers less perfect or
complete notions ofsciemia, as well as a very different, but related notion of sciemia -
that ot a field of study. I turn now to these accounts.
2.3. Other varieties of scientia in the Posterior Analytics
There are two main criteria for what I have dubbed perfect scientia given in the
Posterior Analytics, and the easiest way to create weaker versions of scientia would be
to var\ the extent to which each criterion obtained. Aquinas considers both sorts of
variations on perfect scientia.
2.3.1. Scientia obtained by weakening the certitude criterion
As originally considered, scientia resulted from the cognition of a necessary
conclusion. When the definition ofperfect scientia was presented, this cognition of
necessity was cashed out as certitude of absolute necessity; however, we can easily
speak ot certitude of the truth of a proposition without having to appeal to its being
absolutely necessary. In lectures 37-41 of book I of his commentary on the Posterior
Analytics
,
Aquinas concerns himself with comparisons between different sorts of
demonstrations and different sorts of scientia. In lecture 41, he observes that one way
in which some sciences can be considered to have more certitude than others is by
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examining how closely tied to sensible matter the subject matter of the science is. The
propositions of some sciences depend on mutable, contingent matter, and thus would
come with less certitude (less assuredness of necessity) than the propositions of. for
instance, a purely mathematical (and a priori) science. Arithmetic, Aquinas points out.
has more certitude than music, for “lack of certitude arises from matter’s changes.
Hence the closer one gets to matter, the less certain the science.”44 Aquinas clearly is
prepared to grant that there are sciences that deal with matter, and that the propositions
ot that science cannot be known with complete certitude; thus we can infer that there
must be a form of scientici that involves a certitude less than complete.
In book I, lecture 42 of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, we see that
Aquinas has a notion of certitude different from complete certitude in mind: “It should
be noted, however, that there happens to be demonstration of things which occur, as it
were, lor the most part, insofar as there is in them something of necessity. But the
necessary, as it is stated in Physics II, is not the same in natural things (which are true
lor the most part and fail to be true in a few cases) as in the disciplines, i.e. in
mathematical things, which are always true.”45 The certitude that he has in mind here
derives from some sort of natural regularity which occurs for the most part. He gives
the example of an olive being generated from an olive seed: "... if a demonstration is
lormed from that which is prior in generation, it does not conclude with necessity,
unless perhaps we take as necessary the fact that an olive seed is frequently generated of
an olive, because it does this according to a property of its nature, unless it is
impeded.”46 Aquinas seems to be referring to the powers of natural causes - though
effects ol these causes cannot be deduced with absolute certainty (the causes don't
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necessitate their typical effects). He holds that the efficacy of these sorts of causes is
sufficiently regular to grant that a weak variety of scientia results. In book II. lecture 1
2
ot his commentary on the Posterior Analytics
,
he says, "Yet such demonstrations do not
enable one to know that what is concluded is true absolutely but only in a qualified
sense, namely, that it is true in the majority of cases. Hence sciences of this kind fall
short of sctences which deal with things absolutely necessary, so far as the certitude of
demonstration is concerned.”47 48
2.3.2. Scientia obtained by weakening the perfection criterion
A second variety of scientia can be had by weakening the perfection criterion.
A subject that has perfect apprehension of the truth of P knows the cause of P. In book
I, lecture 23 of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas tells us that this
knowledge of the cause of P gives us knowledge of why {propter quid) P is true. We
might have a weaker sort of knowledge than this: we could know that {quia) P is true,
but not know why P is true. In this case, one could have cognition with complete
certitude that P, and thus a sort of scientia
, scientia quia
,
but not perfect scientia or
scientia propter quid. In lecture 23, Aquinas provides an example of the difference
between the two kinds of scientia. With scientia quia
,
we know that the conclusion is
true but not why—this often occurs when we know that some effect obtains but don't
know its cause. He provides as example the following demonstration quia\
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(a) Whatever does not twinkle is near.
(b) The planets do not twinkle.
(c) The planets are near.
Setting aside how we know the premises (a) and (h), we may come to know that the
conclusion (c), which follows from (a) and (b), is true, but we don't have sciemia
propter quid ot the conclusion. That the planets are near follows from the premises, but
the truth of the premises don’t explain why the planets are near. In fact, it is the
nearness oi the planets that explains why they do not twinkle, as in the following
demonstration propter quid given by Aquinas:
(d) Every planet is near
(e) Any planet which is near does not twinkle
(f) No planet twinkles
We could have scientia propter quid about the conclusion (f) because the non-twinkling
ot the planets is explained by their nearness. The premises (d) and (e) explain why (0 is
true, whereas (a) and (b) do not explain why (c) is true, thus we may have scientia
propter quid about (f), but only scientia quia about (c). 4g
2.3.3. A different notion of scientia
We've seen that Aquinas employs variations in the notion of scientia both in the
degree of certitude about a proposition and in the degree of perfection of the
apprehension ot it. In addition to these senses of scientia, Aquinas introduces a
completely different, though dependent, sense of scientia, one I shall translate as
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‘science.’ Roughly speaking, sciences in the commentary on the Posterior Analytics are
similar to our modem sciences in that they are fields of knowledge or inquiry unified by
subject matter. The account of science follows from the definition of reason set out
earlier in this chapter:
. . .a science is said to be one from the fact that it is concerned with one generic
subject. The reason for this is that the process of science of any given thing is.
as it were, a movement of reason. Now the unity of any motion is judged
principally from its terminus, as is clear in Physics V. Consequently, the unity
o any science must be judged from its end or terminus. But the end or terminus
ot a science is the genus concerning which the science treats: because in
speculative sciences nothing else is sought except a knowledge of some generic
subject; in practical sciences what is intended as the end is the construction of its
subject.
Reason is a movement from one thought to another, and scientia is a species of reason.
Various movements that lead to scientia can be unified by identifying the end for which
those acts are performed. Certain kinds of reasoning to scientia
,
namely the
speculative, are defined as having no other end than attaining knowledge of some
“generic subject” - that is, a subject matter falling under some particular genus. Thus,
acts of speculative reasoning that share the same subject will fall under the same
science. If, suppose, we come to have scientia whose subject is magnitude (for
instance, scientia that the interior angles ofa triangle equal two right angles ) we have
thus come to knowledge of geometry, whose specific genus is magnitude/ 1
Scientia-producing reasoning acts are united into a science by having the same
genus as subject matter. What still needs to be determined is how the genus of one
science will be differentiated from the genus of another. To this Aquinas says, "...
since something scientifically knowable is the proper object of a science, the sciences
will not be diversified according to a material diversity of their scientifically knowable
objects, but according to their formal diversity .” 52 By a “material diversity” Aquinas
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means something akin to what we might describe as the objects themselves. One way
to divide up the sciences into subjects according to material diversity would be
according to natural kinds of objects: thus we might have a science of man. another of
birds (or perhaps of falcons, eagles, etc.), fish, rocks, trees, etc. Or perhaps a division of
subjects according to material diversity might be according to functional parts: we
might split the sciences into the science of legs, arms, stomachs, etc. Dividing sciences
according to material diversity looks unpromising for its arbitrariness. Aquinas, in
addition, has a principled reason to prefer formal diversity as grounds for division:
sciences are constituted by things in virtue of the fact that we have sciemia about them.
At root, therefore, sciences are epistemological constructions, not metaphysical ones,
and how sciences should be divided is not by the material objects with which they are
concerned but by the ways in which the scientia of its subject matter is obtained. That
is, we gain scientia of a proposition by means of a form of reasoning (demonstration)
that starts from principles that are better known, prior to and cause the conclusions of
which we have scientia (see section 2.4.1 below). Differences in principles are at root
what distinguish differences in our scientia
, and thus sciences should be distinguished
on this basis. Here is Aquinas’s argument:
Now just as the formality of visible is taken from light, through which color is
seen, so the formal aspect of a scientifically knowable object is taken according
to the principles from which something is scientifically known. Therefore, no
matter how diverse certain scientifically knowable objects may be in their
nature, so long as they are known through the same principles, they pertain to
one science, because they will not differ precisely as scientifically knowable.
For they are scientifically knowable in virtue of their own principles. 53
Support for this position is given by several examples:
This is made clear by an example, namely, that human voices differ a great deal
according to their nature from the sounds of inanimate bodies; but because the
consonance of human voices and the sounds of inanimate bodies is considered
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accord.ng to the same principles, the science of music, which considers both is
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.
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The distinction between sciences clearly depends on the distinction between their first
principles, a distinction that results in different ways in which the propositions are
known. Different first principles bring about different sorts of scientia, and the unity of
any given science results from the subject matter of that science belonging to a
particular genus .
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2.4. The epistemology of reason and scientia
I ve tried to develop thus far an exegesis of Aquinas’s account of reason and his
account of its principal product, scientia. What remains to be discussed is an
examination of some of the consequences for epistemology that results from this
account. The account of reasoning supplied by Aquinas does not, at root, have much in
the way of epistemological consequences. Since reason, simply understood, is a
movement from one cognition to another, a movement which can produce a variety of
epistemic states in the thinker {scientia, opinion, suspicion, etc.), reason itself is not a
particularly interesting epistemic category. This should not be surprising, since reason,
according to Aquinas, is simply a natural power of the mind, and reasoning simpliciter
is simply an exercise of that power. Reasoning acts can be divided into various
epistemic categories, however, and from these a more interesting epistemology can be
constructed. Aquinas divides reasoning acts into three broad categories: those in which
premises and conclusions are necessarily connected, those in which premises and
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conclusions are contingently connected, and those in which premises are not connected
to conclusions. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned primarily with the first
kind of reasoning act. acts of necessity, the second kind of reasoning act will he
considered when we consider faith in chapter 3, and we will consider some cases of the
third kind (demonstrative errors that produce falsehoods) in section 2.4.2. The
paradigm case of acts of necessity is the reasoning act that results in scientia, so we will
first turn to the epistemology ofperfect scientia.
If you reason to perfect scientia
,
you not only have cognition of a necessary
truth, but also cognition that the proposition is necessary and why it is true. As a basis
for anti-skeptical epistemology, perfect scientia appears to be a good starting point,
since someone who has it should be immune from skeptical worries. If we can have
perfect scientia about divine matters, and the propositions about which we have such
scientia contradict matters ol faith, then it would appear that no epistemic reconciliation
between faith and reason would be possible. However, there are two immediate
epistemological worries about perfect scientia that must first be addressed: “How do we
get perfect scientiaT and “How do we know we have perfect scientia?” Without
knowing the circumstances under which we obtain perfect scientia or when we have it,
we would be unable to test whether or not faith and reason were epistemically
compatible. 56 We shall consider each of these questions in turn.
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2.4.1. Demonstration: Reasoning that produces scientia
After providing a definition ofperfect scientia in lecture four of the Posterior
Analytics, Aquinas then provides a definition of demonstration. Demonstration is
defined as a syllogism that produces perfect scientia. Thus ‘demonstration' is the name
of that reasoning act that starts with some proposition(s) and ends with perfect scientia
of another. In the remainder of lecture four, Aquinas discusses exactly what qualities a
syllogism must satisfy in order count as demonstration. The proposed definition is as
follows:
—
-
is a demonstration =df ( 1 ) X is a syllogism that proceeds from principles that are:
(a) true, (b) first, and (c) immediate, and
(d) better known than, (e) prior to, and (f) causes of:
(2) a conclusion that is known with perfect scientia.
I will leave the in-depth analysis of Aquinas's definition of demonstration to those who
have already provided one, and instead I will give only some brief comments on this
definition that suit my immediate purposes.
This definition of demonstration is provided in order to satisfy the jointly
necessary and sufficient conditions that establish perfect scientia. In the course of his
defense of the definition, Aquinas does not start with some common conception of
demonstration that happens to be something which produces perfect scientia\ rather, the
definition is provided and defended precisely because it produces perfect scientia. In
other words, in developing this notion of demonstration, Aquinas is seeking out a
reasoning act which results in perfect scientia.™ In order for a reasoning act to result in
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PerfeC‘ SCien“a
’
U must produce a “Biition of the proposition, a cognition of its
certitude, and a perfect apprehension of the truth of the proposition. Perfect
apprehension of the truth of a proposition, as we saw before, entails that we know the
causes or grounds for the truth of that proposition. The conditions specified in this
definition of demonstration are necessary for perfect apprehension of the truth ofa
conclusion tor the following reasons.
(a) I he premises must be true. Though true conclusions may follow from false
premises in ordinary syllogisms, the premises in a demonstration must be true. For if
the premises were not true, then we would have no basis for cognizing the truth of the
conclusion (that is, we would have no basis for knowing that the conclusion is true).
Aquinas says, “Now what is not true does not exist, for to be and to be true are
convertible. 1 herefore, anything scientifically knowable (scitur) must be true.
Consequently, the conclusion of a demonstration which does beget scientific knowing
(A/c/7 scire) must be true, and afortiori its premises.”59 If some proposition is not true,
then its ground does not exist (that is, it has no ground for its truth). Thus, if one of the
premises in a syllogism is false, it could not serve as an epistemic ground for the truth
of the conclusion. And if one does not apprehend the grounds of the truth of the
conclusion (that is, have perfect apprehension of its truth), then one cannot have perfect
scientia of the conclusion.
(b) & (c) The premises must befirst and immediate. Though one might be able
to have cognition of a true conclusion if one came to the truth of it by accident, one
would not have perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion. And if premises in
a syllogism are not immediate, then they do not serve as grounds for the truth of the
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conclusion. What Aquinas has in mind here is that immediate premises are known in
themselves, but mediate premises are known in virtue of some intermediary. Self-
evident propositions, for instance, can be known immediately, but theorems are known
as a result ot proof, and thus are known only mediately. Mediate premises cannot serve
as epistemic grounds for conclusions of which we have perfect apprehension of its truth,
since the grounds for the truth of these mediate premises rest in some other premises
from which they were derived. Aquinas says, “Suppose, therefore, that a demonstrator
syllogizes from demonstrable, i.e. mediate, premises. Now he either possesses a
demonstration of those premises or he does not. If he does not, then he does not know
the premises in a scientific way; nor consequently, the conclusion because of the
premises. But if he does possess their demonstration, then, since one may not proceed
to infinity in demonstrations, principles immediate and indemonstrable must be
reached. Either the truth of a conclusion of a demonstration is grounded in
immediate premises, which need no proof, or are mediate, which must first be proven in
order for there to be perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion. Thus, a
demonstration that produces perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion must
either come from immediate premises or from mediate premises that are first resolved
into immediate ones. “First' is taken as synonymous to “immediate', though their
senses differ slightly — “first identifies premises as having no prior, “immediate’ simply
to the fact that they are not mediately known (which would also entail that they are
“first' principles for us ).
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That premises must be first also seems to be necessary for satisfying the
certitude condition ofperfect scientia. Aquinas holds that the certitude in scientia
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comes from the premises: “However, the case is otherwise in regard to first things,
which do not have a cause. For these are understood in virtue of themselves; and such
cognition (cognitio) of these things is more certain than any scientia, because it is from
such understanding (intelligent^
)
that scientia acquires its certitude .”62
(d) & (e) & (f) The premises must be better known, prior to
, and causes ofthe
conclusion. With perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion, the grounds for
the truth of the conclusion are apprehended. In order for us to be able to apprehend
these grounds, the premises must be the cause of the truth of the conclusion - if we
didn’t know the cause of the truth of a proposition, we couldn't perfectly know the
grounds for its truth. Similarly, the premises must be better known and prior to the
conclusion: if they weren’t they could not serve as grounds for the conclusion.
This definition of demonstration may adequately cover all the jointly necessary
and sufficient conditions needed to bring about perfect scientia
;
what they leave
unclear, however, is whether we demonstrate often, if at all. The certitude of the
necessity of perfect scientia would seem to rule out any contingent premises, which
would rule out most propositions about the natural world. Further, it’s not clear how
often we know the causes of the truth of a proposition. Aside from analytic or a priori
connections between propositions, we may never actually have perfect apprehension of
the truth of any proposition. Thus demonstration, as defined above, though perhaps
applicable to logic and geometry, may be too stringent to serve as an example of
reasoning to be contrasted with faith .
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For, if the standard of reason were held to be
demonstration, instances of faith would be just one among many epistemic occasions
that fail to meet that standard. Rather than typical exemplar, demonstration seems more
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like an idealization of reason. Other, weaker notions of scientia and demonstration are
considered in the Posterior Analytics, however. Though I shall not consider them here
(they will be considered in chapter 4), the weaker notions of scientia considered earlier
in this chapter have correspondingly weaker varieties of demonstration.
The answer to the epistemic worry, “How do we get perfect sciential” seems to
be “by demonstration." But this answer seems quite unsatisfactory. Since
demonstration is defined as that act of discursive reason that produces perfect scientia
.
its introduction seems a rather empty response to the worry about how we get it - we
get it by the act that satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for producing it.
On the other hand, this response is perfectly straightforward - we do, in fact, syllogize
to conclusions. Some of these syllogisms are of such a nature that when we perform
them, the result is perfect scientia of the conclusion. I will set aside, for the time being,
worries that demonstration inadequately answers how we get perfect scientia
, and turn
now to the more pressing epistemological concern of how do we know that we have it.
2.4.2. How do we know that we have perfect sciential
Though demonstration guarantees scientia, Aquinas admits that we can be
wrong in thinking that we have demonstrated a conclusion. In the case of the eternity of
the world, for instance (which we will cover in more detail in chapter 4), Aquinas
considers whether it is an article ot faith or a demonstrable conclusion that the world
began64 — and given that he does not think it is demonstrable, it follows that others have
mistakenly thought so (and mistakenly thought their arguments to be demonstrations). 6 ^
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In the commentary on the Posterior Analytics
, lectures 27-30. Aquinas is explicitly
concerned with demonstrative error. In these chapters, he covers in some detail a large
number ot fallacies that yield false premises, false conclusions, or syllogistic failures
(failures that result in an argument form that is not a syllogism). It's clear from these
chapters that we can (and probably do) often fail to demonstrate some conclusions,
despite the fact that we believe that we have done so. In these cases, we do not have
perfect scientia ol the conclusion, because we have not provided a demonstration. As it
is with any fallacy, we can avoid demonstrative error by carefully checking our
reasoning.
Perfect scientia involves three cognitions - cognition of the conclusion, perfect
apprehension ot its truth and certitude. We can mistake some syllogisms (or non-
syllogistic argument forms) for demonstrations, but it would seem that we cannot be
mistaken about having perfect scientia - for either we have the cognitions that
constitute it or we do not. Perhaps a more efficient way of checking to see if one falsely
claimed to ha\q perfect scientia would be to check to see whether one had all the proper
cognitions, rather than to try and determine how one got to one s current epistemic state
(i.e., whether one properly demonstrated or not). But what about these other
cognitions? Is it possible to be mistaken about having a perfect apprehension of the
truth of some proposition, or about having a certitude in its necessity? It would seem
that Aquinas does hold that there can be some error here, for after he defines perfect
scientia (as involving certitude and perfect apprehension of the truth), he says: “... both
those who know scientifically and those who do not know in that way but believe that
they do, take scientific knowing to be as above described. For those who do not know
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in a scientific manner but believe that they do, are convinced in the manner described,
whereas those who know in a scientific manner do know in the manner described.”66 If
we can be mistaken about having perfect scientia
, then we should examine exactly how
such mistakes can arise. We shall consider the possible sources of error first in
certitude, then in perfect apprehension of the truth.
2.4.2. 1. Failure of certitude
As mentioned above (in section 2.2.1), certitude is the result of a judgment, one
which determines the intellect to one thing. If we are mistaken about having certitude
with respect to some proposition, the source of the error resides in some erroneous
judgment, namely, that the intellect is determined to only one thing, when it should not
be. In the Disputed Questions on Truth
,
Aquinas gives a rough account of how the
intellect comes to be determined to one thing:
Sometimes, again, the possible intellect is so determined that it adheres to one
member without reservation. This happens sometimes because of the
intelligible object and sometimes because of the will. Furthermore, the
intelligible object sometimes acts mediately, sometimes immediately. It acts
immediately when the truth of the propositions is unmistakably clear
immediately to the intellect from the intelligible objects themselves. This is the
state of one who understands principles, which are cognized (cognoscuntur
)
as
soon as the terms are known (notis), as the Philosopher says. Here, the very
nature of the thing itself immediately determines the intellect to propositions of
this sort. The intelligible object acts mediately, however, when the
understanding, once it cognizes (cognitis) the definitions of the terms, is
determined to one member of the contradictory proposition in virtue of first
principles. This is the state of one who has scientia.
Sometimes, however, the understanding can be determined to one side of
a contradictory proposition neither immediately through the definitions of the
terms, as is the case with principles, nor yet in virtue of principles, as is the case
with conclusions from a demonstration. And in this situation our understanding
is determined by the will, which chooses to assent to one side definitely and
63
may happen when someone believes what another
or useful to do so . 67
1 move the will, though not
it seems good or fitting to
) believes (credentis ). This
says because it seems fitting
According to Aquinas, the intellect is determined to one thing either by the object (what
is being cognized) or by the will, and either of these can determine the intellect to one
thing when it “moves" it (movendum ). Again, we see the metaphor of motion bringing
premises to conclusion. In the case of certitude, however, our intellect is moved to
considering only one possible truth value for some cognized proposition. When the
intelligible object itself moves the intellect, the process is automatic - in virtue of our
understanding the object we cannot help but consider it to be true (or false). Take, for
instance, the principle ot non-contradiction. When we understand the meaning of the
terms that constitute the principle, we cannot help but hold that it is true
.
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The
principle of non-contradiction itself is such that we must believe that it is true - it
moves or determines our intellect to its truth - and this Aquinas has defined as certitude.
In cases of scientia
,
the certitude comes not from the object directly, but mediately -
when we understand the premises, it is in virtue of these that we are determined to the
truth (or falsity) of the conclusion. Our cognitive ability to perform deductive
inferences moves us to see that the conclusion must be true (or false), given the truth of
the premises .
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If the intelligible object itself moves the intellect to certitude, then we
cannot be mistaken about having certitude, unless we can be mistaken about the truth of
self-evident propositions or unless our deductive faculties fail. Aquinas holds that we
cannot be mistaken in cases of self-evident propositions, and as far as I have been able
about cognition. With reason, we "move" from one cognition to another, that is, from
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to determine, he never considers the possibility that our deductive faculties might not be
reliable.
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There are two ways in which we can come to have certitude - either when the
intelligible object determines the intellect to one thing, or when the will does. Though I
have claimed that no error is introduced in the first manner, the second certainly leaves
room tor deception. It the will can cause a cognition of certitude, how can we be sure
that our certitude in some proposition is not the result of some unjustified act of will? I
will leave this skeptical worry unanswered for the time being, but shall return to it in
chapter 3, when I consider Aquinas’s account of faith and the role played by the will.
2.4.2.2. Failure of perfect apprehension of the truth
Given the account of perfect apprehension of the truth of a proposition, we can
tail to have it in three different ways: (1) we could judge falsely about a state of affairs
(we judge that some proposition is true even though it does not resemble the state of
affairs to which it refers), (2) we could fail to apprehend the principles that actually
caused the conclusion, or (3) we could fail to apprehend how the principles bring about
the conclusion (by, for instance, drawing a false causal inference). It seems that we
would rarely succeed in having a perfect apprehension of the truth concerning the
effects of natural causation, for we will frequently fail to understand precisely how
causes brought about their effects. Our ability to understand nature, and consequently
to perform adequate causal reasoning about natural processes is something Aquinas is
quite skeptical about: “... our cognition (cognitio) is weak to such a point that no
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philosopher would be able to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly. Thus one
reads that one philosopher spent thirty years in solitude that he might know
< cognosceret) the nature of a bee ." 71 Depending on the subject matter, then, failure to
have a perfect apprehension of the truth of some proposition can be quite common, for
it would be easy for someone to judge mistakenly something to be a cause of the truth
ol some proposition or to misapprehend how the cause brings it about that the
conclusion is true.
2.5. Conclusions
Aquinas holds that reasoning is a movement in the intellect from one cognition
to another. This movement can be characterized in two different ways. First, reasoning
acts can be divided by the logical relations between the two cognitions: the two
cognitions can be necessarily connected (the first entails the second), and these are acts
ofnecessity, the two cognitions can be only contingently connected (the first merely
contingently implies the second), and these are acts ofcontingency, or the two
cognitions may turn out not to be logically connected at all (the first neither entails nor
implies the second). Second, reasoning acts can be divided by the epistemic states that
initiate or result from reasoning. Of particular interest are the epistemic states
understanding (intellectus), which is concerned with grasping the initial cognitions (i.e.,
the first principles) of acts of necessity; scientia
,
which is concerned with grasping the
final cognition (i.e., the conclusion) of acts of necessity; and opinion, which is
concerned with grasping the conclusion of acts of contingency. This chapter is
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concerned primarily with scientia, in the next I discuss understanding and opinion in
more detail.
Perfect scientia is an ideal form of scientia, involving not only certitude in the
necessity of the conclusion, but a perfect apprehension of its truth. Since perfect
scientia provides an apprehension that the conclusion is necessary, one can only come
to such a cognition as a result of an act of necessity. With perfect scientia, one discerns
both the necessity ol the conclusion and the necessary connection between premises and
conclusion (which is a necessary condition of perfect apprehension of the truth of the
conclusion). Demonstration is the name of that kind of reasoning act which produces
perfect scientia and provides a thorough knowledge both of the conclusion and of the
reasons for its truth.
Though demonstration guarantees perfect scientia
,
we often fail to demonstrate,
and can even be tooled into thinking that we have demonstrated some conclusion when
we have not done so (and also been tooled into thinking that we have perfect scientia,
when we do not have it). There is a danger of demonstrative failure in three ways.
First, we can fail to demonstrate when we commit demonstrative fallacies, either by
employing false premises, false conclusions or invalid arguments. These sorts of errors
we generally know how to look tor, and thus, do not threaten the in-principle reliability
ot our ability to obtain (and know that we have) perfect scientia. Second, we can fail to
have certitude about the conclusion, and thus fail to have perfect scientia about it.
Certitude, which results when an intelligible object moves the intellect to accept the
truth ot the conclusion, is reliable, according to Aquinas. However, in cases when we
assent to a conclusion as the result of an act of will rather than demonstration, there is a
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risk of error. Assent by willing introduces the possibility that certitude in the
conclusion is misplaced, and that we can mistakenly hold ourselves to have certitude
and perfect scientia of the conclusion. This epistemic worry is considered in chapters 3
and 4. Third, though demonstration guarantees perfect apprehension of the truth of the
conclusion, we can fail to demonstrate by not satisfying the necessary conditions for
perfect apprehension of its truth. We would fail to have perfect apprehension of the
truth of a conclusion were we to employ false premises (in which case we fail to
apprehend the principles that cause the conclusion), or to draw a false conclusion
(where we judge falsely about the state of affairs that results from some cause), but we
can also fail to judge properly how or that the principles cause the conclusion. Though
not a logical fallacy, such a failure in causal explanations would prevent a perfect
apprehension of the truth of the conclusion, and thus prevent one from having perfect
scientia.
The epistemological promise ot perfect scientia is great - it provides not only
knowledge of the conclusion, but knowledge that it is necessary, and why it is true -
when we have it, it is infallible. However, the conditions for obtaining perfect scientia
are severe and extremely difficult to obtain, and we can be mistaken in attributing it to
ourselves. These concerns will be taken up again in chapter 4, when we consider the
limitations of reason in matters of faith.
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ENDNOTES
translator s note: many translations of Aquinas into English translate termshat blur together epistemie categories that I wish to maintain as distinct. For instancen the translation ot Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Larcher
translates notus and related terms (notitia. nosco) as 'known' or 'knowledge', but alsooften translates cogmtio and related terms (cognosce) in the same way. (See, forinstance, Larcher s translation in the PA prologue). Similarly, McGlynn often translatesthese terms synonymously in his translation of the Disputed Questions on Truth (seefor mstance his translation ofQDV 1 5. 1 ). Ross (1985) explicitly interprets Aquinas' as
speaking ol knowledge when he uses the term cognilio. In contrast, I will generally
translate cogmtio as 'cognition', 'apprehension' or 'thought’, and it and related terms
are to be translated as neutral with respect to whether or not they are true, except when
the context makes it absolutely clear that these terms should be translated as
nowledge
. Notitia
,
on the other hand, I will generally translate as ‘knowledge ’ for
Aquinas does seem to consider it to include truth. Scientia I will leave untranslated for
as we shall see in section 2.2, it is a rather special epistemie category and has no
synonymous English term. Rather than provide a justification for these translation
choices here, I refer the reader to Jenkins (1997), p. 16-17, and MacDonald (1993), p.
160-163. When providing an English translation of Aquinas, I will generally supply the
translation direct from the sources that I use (see ‘Abbreviations’ for the translations
used); however, when Aquinas uses an epistemically significant term, I will supply both
my translation and the Latin used by Aquinas.
2
ratio \ero discursum quemdam designat, quo ex uno in aliud cognoscendum
anima humana pertingit vel pervenit.” (QDV 15.1)
hie autem addit rationem, quae pertinet ad deductionem principiorum in
conclusiones.” (PA 1.44.nl 1)
4
See for example, ST 1.79.8.
5
“scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in
cognitionem ignoti. (PA prologue.n4) See also QDV 15.1. Aquinas describes two
other types of rational acts, which he describes as part of the intellect rather than of
reason proper. These acts, one of understanding simples, the other of combining and
dividing, describe more the coming to cognize a proposition rather than a transition
from one proposition to another, and thus are not instances of reasoning in the sense
used here.
6
“attendendum est autem quod actus rationis similes sunt, quantum ad aliquid,
actibus naturae, unde et ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest, in actibus autem
naturae invenitur triplex diversitas. in quibusdam enim natura ex necessitate agit, ita
quod non potest deficere. in quibusdam vero natura ut frequentius operatur. licet
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q deque possit deficere a propno actu. unde in his necesse est esse duplicem actum-unum. qui sit ut in plunhus, sicut cum ex semine generatur animal perfectum- alium
veto quando natura deficit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, sicut cum ex semine
generatur altquod monstrum propter corruptionem alicuius principii.
et haec etiam tria inveniuntur in actibus rationis. est enim aliquis rationis
processus necessitates, mducens, in quo non est possibile esse veritatis defectum- et perhutusmodt rationis processum scientiae certitudo acquiritur. est autem alius rationis
processus, in quo ut in plunbus verum concluditur. non tamen necessitatem habens
tertius vero rationis processus est. in quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius principiideiectum; quod in ratiocinando erat observandum.” (PA prologue.n5)
sed causa solum dicitur de illo primo ex quo consequitur esse posterioris:
unde dicitur quod causa est ex cuius esse sequitur aliud.” (DPN 3)
8
In lect. 15.
necessitas quidem absoluta est quae procedit a causis prioribus in viam
generationis, quae sunt materia et efficiens: sicut necessitas mortis quae provenit ex
materia et ex dispositione contrariorum componentium; et haec dicitur absoluta quia
non habet impedimentum. haec etiam dicitur necessitas materiae.” (DPN 4)
non enim sequitur quod quia hoc factum est, scilicet quod iste medicinam
bibit, hoc erit, scilicet sanabitur. iam enim supra dictum est quod causa quae ex
necessitate infert eftectum, est simul cum effectu. ... unde posito priori non sequitur ex
necessitate posterius in illis in quibus effectus causarum impediri possunt ” (PA
II. 1 0,n9)
11
See P 11.8-10.
1
2
quarum una sub altera non continetur, sicut cum praeter intentionem
occurrunt mihi latrones. (Hie enim concursus causatur ex duplici virtute motiva, scilicet
mea et latronum). Turn etiam propter defectum agentis, cui accidit debilitas, ut non
possit pervenire ad finem intentum; sicut cum aliquis cadit in via propter lassitudinem.
Turn etiam propter indispositionem materiae, quae non recipit formam intentam ab
agente, sed alterius modi sicut accidit in monstruosis partibus animalium.” (M
VI.3.nl210)
13
See M VI.3.nl220. This position, that God chooses whether or not some
effects follow necessarily or contingently is used by Aquinas to help him out of the
problem of divine foreknowledge necessitating all future states of affairs.
14
“necessitas autem conditionalis procedit a causis posterioribus in generatione,
scilicet a forma et fine: sicut dicimus quod necessarium est esse conceptionem. si debeat
generari homo; et ista est conditionalis, quia hanc mulierem concipere non est
necessarium simpliciter, sed sub conditione, si debeat generari homo, et haec dicitur
necessitas finis.” (DPN 4)
70
0f cours
f’
lf animals can be effected from a cause other than a seed (forinstance from cloning), then seeds will not be conditionally necessary for animals Thisparticular seed that actually produced this particular animal (‘Bessie’), will still be
conditionally necessary for Bessie’s coming to be however
16
prologue n6r
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sed tria eorum, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellects, important
rectitudinem cognitionis circa necessaria: scientia quidem circa conclusiones, intellects
autem circa prmcipia, sapientia autem circa causas altissimas, quae sunt causae
divinae.” (PA 1.44. nl 1)
There are two logical works of Aristotle concerned with acts of necessity - the
/ nor and Posterior Analytics. I believe we can explain the separation of these acts into
two works given the epistemological distinctions made thus far. In acts of necessity, the
premises entail the conclusion. That premises can entail conclusions is of some general
interest, particularly in understanding logic by examining the logical relations involved
in inferences - and this is the purview of the Prior Analytics. But we also want to pay
special attention to those acts of necessity in which we somehow recognize that the
premises of some particular reasoning act entail the conclusion in this particular case.
This recognition, that some particular act of necessity is just such an act is of particular
epistemological interest, and earns its own consideration in the Posterior Analytics.
Given that this dissertation is primarily interested in epistemology and not logic, the
Prior Analytics will not be considered here.
20
It is commonly held that the views presented by Aquinas in his commentaries
on the works of Aristotle are to be understood as views also held by Aquinas himself. I
follow in this tradition, though it is by no means entirely clear that it is justified. For a
discussion relevant to this issue, see Pasnau s introduction to Aquinas's Commentary on
Aristotle 's De Anima (1999), p. xviii-xxi, and Chenu (1964), ch. 6.
21
See Serene (1982).
11
“ For a careful survey of several views on demonstrative science in the
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, see Serene (1982).
23
Aquinas presents accounts of scientia outside of his Aristotelian
commentaries that seem, at least at first, somewhat different than the account presented
here. There has been some debate as to whether or not the account of scientia in PA is
the same and/or consistent with the account employed in Aquinas's theological
treatises. I am inclined to interpret Aquinas as employing substantively the same notion
of scientia throughout his works, but do not have the space to engage a defense of this
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interpretation here. Instead, I refer the reader to Jenkins (1997). ch. 2
thoroughly and usefully discusses this interpretive issue.
in which he
24
" 'quod scire allc
l
uld est perfecte cognoscere ipsum, hoc autem est perfectepprehendere ventatem ipsius: eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis ipsius utpatet ex n metaphysicae. oportet igitur scientem, si est perfecte cognoscens. quod
cognoscat causam rei scitae. si autem cognosceret causam tantum, nondum cognosceret
effectmn in actu. quod est scire simpliciter, sed virtute tantum, quod est scire secundumquid et quasi per accidens. et ideo oportet scientem simpliciter cognoscere etiam
apphcationem causae ad effectum.” (PA I.4.n5)
Note that we are referring to propositions here—‘the cause of the truth of P’
1 he parallel between premises and causes is a very tight one for Aquinas, and he often
shuts from the language of propositions to the language of things. In PA 1.3, he is very
clear on the close connection: "Now the principles in demonstrative matters are to the
conclusion as efficient causes in natural things are to their effects; hence in Physics II
the propositions of a syllogism are set in the genus of efficient cause.” Thus, Aquinas
often speaks of scientia as if it concerned things, not propositions. For instance, he
speaks of the certain cognition of a thing (res) rather than a certain cognition of a
proposition referring to that thing. When using causal language he often speaks of the
content of premises causing the content of conclusions. The two modes of speaking can
be reconciled, I believe, by considering Aquinas to hold that the relations between
propositions and the truth of propositions will typically reduce to the objects (or their
essences) that are specified by their contents. So we can consider the following sorts of
expressions to be equivalent, under appropriate contexts: an object caused something,
e.g. the match caused the fire ; an object caused a cognition, e.g. The match caused the
cognition that there is a fire ’; a cognition led to another cognition, e.g. The cognition
that there is a match brought about the cognition that there is a fire'. In each of these
cases we should understand Aquinas to have the following picture in mind: object A
causes B, A is the ground for the truth of proposition P, B is the ground for the truth of
Q, Q logically follows from P precisely because A causes B; however, A causing B
does not necessarily result in someone thinking Q, even if that person has already
cognized P. For more on this, see section 2.2.2.
26
Aquinas calls this notion scientia simpliciter. See PA 1.4.n5.
27
“nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. unde de his, quae inventa sunt,
iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur.” (PA prologue.n6)
28
See PA I.4.n5, 1.44.n3.
29 .
“quia vero scientia est etiam certa cognitio rei; quod autem contingit aliter se
habere, non potest aliquis per certitudinem cognoscere” (PA I.4.n5)
30
See also QDV 14.1.ad 7.
72
1 1 QS4 , „ 'I
1
,
Sc
'l!
d ' 23
' q
;
2
-
a
- 2
’
soL 3
- This translation and the next are by Griffin
‘certitude'
' Wh° Pr0V 'deS 3 USetUl and th°r0Ugh accounl of Minas's use of
32
HI Sent d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.
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These two accounts of certitude - as determination to one thing and asfirmness ot adherence - are not identical. In cases of sciemia. they are coextensive, butthey can separate in certain circumstances. For more on this, see chapter 3.1 .2.D.
To help explain this position, here’s a definitely non-Thomistic explanation-
suppose you cognize some proposition P. You decide to judge whether or not P is
necessary, and you do so by "looking" into other possible worlds. If you find some
possible world where P has a truth value different than this one, your attention would be
divided between these two options for the truth value of P in any unspecified possible
world. Should you find no possible world where the truth value of P is otherwise, your
attention would be fixed on the truth value of P as set - you would consider P to be
necessary. This judgment about P is the same as being determined to only one thing -
the truth value of P - and your adherence to that truth value for P would be firm.
Note that the certitude as determination to one thing by judging that the
proposition cannot be otherwise does not correspond well to the certitude we have of
conclusions
- presumably, this sort of certitude corresponds more to self-evident
premises rather than conclusions. The certitude of conclusions of deductive reasoning
is, for Aquinas, a by-product of the certitude of the premises and of deductive inference.
I discuss Aquinas's views on this derived certitude in section 2.4.1
.
36
sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus
quidam attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo
effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus
aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur.”
(PA prologue.n6)
“...quod scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsum, hoc autem est perfecte
apprehendere veritatem ipsius: eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis ipsius, ut
patet ex ii metaphysicae. oportet igitur scientem, si est perfecte cognoscens, quod
cognoscat causam rei scitae. si autem cognosceret causam tantum, nondum cognosceret
effectum in actu, quod est scire simpliciter, sed virtute tantum, quod est scire secundum
quid et quasi per accidens. et ideo oportet scientem simpliciter cognoscere etiam
applicationem causae ad effectum." (PA I.4.n5)
38 .
"cum emm intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se
similitudinem hominis habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc similitudinem
habere, quia non iudicat hominem esse animal rationale et mortale: et ideo in hac sola
secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum
intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem
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C°gn°SCendo et diiudicando ipsam. ex his igitur patet, quod veritas non est inebus, sed solum in mente, et etiam in compositione et divisione.” (M VI.4.cl236)
“et hoc ideo, quia esse rei est causa verae existimationis quam mens habet de
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The examples used here concern propositions that represent material
particulars, and thus it is natural to refer to the ‘state of affairs' represented by theproposmon8 . This is not meant to suggest that propositions only represent states of
affairs of material particulars - Aquinas holds that propositions about non-material
objects (e.g., mathematical objects) can also be true. For the sake of brevity, I will
continue to refer to states of affairs as the referents of propositions, but we should
understand this expression to refer not only to states of material objects but also to non-
material ones. Some readers may prefer something like ‘relation of ideas’ in cases like
these, to ‘states of affairs.' I mean for ‘states of affairs' to be metaphysically broad
enough to cover all such cases, both sensible and intelligible.
41
“sciendum est autem, quod cum quaelibet cognitio perficiatur per hoc quod
similitudo rei cognitae est in cognoscente; sicut perfectio rei cognitae consistit in hoc
quod habet talem formam per quam est res tabs, ita perfectio cognitionis consistit in
hoc, quod habet similitudinem formae praedictae. ... ita verum et falsum designant
perfectiones cognitionum.” (M VI.4.C 1 234)
In M V.l 8.cl033. See also, P III. 1 1x385.
43
See PA I.4.n8.
44
“quia incertitudo causatur propter transmutabilitatem materiae sensibilis; unde
quanto magis acceditur ad earn, tanto scientia est minus certa.” (PA 1.41.n3)
45
est autem considerandum quod de his quidem quae sunt sicut frequenter,
contingit esse demonstrationem, in quantum in eis est aliquid necessitatis, necessarium
autem, ut dicitur in ii physicorum, aliter est in naturalibus, quae sunt vera ut frequenter,
et deficiunt in minori parte; et aliter in disciplinis, idest in mathematicis, quae sunt
semper vera.’’ (PA I.42.n3)
“unde si fiat demonstratio ex eo quod est prius in generatione, non concludet
ex necessitate; nisi forte accipiamus hoc ipsum esse necessarium, semen olivae ut
frequenter esse generativum olivae, quia hoc facit secundum proprietatem suae naturae,
nisi impediatur.” (PA.I.42.n3)
47
“huiusmodi tamen demonstrationes non faciunt simpliciter scire verum esse
quod concluditur, sed secundum quid, scilicet quod sit verum ut in pluribus; et sic etiam
principia quae assumuntur, veritatem habent. unde huiusmodi scientiae deficiunt a
scientiis, quae sunt de necessariis absolute, quantum ad certitudineni demonstrationis.”
(PA II.12.n5)
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WhlCh thC COgmtions are connected not necessarily but onlygently. This sort of certitude-weakened scientia would thus seem to be an act of
contingency, not an act of necessity. But as we saw in section 2.1, acts of contingency
yield opinion (or suspicion), and acts of necessity yield scientia. So how are we to
understand this certitude-weakened sciential Is it actually a form of scientia or is it
opinion? Or do the two shade into each other? It is not entirely clear how Aquinas
would resolve these questions. However, in chapter 3.1.1, 1 argue that Aquinas intends
each of faith, opinion and scientia to be quite distinct from the others. Allowing a
certitude-weakened scientia that counts both as scientia and as contingent causes
problems for Aquinas's account of faith as I present it in chapter 3, and for his solution
to the problem of faith and reason as I present it in chapter 5. This is a thorny problem
and not easily resolved, and unfortunately, must be put off because I do not have the
space to engage it here.
Other ways one can have scientia quia but not scientia propter quid are
considered in PA 1.24-25. I will not cover them here, because it serves my purpose to
point out the distinction between knowledge that and knowledge why
,
but does not
serve my purposes to go into detail describing all the various ways we can have scientia
quia.
dicit ergo primo quod scientia dicitur una, ex hoc quod est unius generis
subiecti. cuius ratio est, quia processus scientiae cuiuslibet est quasi quidam motus
rationis. cuiuslibet autem motus unitas ex termino principaliter consideratur, ut patet in
v physicorum, et ideo oportet quod unitas scientiae consideretur ex fine sive ex termino
scientiae. est autem cuiuslibet scientiae finis sive terminus, genus circa quod est
scientia: quia in speculativis scientiis nihil aliud quaeritur quam cognitio generis
subiecti; in practicis autem scientiis intenditur quasi finis constructio ipsius subiecti ”
(PA 1.41.n7)
51
See PA 1.41.n7.
52
“cum ergo scibile sit proprium obiectum scientiae, non diversificabuntur
scientiae secundum diversitatem materialem scibilium, sed secundum diversitatem
eorum formalem.” (PA 1.4 1 .n 1 1
)
53
“sicut autem formalis ratio visibilis sumitur ex lumine, per quod color videtur.
ita formalis ratio scibilis accipitur secundum principia, ex quibus aliquid scitur. et ideo
quantumeunque sint aliqua diversa scibilia secundum suam naturam, dummodo per
eadem principia sciantur, pertinent ad unam scientiam; quia non erunt iam diversa in
quantum sunt scibilia. sunt enim per sua principia scibilia.” (PA 1.41.nl 1)
54
“sicut patet quod voces humanae multum differunt secundum suam naturam a
sonis inanimatorum corporum; sed tamen, quia secundum eadem principia attenditur
75
consonantia in vocibus humanis et sonis inanimatorum corporum, eadem est scientia
musicae, quae de utnsque considerat. si vero aliqua sint eadem secundum naturam ettamen per diversa pnncipia considerentur, manifestum est quod ad diversas scientias
pertinent, sicut corpus mathematicum non est separatum subiecto a corpore naturali-quia tamen corpus mathematicum cognoscitur per principia quantitatis, corpus autem
naturale per pnncipia motus, non est eadem scientia geometria et naturalis ” (PA
1.41 .nl 1)
The principles of a science serve as the grounds for the truth of the
conclusion, that is, they cause the conclusion to be true. This statement can be
interpreted in two ways: it can be taken as an observation about epistemology (earlier
t oughts bring about later thoughts), or about metaphysics (A, which makes the first
thought true, causes B, which in turn causes the later thought). The account of science
just given seems to allow the ambiguity to remain. Are the sciences divided as they are
because we distinguish their first principles on purely epistemological grounds (by their
various modes of apprehension) or are the sciences divided on metaphysical grounds
first, and lor this reason we make subsequent epistemic divisions? Aquinas scholars are
divided on this issue. For a metaphysical division of the sciences, see, for instance,
MacDonald (1993), p. 170. For the opposing view, see Jenkins (1997) p. 258. fn 5.
6
1 should note here that Aquinas does not seem particularly struck by these
epistemic worries. In considering them, I am making a purely dialectical move - by
considering the worries concerning how we get scientia and how we know that we have
it, we can better understand Aquinas’s account of scientia.
See MacDonald (1993) and Jenkins (1997). For a very thorough account of
an interpretation of how Aristotle understood these conditions, see McKirahan (1992).
5g
Aquinas does seem to hold that other acts of the reason can produce scientia
which is less than perfect - for example, scientia quia.
" g
"nam esse et esse verum convertuntur. oportet ergo id quod scitur esse verum.
et sic conclusionem demonstrationis, quae facit scire, oportet esse veram, et per
consequens eius propositiones.” (PA I.4.n.l3)
60
“detur ergo quod aliquis demonstrator syllogizet ex demonstrabilibus, sive
mediatis: aut ergo habet illorum demonstrationem, aut non habet: si non habet, ergo non
scit praemissa, et ita nec conclusionem propter praemissa; si autem habet, cum in
demonstrationibus non sit abire in infinitum, ut infra ostendet, tandem erit devenire ad
aliqua immediata et indemonstrabilia.” (PA I.4.n.l4)
61
There is another sense of 'immediate’ beyond the meaning 'indemonstrable'
used here. 'Immediate' is also used to pick out the result of an act of intellectus
,
or
understanding, in which we intellectually 'see’ the truth of a proposition. For more on
this, see chapter 3.I.2.D.
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sed de pnmis, quae non habent causam, est alia ratio, ilia enim
intel hguntur; et tabs eorum cognitio est certior omni scientia, quia ex tali
scientia certitudinem habet.” (PA 1.42. n. 8)
per se
intelligent^
63
Aquinas seems to recognize the limitations of the applicability of
demonstration In M II.5.c336, he says that demonstration should be used “only in the
case of those things which have no matter” for these things have certitude in virtue ofbeing unchangeable. Mathematics, because it is abstracted from matter, is
demonstrable, as is the science of celestial bodies, because they are unchanging. Since
natural philosophy is concerned with changeable matter, “[demonstration] does not
belong to natural philosophy” according to Aquinas.
64
In ST 1.46.1. prol.
In SI 1.1.1, Aquinas states that truths about God that are investigated by
reason come only to a few, and are mixed with many errors. From the context of the
article, I think it s clear that the reasoning Aquinas has in mind here is purported
demonstration.
”... quod tarn scientes, quam non scientes, existimantes tamen se scire, hoc
modo accipiunt scire sicut dictum est: non scientes enim qui existimant se scire,
opinantur sic se habere in cognoscendo, sicut dictum est; scientes autem vere sic se
habent.” (PA I.4.n6)
“quandoque vero intellectus possibilis determinatur ad hoc quod totaliter
adhaereat uni parti; sed hoc est quandoque ab intelligibili, quandoque a voluntate. ab
intelligibili quidem quandoque quidem mediate, quandoque autem immediate,
immediate quidem quando ex ipsis intelligibilibus statim veritas propositionum
intellects infallibiliter apparet. et haec est dispositio intelligentis principia, quae statim
cognoscuntur notis terminis, ut philosophus dicit. et sic ex ipso quod quid est,
immediate intellectus determinatur ad huiusmodi propositiones. mediate vero, quando
cognitis definitionibus terminorum, intellectus determinatur ad alteram partem
contradictionis, virtute primorum principiorum. et ista est dispositio scientis.
quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem
contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis, nec
etiam virtute principiorum, sicut est in conclusionibus demonstrationis; determinatur
autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter
aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum
intellectum, utpote quia videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire. et ista est
dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia videtur ei decens
vel utile.” (QDV 14.1)
These are principles that are known per se. See, for example. PA 1. 10.
69
Using contemporary terms, we might say that when we have certitude about a
principle, it is in virtue of its being analytic (which, for Aquinas, is that the notion of the
77
predicate is contained in the notion of the subject - cf. M XI.4.c2210 M IV 5 c595tand when we have certitude about a conclusion, it is in virtue of self-evident premisesemployed in a deductive inference
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- 1 wlU not give Aquinas’s account of the reliability of our
intellect here, but see Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error and Ignorance” (1991 ) for athorough treatment on error according to Aquinas.
Sed cogmtio nostra adeo debilis est quod nullus philosophus potuit perfecte
lnuestigare naturam unms musce; unde legitur quod unus philosophus fuit triginta annism solitudine ut cognosceret naturam apis.” ( The Sermon-Conferences ofSi Thomas
Aquinas on the Apostles ’ Creed
, 1.4.)
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CHAPTER 3
AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF FAITH
3.1. The movement of reason revisited
In the last chapter, we presented Aquinas’s account of reason generically as a
movement from one cognition to another. The Posterior Analytics is primarily
concerned with one such sort of movement, demonstration, which involves a movement
from cognition of necessarily true premises to a cognition of a necessarily true
conclusion. The ideal epistemic state resulting from demonstration is perfect scientia
,
which is comprised of three different cognitions: a cognition of the conclusion, a
cognition that the conclusion is necessarily true (certitude), and a perfect cognition of
the truth of the conclusion (which amounts to an apprehension of what makes the
conclusion true and why it makes it true). When we have perfect scientia of a
proposition, we have what amounts to a perfect form of knowledge of that proposition.
However, as we observed in the last chapter, the occasions for perfect scientia are rather
limited: in order for us to have complete certitude in the conclusion, the conclusion
itself must be necessary, which rules out many truths of natural science ;
1
and the
conditions for perfect apprehension of the truth of a conclusion would seem to limit
demonstration and perfect scientia to analytic or a priori truths.
Complementing perfect scientia (and its weakened variants) is the epistemic
state opinion. Though Aquinas did not comment on Aristotle's Topics
,
a text devoted to
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the treatment of opinion, he does discuss it briefly in his last lecture from his
commentary on book I of the Posterior Analytics. In this lecture, Aquinas describes
opinion as being parallel in structure to scientia and understanding
.
2
Just as
demonstration is a movement from premises immediately held (by understanding) to
saentm of the conclusion, the dialectical syllogism is a movement from premises
immediately held (by opinion) to opinion of the conclusion
.
3
The dialectician starts
from some immediately held premises. These are premises that are themselves
unproven, and from them he proves his conclusion. Though Aquinas differentiates two
states involved in demonstration - understanding is the state of cognizing premises,
scientia ol conclusions - he does not distinguish two separate states involved in the
dialectical syllogism, though the opinion of premises is distinguished from the opinion
of the conclusion by the former being unproven, and the latter being reached as the
conclusion of a syllogism. What differentiates opinion from scientia or understanding
is that the objects of opinion are contingent propositions instead of necessary ones.
Aquinas says:
... if every truth belongs to either understanding or scientia or opinion, and there
are some contingent truths, and they belong neither to scientia nor
understanding, what is left is that opinion is concerned with them, whether they
be actually true or actually false, provided that they could be other than they are.
... For opinion is not exclusively about things contingent in their very nature,
because then a man could not have opinion about everything he knows. Rather
opinion is about that which is accepted as possible to be otherwise, whether it is
that or not .
5
Opinion fundamentally differs from scientia and understanding in that it is concerned
with what could be otherwise; however, ‘could be otherwise' is not to be taken as ‘not
necessary,' but rather, ‘conceived as not-necessary.’ He says that one can have opinion
of premises “so that the immediate proposition in itself is indeed necessary, but it is
80
accepted by opinion as non-necessary .”6 When one cognizes that it is possible for the
truth-value ot a proposition to be otherwise than what it is, one fails to have certitude of
that proposition (which, recall, is a determination to only one possible truth-value for a
proposition). Thus, the primary distinction between opinion and scientia is that the
former lacks certitude
.
7
That a proposition is only contingently true is not essential to
opinion, but what is essential to opinion, namely, the lack of certitude, can result from a
proposition's being contingent.
The movement of reason from one opinion to another (the dialectical syllogism)
parallels the movement of reason from understanding to scientia (the demonstrative
syllogism), with the essential difference being that the latter epistemic states include a
cognition of certitude, whereas the former does not. What we seem to have at the end
of the Posterior Analytics is a fairly detailed account describing the mechanisms of
reason which produce scientia
,
and had Aquinas commented on the Topics
,
we could
expect a similar account behind the mechanisms of reason that produce opinion
.
8 We
have the acts of reason carved at the joints in two different ways: acts of reason can be
divided by the logical connection between propositions (either a necessary or contingent
connection, or no connection between the propositions9 ), and they can be divided by the
epistemic states that result from the movement of reason (either including certitude or
failing to include it). What we do not yet have is Aquinas's account of faith. We turn
now to this.
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3.1.1. Faith, scientia. opinion compared and contrasted
Aquinas does not give an account of faith (fides) in his commentary on the
P°s,erior Analytics
,
so we must turn to his other works for this . 10 In his treatise on faith
from the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas provides a characterization of the difference
between scientia
, opinion and faith:
Scientia cannot simultaneously be together with opinion about the same thing
simply speaking, since it is part of the account of scientia that what is known by
scientia cannot possibly be otherwise. It is part of the account of opinion that
what some°ne opines, he recognizes as possibly being in another way. But what
is had by faith, because ot the certitude of faith, is also recognized as not
possibly being otherwise. One thing in one respect cannot simultaneously be
known by scientia and believed, for the reason that the known is seen (visum)
and the believed is not seen ... 1
1
As we saw in the last section, scientia is distinguished from opinion in that the former
has certitude but the latter lacks it. Faith, on the other hand, appears to have certitude.
The difference, according to Aquinas, is that scientia is of something 'seen' (visum)
whereas faith is of the 'unseen' (non visum). In order to understand what it means for
faith to be of something 'unseen,’ we must first examine what Aquinas means for
something to be ‘seen.’
Seeing a proposition, or alternatively, having 'vision' of it, is a metaphorical
way of referring to understanding things with the intellect. Just as the eye sees things in
the world, the mind s "eye” 'sees' things in the mind. Aquinas explains:
By likeness to bodily sense, there is also said to be a sense about intelligence ...
This sense that is about intelligence does not perceive its object through a
medium ot bodily distance, but by some other medium, just as it perceives the
essence of a thing through its property, and perceives a cause through its effect.
He is said to be sharp in sense about intelligence who comprehends at once the
nature of the thing when he has apprehended its property or even its effect, and
so far as he attains to the smallest conditions of the thing to be considered. He is
said to be dull about intelligence who cannot attain to apprehending the truth of
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the thing except by much exposure to it, and even then cannot attain to
considering completely all that belongs to the account of the thing
.
12
Understanding is the epistemic state that results when we have intellectual vision of the
sort described in the passage above. We understand the proposition ‘man is a rational
animal' when we that manhood includes rationality and animality. From this vision.
or understanding ot principles, we can then derivatively see that certain conclusions
true as a result of the truth of the principles. So, for instance, from our understanding
seeing that man is a rational animal' we can construct a demonstration yielding the
are
or
conclusion that ‘horses are not men.’ If we see the truth of all the premises that yield
this conclusion, and see that these premises yield the conclusion, then we can also say
that we see the truth of the conclusion. But this intellectual vision of the conclusion
satisfies exactly the same conditions as perfect apprehension of the truth of the
conclusion. With the latter, we understand both that the premises lead to the truth of the
conclusion and why they do - this amounts to seeing why the conclusion is true. Thus,
we can take Aquinas s account of intellectual vision to be equivalent to a perfect
apprehension of the truth of a proposition.
From our definition of the previous chapter, perfect scientia that P involves
three cognitions: cognition ot P, certitude of P, and perfect apprehension of the truth of
P. Opinion, according to Aquinas, lacks the last two cognitions, and faith has the first
two, but not the last. The three epistemic states perfect scientia
,
opinion and faith are
mutually exclusive: one cannot have both perfect scientia that P and opinion that P, nor
faith that P and opinion that P, because it is impossible that one both have certitude that
P and not have it (one cannot simultaneously hold P to be necessary and non-
necessary). One cannot have both perfect scientia that P and faith that P because it is
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impossible that one both have a perfect apprehension of the truth that P and lack it (one
cannot simultaneously apprehend why P is true and not apprehend it). 13 As we saw in
the previous chapter, perfect scientia is had by means of a demonstration from
principles that are understood (i.e., are seen) to conclusions that are seen. Opinion is
had by means oi a dialectical syllogism from principles that are accepted as true (but
not seen to be true, nor are seen to be necessary) to conclusions that follow from those
principles (but likewise are not seen to be true, nor are seen to be necessary). But what
exactly is the movement involved in faith? And how does faith have certitude while
lacking vision? To address these questions, we turn now to Aquinas’s account of faith.
3.1.2. Faith as belief
As opposed to the relative scarcity of recent work on Aquinas’s account of
reason and scientia
,
quite a bit has been written recently on his account of faith.
Interpreters of Aquinas roughly tend to fall into one of two broad categories:
Intellectualists and Voluntarists. Intellectualist interpreters of Aquinas tend to stress the
intellectual component of his account of faith. For these interpreters, faith is primarily a
cognitive state, involving cognition of and assent to propositions (e.g. that God exists,
that He is triune, etc.). Under an Intellectualist interpretation, the question of how faith
acquires its certitude is frequently understood as a question of how belief acquires its
justification (or its warrant) - and thus many Intellectualist interpreters look for places
where Aquinas seems to provide or appeal to evidence that grounds belief and
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certitude. The Intellectuals stance is well expressed by Anthony Kenny, in his book
The Five Ways:
To me it seems that if belief in the existence of God cannot be rationally
justified, there can be no good reason for adopting any of the traditional
monotheistic religions. A philosophical proof of God’s existence from the
nature ot the world would not be the only form such a rational justification
might take: a man might, tor instance, come to accept the existence of God
through believing something in the world to be a revelation from God ... Those
philosophers and theologians who still consider belief in God to need rational
justification frequently offer the arguments of Aquinas as such a justification. 15
Many critics find the Intellectualist interpretation to be unsatisfactory because it seems
to provide an account of faith that is not characteristically Christian. Eleonore Stump
raises some important questions about faith that Intellectualist interpretations seem
unable to answer:
First, if there is an omniscient and omnipotent God, why would he want human
relationships with him to be based on faith? Why wouldn't he make his
existence and nature as obvious and uncontroversial to all human beings as the
existence of their physical surroundings is? Second, why should having faith be
meritorious, as Christian doctrine maintains it is? And why should faith be
supposed to make acceptable to God a person whom God would otherwise
reject? Finally, why is it that epistemological considerations seem to play so
little role in adult conversions? 6
Often, critics of the Intellectualist interpretation will instead focus on the role of the will
in Aquinas s account of taith, finding in it the locus of the merit and salvation that is
more typical of Christian faith. These Voluntarist interpreters tend to place more
emphasis on the will and its movement to produce a characteristically Christian faith. 17
Because Aquinas reserves a role for both the will and the intellect in faith 18 it is
not immediately clear whether an Intellectualist or Voluntarist interpretation (or
something else) should be advanced. That faith involves both a cognitive and a
voluntary component also makes it not entirely clear what Aquinas understands faith to
be. In the remainder of this section and the rest of the chapter, we shall examine closely
85
what Aquinas does say about faith, keeping in mind the following two questions: What
exactly is the movement involved in faith? And how does faith have certitude while
lacking vision'? The first question is of fundamental importance for understanding how
any Voluntarist interpretation of faith is supposed to work; similarly, the second is
fundamental for any Intel lectualist interpretation.
That we do not have a perfect apprehension of the truth of matters of faith seems
quite appropriate. Perfect apprehension of the truth of faith requires understanding
what made the matters of faith true as well as why they made the matters of faith true.
Now matters of faith, for instance, that God is triune, or that He is incarnate, are
supposed to be mysteries — we are not supposed to understand why they are true.
Aquinas says, The most important thing we can know {scire) about the first cause is
that it surpasses all our knowledge (scientiam ) and power of expression. For that one
apprehends (cognoscit ) God most perfectly who holds that whatever one can think or
say about Him is less than what God is.
... [Dionysius] presents this proposition: The
first cause transcends description .” 10 Thus, excluding perfect apprehension of the truth
from the epistemic state of faith seems correct. However, many have objected that if
faith does not provide vision, then it could not provide certitude . 20 This objection has at
least an initial plausibility, tor it would seem that if you cannot see why a proposition is
true (i.e. you lack perfect apprehension of its truth), you would not be determined to
hold it as necessary (you'd have no reason for ruling out other possible truth values).
In order to see why faith could include certitude, we need to return to Aquinas’s
discussion of the motion that leads to certitude that we covered in the last chapter (in
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2.4.2.
1 ). I include again a passage from the Disputed Questions on Truth from that
section:
Sometimes, however, the understanding can be determined to one side of a
contradictory proposition neither immediately through the definitions of the
terms, as is the case with principles, nor yet in virtue of principles, as is the case
with conclusions from a demonstration. And in this situation our understanding
is determined by the will, which chooses to assent to one side definitely and
precisely because of something which is enough to move the will, though not
enough to move the understanding, namely, since it seems good or fitting to
assent to this side. And this is the state of one who believes. This may happen
when someone believes what another says because it seems fitting or useful to
do so.
Certitude is the result of a judgment, one which moves the intellect to consider only one
side of a contradiction as possibly true. This movement of the intellect can be brought
about either by the intelligible object (as we examined in the last chapter) or by the will.
In the former case, we have vision — we see that the proposition is true, and in seeing
this we cannot help but hold that it is necessarily true - our certitude follows from the
intellectual vision of the truth. In the latter case, we have what Aquinas calls ‘belief
(icredere ) - something moves the will, but not the intellect (we lack vision), and as a
result of this movement of the will we are determined to one side of a contradiction, and
thus to certitude. Faith (fides), for Aquinas, is a species of belief (credere ) - it lacks the
vision that comes with understanding, and thus lacks perfect apprehension of the truth,
but it has certitude in the truth of the object of belief, though the certitude comes to the
believer as a result of an act of will rather than a result of vision. Under this account,
there are two sources of certitude, vision and will. The former source provides certitude
of understanding, the latter provides certitude of belief. This account does not yet really
explain how the will generates certitude, nor does it yet offer a satisfactory answer to
the objection raised earlier (that certitude requires vision).
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3.1.2. 1. Aquinas’s account of belief
According to Aquinas, the will is a “rational appetite” (appetitus rationalis ).
22
An appetite is “an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing.”23
What makes this appetite rational is that the thing that we desire is presented to us in an
apprehension. Rational appetites differ from other appetites in that what is desired is
apprehended as desirable - natural and sensitive appetites, though they also incline
persons and things towards desirable states, do not present to the intellect the desired
object as desirable. In short, the will is that power by which something we apprehend
as good is desired. Whether or not we desire something by the will does not depend on
whether or not the object itself is actually good for us, but only whether or not we
apprehend it as good for us. All goods except happiness are capable of being
apprehended by us as not good, as Aquinas explains:
Therefore it the will be offered an object which is good universally and from
every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all;
since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an
object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of
necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently
that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the
will cannot not-will it; and this is Happiness. But any other particular goods, in
so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods, and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend
to one and the same thing from various points of view . 24
Once something is apprehended as good and desired, one is then able to initiate a course
of action in order to obtain this desired good. So, for instance, should one apprehend
that eating lunch now would be good and develops a desire for lunch, in this way one
will have willed to have lunch. From this a person may initiate a deliberation as to how
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to achieve this goal, which ultimately can lead to choosing and pursuing some course of
action aimed at getting lunch. 25
The initial movement of the will, or simple willing,26 proceeds from
apprehension ol something as good lor it to desire. In the passage from the previous
section (from QDV 14.1), Aquinas characterizes belief as the state resulting from the
will "‘which chooses to assent to one side definitely and precisely because of something
which is enough to move the will, though not enough to move the understanding,
namely, since it seems good or fitting to assent to this side.” We can see that belief is
more than simple willing - though it does involve an apprehension of something as
good (“it seems good ...”) and involves desire (“is enough to move the will ...”); it also
results in an action, namely assent to a proposition. That belief is more than simple
willing is clear Irom the following: “... the understanding assents to something, not
because it is sufficiently moved by the proper object, but by a choice of the will tending
to one alternative rather than another.”
27 We can thus define belief in P as follows.
S has belief that P =df ( 1 ) S apprehends P,
(2) S apprehends that assenting to P would be good for S,
(3) this leads to a desire in S to assent to P,
(4) this leads to a choice by S to assent to P, and
(5) this leads S to assent to P.
2X
For Aquinas, faith (fides) is simply a species of belief(credere). We see that the
assent to matters of faith follows the same model as that of belieffrom this response that
Aquinas gives to the question What is faith? in the Disputed Questions on Truth :
For the state of the believer ... is such that the intellect is determined to
something through the will, and the will does nothing except in so lar as it is
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moved by its object, which is the good to be sought for and its end. In view of
this, faith needs a twofold principle, a first which is the good that moves the
will, and a second which is that to which the understanding gives assent under
the influence of the will.
un<fer the movement ot this good, proposes as worthy of assent
something which is not evident to the natural understanding. In this way it gives
the understanding a determination to that which is not evident, the
determination, namely, to assent to it. Therefore, just as the intelligible thing
which is seen by the understanding determines the understanding, and for this
reason is said to give conclusive evidence to the mind; so also, something which
is not evident to the understanding determines it and convinces the mind because
the will has accepted it as something to which assent should be given. 29
In faith, as with other acts of belief there is a “twofold principle”: the first which
generates a simple willing to assent to some matter of faith, the second in which the will
chooses to pursue the desired good and influences the intellect to assent. For Aquinas,
faith counts as a species of fte/ze/because it satisfies the five conditions given in the
definition of belief. I have not yet provided the criteria by which faith differs from
other acts ol belief
,
nor have we examined how Aquinas explains how Christian faith
does, in tact, satisfy the five conditions given above. I turn to the latter issue in the next
section (the former will be visited in section 3.1.3).
3.1.2.2. Belief and the will
Conditions (l)-(3) of the definition of beliefyield a simple willing to assent to
some proposition - one apprehends that it would be good to assent to the proposition
and subsequently desires to do so. What we need to examine is how one might come to
have a simple willing to assent to some matter of faith first by looking at how one might
come to apprehend that assenting to some matter of faith would be good. Aquinas
repeatedly and tersely identifies what grounds this apprehension;
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. . . faith is called “the substance of things hoped for,” inasmuch as it is for us an
initial participation of the eternal life for which we hope by reason of the divine
promise. And in this way mention is made of the relation between faith and the
good which moves the will in its determination of the intellect.30
Thus, too, we are moved to believe what God says because we are promised
eternal life as a reward it we believe. And this reward moves the will to assent
to what is said, although the intellect is not moved by anything which it
understands. 31
Aquinas also characterizes this good in terms of an evil to be avoided:
Faith produces in us an apprehension of certain punitive evils that are assigned
because of divine judgment. And in this way faith is the cause of the fear by
which someone fears to be punished by God, which is servile fear. 32
We can apprehend that assenting to matters of taith would be good for us because we
apprehend that if we accept them, we will be rewarded with eternal life. 33 (A second,
related motivation appears to be that if we reject them, we will be punished by God.)
Once we apprehend that accepting matters of faith yields eternal life (and also
apprehend that having eternal life is good), it becomes understandable why we would
desire to accept matters of faith. These motivations will generate in us a simple willing
to assent to matters of faith.
In order to understand how a simple willing to assent can lead to a choosing to
assent (condition [4]) and finally to assenting to matters of faith (condition [5]), we
must first take a look at what Aquinas means by ‘assent.’ For Aquinas, the assent in
faith is not simply accepting the proposition to be true, for opinion includes such
acceptance but lacks the assent of faith:
Sometimes, however, the understanding tends more to one side than the other;
still, that which causes the inclination does not move the understanding enough
to determine it fully to one of the members. Under this influence, it accepts
{accipit) one member, but always has doubts about the other. This is the state of
one holding an opinion, who accepts (accipit ) one member of the contradictory
proposition with some fear that the other is true.
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us, also, one who has an opinion does not give assent, because his
acceptance (acceptio) of the one side is not firm. The Latin word sententia as
saac and Avicenna say, is a clear or very certain (certissima ) comprehension of
one member of a contradictory proposition. And assentire is derived from
sententia.
Aquinas links assent with firm acceptance and certain (certissima) comprehension, in
other words, certitude. 35 Here he explicitly links certitude and assent:
In a second way, the understanding assents to something, not because it is
sufficiently moved by the proper object, but by a choice of the will tending to
one alternative rather than another. And if this occurs with doubt and hesitation
about the other alternative, there is opinion. If it occurs with certitude and
without any such hesitation, there is faith. 36
Opinion and faith differ generically because faith involves firm assent, which includes
certitude, whereas opinion lacks both. The assent of faith differs, as we have seen, from
the assent of understanding or scientia because the former is a result of the will
inducing certitude, whereas the latter is a result of vision determining certitude. Assent,
then, is simply the act by which the intellect is brought to certitude about a proposition.
If the cause of the assent is vision, the assent yields understanding. We are now: brought
back to the concern raised at the end of section 3.1.1: how can the will (without vision)
generate certitude? The answer to this is that the will (in producing belief) generates
assent and assent yields certitude. But this answer is simply analytic: belief is defined
as producing assent and assent is defined as producing certitude. What we still need to
understand is how a simple willing can result in assent, and how this assent induces
certitude in a believer. We turn now to these issues, considering how the will produces
assent in the next section, and how this assent induces certitude in section 3.1 .2.4.
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3. 1.2.3. The will and assent
That one might have a simple willing to assent to a proposition of faith seems
quite understandable - once someone recognizes that assent to these matters can lead to
eternal life, a desire to assent follows fairly naturally. How one proceeds from a simple
desire to assent to assent is a bit more complicated. Aquinas identifies two causes by
which one proceeds from a desire to assent to actually assenting:
The will can move the intellect in two ways. First, from the ordering of the will
to the good, in this way believing is a praiseworthy act. In another way, because
the intellect is convinced in judging that there is something to be believed in
what is said, even if it is not convinced by the evidence of the thing. Just so
some prophet might predict some future thing with the word of the Lord, and
add to it the sign of raising the dead, and might convince by this sign the
understanding of an observer, so that the observer might clearly apprehend that
the things said were said by God, who does not lie. Even so the predicted future
thing would not be evident in itself, so that the account of faith would not be
taken away . 37
The second sort of cause mentioned in the above passage suggests that we can have
some sort of evidence that what someone tells us is true if that person accurately
prophesies or performs miracles. In these sorts of cases, we are supposed to infer that
God is speaking through this messenger, and thus, that what the messenger says is true.
Notice that this does not give us vision (i.e. perfect apprehension) of the truth of what
the messenger says - even if we know that everything he says is true, we do not see why
those things are true; however, we may see why we might be justified in believing them.
This sort of evidence, evidence that P is true on the basis of what someone asserts,
would count (as Kenny admits above) towards the justification of belief of matters of
faith. If faith were based on such evidence, this would seem to support an Intellectualist
interpretation of Aquinas.
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Suppose we witness John performing miracles, then uttering some statement P
about God (perhaps that He is triune). We might think that this constitutes conclusive
evidence for P, along the lines of the following argument, which I shall call the veracity
argument.
(a) John performs miracles and utters P
(b) It someone performs a miracle, then that person is a messenger of God
(c) If someone is a messenger of God, then any assertion uttered by that
person comes from God
(d) If an assertion comes from God, then that assertion is true
.'.(e) P is true
1 hough we do not have perfect scientia of the conclusion (this argument does not show
us why P is true), one might plausibly hold that the argument constitutes a
demonstration quia
, and hence that we have scientia quia of the conclusion, that is,
knowledge that the conclusion is true (recall the account of scientia quia from section
2.3.2). Scientia quia lacks the perfect apprehension that is part ofperfect scientia but
does have certitude, which is also the case for faith. As we saw in section 3.1.1 above,
faith lacks the vision ofperfect scientia
,
but so does scientia quia. Thus, one might be
inclined to interpret faith as a species of scientia
,
one that lacks vision because the
faithful do not understand why matters of faith are true, but do understand why they are
to be believed. This interpretation, though tempting, cannot accurately capture what
Aquinas means by faith, and this for several reasons. First, from the passage above,
Aquinas identifies a second and separate cause of faith and that is “the will being
directed to the good,’' and faith that comes from this cause is that of the “faithful of
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Christ
,
whereas the faith from evidence of the veracity argument is that of the demons
(tor more on this see section 3.2.2 below). This other cause of faith, one that does not
rely on evidence, seems to be more in line with the conception of beliefand the will that
has been developed thus tar. Second, though evidence without vision can be a cause of
faith, this evidence alone is not sufficient for faith, according to Aquinas. He says that
external inducement (e.g. by evidence of miracles) is not “a sufficient cause. Among
those seeing one and the same miracle, and those hearing the same preaching, some
believe and some do not believe. And so another inward cause must be recognized,
which moves man inwardly to assent to the things that are of faith/’40 If this external
evidence is not sufficient, then taith cannot be some sort of scientia quia< for a
demonstration quia is sufficient for this form of scientia
,
but, as Aquinas claims, it is
not sufficient tor faith. Finally, Aquinas explicitly rejects this interpretation. He says
that the act of believing is distinguished from all other acts of the intellect (including
scientia)
.
4I
This first rejected interpretation for faith was that it was assent brought about by
conclusive evidence for the veracity of testimony - one who has faith has proof (and
from this, certitude) that matters of faith are true. Aquinas tells us that this sort of
conclusive evidence is not sufficient for faith, and that Christian faith is caused by the
will being directed towards the good. He also tells us that assent comes from some
internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent. What is this internal cause, and
how does it lead one from a simple willing to assent? In short, this cause is God's
grace :
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. . . believing does lie in the will of the believer. But it is required that the will of
man be prepared by God through grace in order to be elevated to the things that
are above nature, as was said above.42
And so as regards assent, which is the principal act of faith, faith is from God
moving inwardly by grace.43
... Nicodemus, having an imperfect opinion about Christ, affirmed that he was a
teacher and performed these signs [i.e., miracles] as a mere man. And so the
Lord wishes to show Nicodemus how he might arrive at a deeper understanding
(cognitionem ) of him. And as a matter of fact, the Lord might have done so with
an argument, but because this might have resulted in a quarrel - the opposite of
which was prophesied about him: uHe will not quarrel” (Is 42:2) - he wished to
lead him to a true understanding (cognitionem ) with gentleness. As if to say: It
is not strange that you regard me as a mere man, because one cannot know
(scire) these secrets of the divinity unless he has achieved a spiritual
regeneration. And this is what he says: unless one is born again, he cannot see
the kingdom ofGod.
44
Though miracles would seem to provide evidence for the truths of matters of faith, this
evidence alone is not sufficient for instilling faith in a person. Nicodemus, according to
the Gospel of John (3:5), explicitly acknowledged Jesus as a divine messenger, and
seemed to accept the veracity argument. Yet Nicodemus did not yet have faith. In the
passages above it is God's grace that is necessary for faith, not the evidence of the
veracity of the messenger.
In coming to believe one first apprehends a proposition, and then apprehends it
as good (conditions [1] & [2]). The awareness of the proposition comes from the
testimony of another - someone tells us about it. Once we hear the proposition and hear
that assenting to it can give us eternal life, we apprehend that it would be good to assent
to it, and desire to assent to it (condition [3]). Aquinas says that for faith, we do not
choose to assent to the proposition (condition [4]) on the basis of conclusive evidence
for the veracity of the testimony of the person we heard it from - instead, we choose to
assent to it because of an inward cause, namely, the grace of God. Scripture (e.g. John
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3:5) tells us that grace is necessary for eternal life, and Aquinas construes grace as also
necessary for faith. We move from a desire to assent to matters of faith to a choice to
assent not by mere wishful thinking, and not by evidence, but by grace. The grace of
God moves (or helps move) the will from simple willing to choice. For our purposes, I
shall merely observe here that, for Aquinas, one proceeds from conditions (3) to (4) in
the definition of beliefby means of grace. 45 I wish now to examine the last stage of
belief, how we proceed from a choice to assent to assent itself, and how that assent
yields certitude.
3.1.2.4. Assent and certitude
Assent is the act that brings about certitude - one assents to P only when it
yields certitude that P. from the last chapter (section 2.2.1), we presented Aquinas's
definition of certitude as determination of the intellect to one thing, or, as firmness of
adherence ol the intellect. That the intelligible object (e.g. a self-evident proposition)
moves the intellect to assent in cases of understanding seems fairly straightforward: we
simply see that some proposition is true, and in seeing it to be true, we can’t help but
assent to it, and we can’t help but firmly adhere to its being true, and we can’t help but
think that it must be true (that it couldn't be otherwise). Taking some propositions that
we understand, that is, that we see to be true, and from them demonstrating other
propositions, it is also clear how we can't help but assent to these conclusions as well,
even though in this case the assent is a result of a movement of reason rather than an
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immediate intellectual vision as with self-evident propositions. Of the assent in faith.
Aquinas says the following:
But, in faith, the assent and the discursive thought are more or less parallel. For
the assent is not caused by the thought, but by the will, as has just been said.
However, since the understanding does not in this way have its action
terminated at one thing so that it is conducted to its proper term, which is the
sight of some intelligible object, it follows that its movement is not yet brought
to rest. Rather, it still thinks discursively and inquires about the things which it
believes, even though its assent to them is unwavering. For, in so far as it
depends on itself alone, the understanding is not satisfied and is not limited to
one thing; instead, its action is terminated only from without. Because of this
the understanding ot the believer is said to be “held captive,” since, in place of
its own proper determinations, those of something else are imposed on it . . . Due
to this, also, a movement directly opposite to what the believer holds most
firmly can arise in him, although this cannot happen to one who understands or
has scientific knowledge
.
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The assent of faith is caused by the will, not by the intelligible object. Since the
intellect is not moved to determine one thing or moved to adhere firmly to the truth of
the object by the object itself, in a way, the intellect has not stopped moving. We can
explain this situation as follows. Suppose John is considering whether or not P is true.
He does not see that it is true, so both truth values for P are still possible options as far
as John is concerned. His attention moves back and forth between the two possibilities.
Should John see the evident truth of P, or have it demonstrated for him, he would then
no longer consider the falsehood of P as a possible option - he would be determined to
the truth of P, and the movement of his attention would cease and settle only on the
truth of P. In the case of faith, John does not see why P is true, and thus his attention
can still move between possible truth values for P, and yet, at the same time, the will
pushes the intellect to assent to P. There can be, somehow, simultaneously motion and
determination (non-motion) involved in the assent of faith. Aquinas acknowledges that
faith has exactly this characteristic:
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In faith there is some perfection and some imperfection. The firmness which
pertains to the assent is a perfection, but the lack of sight, because of which the
movement of discursive thought still remains in the mind of one who believes is
an imperfection. The perfection, namely, the assent, is caused by the simple
’
light which is faith. But, since the participation in this light is not perfect, the
imperfection of the understanding is not completely removed. For this reason
the movement of discursive thought in it stays restless
.
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What we have with faith, according to Aquinas, is certitude which derives from some
sort of firmness of assent, yet this firmness does not derive from intellectual vision,
because the intellect can still entertain the possibility that the proposition assented to is
false. Somehow this assent of faith comes from the will, and from the passage above,
Aquinas tells us that the assent is “caused by the simple light which is faith.” Under
this account of faith, then, it seems that the Intellectualist interpretation of Aquinas
cannot be right — for it the certitude of faith stems from some sort of rational
justification for believing that P, we would seem to have reached an answer regarding
the truth of P, one which results from the termination of discursive thought. Since
discursive reasoning does not terminate in cases of faith, faith does not seem to involve
this sort of rational justification .48
Just as there is a metaphorical light of natural reason, by which we ‘see' the
truth of propositions, Aquinas holds that there is also a light of faith.
And thus the human understanding has a form, namely, intelligible light itself,
which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, namely, those
we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things the human
intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, namely, the light
of faith or prophecy which is called the light of grace, since it is added to
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nature.
... the light of faith makes one see the things that are believed. Just as by other
habits of virtues a man sees what is appropriate for him according to that habit,
so also by the habit of faith the mind of man is inclined to assent to the things
that are appropriate to right faith and not to others .
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The light of faith allows us to 'see' what it is we are supposed to believe. In a way,
propositions that are potential candidates for Christian beliefs 'lit up' so that we can
'see' that they are supposed to be believed. Aquinas has here introduced another notion
of vision, seeing by the light of faith, which I shall refer to as faith- orf-seeing. One/:
sees a proposition P when the light of faith reveals to one that P is to be believed. In
contrast, one may see by the light of natural reason in such a way that one has a perfect
apprehension of the truth of P — this I shall refer to as perfect- or p-seeing. Finally. I
will refer to someone as quia- or q-seeing P for whom the light of natural reason
provides knowledge that P is true (scientia quia), but for whom it does not provide
perfect apprehension of why P is true. 51
When we p-see that P is true, we cannot help but assent to it, and we have
certitude about the truth of P, for we simply cannot entertain the possibility of its being
false - our determination to the truth of P and the firmness of adherence is absolute.
When we q-see that P is true, we cannot help but assent to it, and we have certitude
about the truth of P, though the certitude seems to be less strong. Even were we
persuaded by the veracity argument to accept some proposition P, it seems we could at
least clearly entertain the possibility that P is false, even though we might adhere firmly
to its truth. This is probably why Aquinas characterizes the knowledge from q-seeing
(i.e., scientia quia) as having less certitude than the knowledge from p-seeing (i.e.,
scientia propter quid): On the other hand, when wef-see that P is to be believed, it is
up to our free-choice whether or not we want to assent to it.
M When wef-see, we don't
see why the proposition is true (we don't p-see it), and thus we aren't compelled by the
proposition itself to assent to it; we also don't see that the proposition is true (we don't
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q~See it} ’ and also for this reason are not compelled to assent to it. Instead, we see that
the proposition is to be believed as part of faith. As a Christian faithful, one already
desires to assent to certain propositions, the assenting to which promises eternal life.
Grace helps the faithful move from a simple desire to assent to a choice to assent, and
this infused light of faith (which is also a result of grace )
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allows the faithful to f-see
what propositions are worthy of assent. Confident that the light of faith correctly picks
out the propositions to be believed
,
that God is not a deceiver, and that believing matters
of faith will help bring one eternal life, the Christian believer willingly and confidently
assents to matters of faith, and derived from this confidence, the believer will have a
very firm adherence to the truth of these propositions - and this satisfies Aquinas’s
definition of certitude.
Aquinas is sensitive to the worry that the certitude of faith does differ in
important respects from the certitude of understanding, and on numerous occasions he
points out that ‘certitude’ can have multiples senses, as he does here in the Disputed
Questions on Truth
:
Certitude can mean two things. The first is firmness of adherence, and with
reference to this, faith is more certain than any understanding [of principles] and
scientia. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful
cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or
scientia. The second is the evidence of that to which assent is given. Here, faith
does not have certainty, but scientia and understanding do. It is because of this,
too, that understanding has no discursive thought . 55
Understanding and perfect scientia have both the certitude of firmness of adherence and
the certitude of evidence, and faith only has the former. What is striking is Aquinas's
claim that faith has more firmness of adherence than understanding - it would seem that
assent that is subject to a free choice of the will would be less firm than assent that
results from the intellect being completely unable to entertain other possible truth values
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tor a proposition. We shall return to this worry when we consider the epistemological
consequences of Aquinas's account of faith in section 3.3.
3.1.3. Faith as habit and virtue
We have thus far been concerned with the act of faith (as a species of act of
belief), that is, the particular movements of the intellect and the will that result in
assenting to matters of faith. However, for Aquinas, faith is properly a habit, not an
act. Aquinas takes his definition tor faith from Scripture: “Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.” (Heb. 11:1). In the
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas explains how this passage is to be interpreted. From it. he
extracts the following definition for faith:
If therefore someone wanted to reduce words of this kind to the form of a
definition, it could be said that “faith is a habit of mind, by which eternal life
begins in us, making the understanding assent to what does not appear.”57
Since faith is a habit, that is, a settled state of mind, by examining this habit more
closely we can better understand its principal act: the act of faith that we have been
considering thus far. What is this habit of faith? A habit is defined as “a disposition to
do well in those powers of the soul that stand in relation to opposites.”58 There are two
powers involved in the act of faith: first, a power to choose to assent or not to assent
(condition [4] in the definition of the act of belief), and this is a power of the will;
second, a power to assent or not to assent (condition [5]), and this is a power of the
intellect.
59
The habit of the will that disposes one to choose to assent Aquinas identifies
as the habit of charity, and the habit of the intellect that disposes one to assent to
matters of faith is the habit of faith.
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As we saw in the account of the act of faith, assent to matters of faith are
provoked byfreeing them by the light of faith. The habit of faith is simply a
disposition to assent to propositions that onef-sees. Here he identifies the disposition to
assent: “The habit of faith helps our minds in two ways: it makes us easy and assured
about what should be believed, and discerning about what should be rejected .”60 And.
as we saw before, byf-seeing we can tell which propositions should be believed and
which should not. Becausef-seeing by the light of faith is available to us only by the
grace ol God, so too the habit of faith (which is a disposition to assent to what one f-
sees) comes from the grace of God - it is an infused habit.
The act of faith satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions specified in the
definition of belief, but not every act of beliefneed be an act of faith. Beliefs are formed
when one assents to a proposition after forming a desire to assent. There are a number
of circumstances in which this can occur without God s grace — for instance, a heretic
might assent to the proposition ‘Jesus was not divine' not from a habit of faith but
because he perceives that assenting to the proposition will result in the good of his
membership in a heretical group (membership in which he could, for instance, perceive
as good because it yielded him more sensual pleasures). What distinguishes acts of
faith from other acts of belief is that the assent from faith stems from the infused habit
of faith: a settled state of character in which one is disposed to assent to propositions
revealed by the light of faith. Even if a heretic believes most of the matters of faith, he
does not have faith if he does not have the habit. Aquinas explains:
A heretic does not have the habit of faith even if it is only one article of faith
which he refuses to believe. For infused habits are lost through one contrary act.
And the habit of faith has this power, that through it the understanding of the
believer is withheld from giving assent to things contrary to faith, just as chastity
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restrains us from acts opposed to chastity. Now, when a heretic believes
pagans a,so with
Take some matter of faith that “is beyond the seope of natural knowledge,” that is, not
knowable by natural human reason - for instance, that God is triune - and suppose
someone (a heretic) believes that God is triune but does not assent to some other matter
of faith (e.g., that Christ was resurrected). Aquinas argues that this person cannot have
the habit of faith - for if he did have the habit, it would direct him to assent to every
object of faith equally - that is, someone who has the habit of faith would assent to any
matter of faith, once it is proposed to him. That the heretic believes some matter of
faith (that God is triune) does not show that he has the habit of faith, but that someone
denies some matter of faith shows that he does not have it. When the heretic assents to
or denies a proposition he does so not on the basis of an infused habit, but rather on the
basis of his own reasoning and his own judgment on the matter - the heretic judges that
he should assent to the triune nature of God, while judging that he should not assent to
the resurrection of Christ. Instead of assenting as a result of/-seeing, heretics assent on
the basis of their own determinations. But there can even be some who believe all the
matters of faith and still lack the habit:
... just as one who remembers the conclusions of geometry does not have the
science of geometry if he does not assent to these conclusions because of the
reasons of geometry, but he holds these conclusions only as opinion; so also one
who holds those things which are of faith but does not assent to them because of
the authority of Catholic teaching, does not have the habit of faith. For, he who
asserts to anything because of Catholic teaching assents to all those things which
that teaching contains. Otherwise, he would believe himself more than the
teaching of the Church. From this it is clear that he who obstinately denies an
article of faith does not have faith in the other articles - that faith. I say, which is
an infused habit - for he holds the conclusions of faith as opinion
.
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In the passage above, Aquinas refers to the “virtue of faith.” According to
Aquinas, “Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is
considered chiefly in relation to its end. But the end of power is act. Therefore power is
said to be perfect, according as it is determined to its act.”63 In order for the habit of
faith to be perfected, and thus be a virtue, the acts that result from the habit must
themselves be perfect. Aquinas explains how the act of faith can be perfected:
... two things are required for completing this act. One is that the understanding
infallibly tends to its good, which is the truth; the other is that it infallibly be
ordered to the last end, because of which the will assents. And both of these are
found in the act of formed faith. It is part of the very account of faith that it
always carry the understanding to the truth, since the false cannot come under
faith, as was had above. From charity, which forms faith, the soul has it that it is
infallibly ordered to the good end. And so all formed faith is a virtue
.
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The act of faith is perfected if one always assents only to true propositions, and further.
that the choice to assent is motivated by a will that seeks something that is truly good.
namely, the “last end” which is union with God in an eternal afterlife. If one assents
only because onef-sees that the proposition should be assented to, then one will not
assent to anything false - and this is the case of the person who has the habit of faith.
In order for the will to identify properly the ultimate good to be desired, and to choose
to assent on this basis, the will must be perfected by the habit of charity. When one
chooses to assent with a will perfected by charity, that person can be sure that he or she
is willing the ultimate good (rather than some lesser good misperceived as the ultimate
good).
One has the virtue of faith, then, when one has two habits that have been
perfected: faith and charity. Having perfect habits of faith and charity ensures that
when one forms beliefs about matters of faith, the proposition is true, and the desired
goal is the ultimate good. As we saw above, it is possible for someone to believe
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matters of faith while lacking the habit of faith. In the section 3.2.1 below, we shall
examine how it is possible for someone to have faith that P, without having the virtue of
faith.
3.2. Issues related to Aquinas’s account of faith
In the account of faith given thus far, we see that the act of faith is a species of
an act of belief. The act of faith involves God’s grace at two points: one in which grace
helps someone move from a simple desire to assent to a decision to assent, another in
which grace allows one to f-see that matters of faith are to be assented to, and thus
allows one to assent with the firmness of adherence that constitutes certitude. In the
next two sections, we shall consider some issues that arise from this account: in the next
section we will examine how one might assent to matters of faith without having the
virtue of faith; in the following section (3.2.2) we will examine the faith attributed to
demons.
3.2.1. Lifeless faith - faith without charity
There is a sort of faith that one can have without having the habit of charity, and
this is called Tifeless' or ‘unformed’ faith. Lifeless faith, because it lacks charity, is not
a virtue, because the habit of the will has not been perfected,66 though it does count as
faith because it includes the habit of faith. The virtue of charity, which lifeless faith
lacks, involves a special sort of relationship with God:
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Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, in so far asHe communicates His happiness to us, there must be some kind of friendship
based on this same communication, of which it is written ( 1 Cor. 1 :9): “God is
faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” The love
which is based on this communication, is charity. And so it is evident that
charity is the friendship of man for God. 67
Charity is an infused habit that arises within us by means of communication with God.
If we have charity, we form a special friendship or union with God, a particular bond.
As a result of this bond, we properly see God to be the ultimate good that our wills
always desire - for the blessed, because they have charity and union with God, “it
entirely fills the potentiality ot the rational mind, since every actual movement of that
mind is directed to God."68 For ordinary men, the will can tend towards other perceived
goods, and those infused with less than perfect charity sometimes may desire something
other than God:
For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin
and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity; and
this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be
destroyed. In the second place man’s chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good,
and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their
charity by adding to it. Man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and
enjoyment of God, and this pertains to the perfect who “desire to be dissolved
and to be with Christ.”69
For our purposes, we can conceive charity as a habit of the will in desiring better goods.
Beginners, who do not have a close communion with God, try to develop a habit to
avoid sinful desires. Those further along try to develop a habit to pursue only goods,
and those approaching perfection of charity desire only the best good - union with and
enjoyment of God - no other goods are desired over God. We lose charity when we
desire inordinately - by desiring sin over goodness, or by desiring some lesser good
when we should desire God - we withdraw from our friendship with God, and thereby
lose the charity that results from such a closeness.
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Charity perfects faith because it orients the will to desire the proper goods. One
who has the virtue ot faith both/-sees that matters of faith are to be believed
, but also
has charity and desires them easily and without struggle. One clear difference between
lifeless faith and the faith formed by charity is that one who has the latter is subject to
filial fear, which is a fear of being separated from God, and in response to such a fear,
one desires eagerly and easily to assent to matters of faith, such assent being necessary
for union with God in heaven. With lifeless faith, on the other hand, there is merely
servile fear, in which one desires to assent to matters of faith merely to avoid
punishment by God. 70 Faith formed by charity easily and, so to speak, naturally assents
to matters of faith, whereas lifeless faith does so uneasily. Finally, unformed faith,
though it involves assent to matters of faith, is not sufficient for salvation, because the
heart has not been purified:
This impurity happens when the human understanding inordinately inheres in
things below it, namely, when it wills to measure divine things according to the
accounts of sensible things. But when it is formed by charity, it admits no
impurity within itself, since “charity covers all faults," as it is said in Proverbs
10.
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3.2.2. Faith of the demons
A source of great controversy in interpreting Aquinas's account of faith
surrounds the claim he seems to make that demons also have faith. Motivated by a
passage from James 2:19, “The devils believe, and tremble," Aquinas seems to attribute
faith to demons - he says that they cannot perceive certain truths about Christ “except
through faith,"
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and he says “the first sort of faith exists in demons"
73
and also refers to
“the faith which the demons have.” 74 Attributing faith to demons is problematic.
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because the idea that demons have faith seems inconsistent with the account of faith we
have presented thus far. Unlike the virtue of faith that we have discussed, demonic faith
lacks charity,
7
- assent is not a result of grace
,
76
and belief results from the evidence of
miracles and other signs, rather than by a will being directed to the good . 77 Aquinas
holds that the demons don’t assent on the basis of their wills at all; rather, their
intellects are compelled by the evidence of miracles: “It is not their wills which bring
demons to assent to what they are said to believe. Rather, they are forced by the
evidence of signs which convince them that what the faithful believe is true .”78 The
case of the demons seems to present a problem for Aquinas’s account of faith:
according to the account of faith provided thus far, faith depends essentially on the will
and is not compelled by evidence, but the demons seem to have faith, and their assent
appears to be compelled by evidence. This apparent inconsistency in allowing for
demonic faith has motivated various complaints against Aquinas: John Hick believes
that Aquinas should jettison demons from his theology (thus solving the problem by
denying that there are any demons that have faith );
79
Terence Penelhum suggests that
the human faithful have accessible to them the same conclusive evidence that the
demons have (which would render our account of faith as not involving q-seeing
incorrect); James Ross denies that the demons are really compelled to believe, and
thus can be said to have faith ;
81
and Eleonore Stump seems to hold a position similar to
Ross’s in which demons and humans have the same sort of faith, that the faith of the
demons is lifeless, and that the evidence motivates (rather than compels) demons to
assent .
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These responses suffer from one of two problems: they seem either to correct or
change Aquinas’s position (Hick, Ross, Stump), or to advocate an account of faith that
differs from the one that I have been presenting (Penelhum, Ross). I wish to present an
explanation of demonic faith that does not undermine the account of faith provided thus
far and does take Aquinas seriously and literally. Given that Aquinas does clearly hold
that the demons' assent is compelled, unformed and lacking grace, demonic faith does
not seem to be the same as human faith. Aquinas does hold explicitly that demonic
faith is not exactly the same as human faith - he holds that ‘faith’ is equivocal for
demons and for humans: “... belief is predicated equivocally of men who believe and of
the demons. And faith does not result in them from any infused light of grace as it does
in the faithful.’
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If demonic faith is not the same as human faith, then what is it, and
why is it called ‘faith’?
When we examined the veracity argument in section 3.1 .2.3 above, in which the
truth of some proposition is proven by evidence for the veracity of the person uttering it,
we considered the possibility that beliefmight be a form of scientia quia: knowledge
that the proposition is true, but not why it is true. This interpretation was rejected for
Christian faith, but Aquinas tells us that the demons, unlike humans do seem to believe
on the basis of the veracity argument: “Demons see many clear indications from which
they perceive that the doctrine of the Church is from God, even if they do not see things
that the Church teaches, for example, that God is three and one or something else of this
kind.” Aquinas seems to think that assent of this sort still should be called ‘faith,’
since the proposition believed “would not be evident in itself, so that the account of
faith would not be taken away.” 85 Aquinas seems to construe an essential characteristic
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of faith as lacking p-vision of the truth of propositions - recall his definition of faith:
“faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect
assent to what is non-apparent.” Demons can be said to have faith because they assent
to what is non-apparent, though they have a different sort of faith from that of the
Christian faithful, since their faith is not motivated by eternal life with God.
Though the demons have a sort of faith, demonic faith cannot be a species of
belief as was defined above, since the demons do not apprehend that assenting to
matters of faith would be good for them (condition [2]),
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and thus do not desire to
assent (condition [3]), and because they are compelled by the evidence, they also do not
freely choose to assent to matters of faith (condition [4]).
Rather than beliefor faith, I think that what Aquinas has in mind as primary is
the assent itself, and there are two kinds: assent with p-vision and assent without p-
vision. In the former kind of assent, one has p-vision of the truth of the proposition
because the intelligible object forces the intellect to assent. This form of assent yields
the epistemic states ofperfect scientia and understanding. The latter kind of assent
lacks p-vision because the assenter does not see why the proposition is true. There are
two kinds of assent that lack p-vision : in the first, the assenter, on the basis of some sort
of veracity argument q-sees that the proposition is true, which yields something merely
resembling beliefthat results from a demonstration quia ; in the second kind, one assents
on the basis of the will, which yields beliefproper. Demonic faith is a species of the
former kind of assent without p-vision
,
human faith a species of the latter. When
Aquinas says that the demons believe, or that they have faith, he is calling attention to
the similarity between demonic assent from evidence (q-seeing) and human assent from
taith proper (/-seeing). These are similar to each other because neither of them has
vision {pseeing) though both involve assent, and neither results in the sort of complete
certitude of evidence (i.e., the contradictory of what is assented to is conceivable),
though they both involve the certitude that is firmness of assent. When compared with
understanding or perfect scientia
.
,
demonic and human faith appear to be more similar to
each other than different, and this is why Aquinas says that the demons have faith. But
when he contrasts human and demonic faith (as he does in the passage in section 3.1 .2.3
above, when he discusses two different causes of faith), we see that two different acts
are being described - one that results from/-seeing, one from q-seeing. So, unlike the
solutions presented by Hick, et. al., my solution to the problem of demonic faith is this:
the demons, unlike humans, have assent compelled by evidence, and for this reason do
not have the same sort of faith that humans have. But what demons have is similar
enough to be called "faith,’ and thus we can do so, at least in some contexts. 88
3.3. The epistemology of faith
According to Aquinas, the act of faith is a species of belief. Recall the definition
for belie/that we presented earlier:
S has beliefthat P =df ( 1 ) S apprehends P,
(2) S apprehends that assenting to P would be good for S,
(3) this leads to a desire in S to assent to P,
(4) this leads to a choice by S to assent to P, and
(5) this leads S to assent to P.
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For matters ot faith, the first condition is brought about by testimony: we are either told
directly by someone that P is true, for instance, from hearing a sermon or from hearing
someone who is presented to us as a messenger of God; or indirectly by, for instance,
reading about the truth of P from Scripture. In conjunction with learning about the
proposition, we learn that assenting to the proposition is necessary for and promotes
eternal life. 1 his leads to the satisfaction of the second and third conditions. In order to
believe, one must proceed from desire to choice - there are many things which we may
desire, but presumably we decide to pursue only a very limited number of them. In the
paradigmatic case ol faith, faith formed by charity, one is motivated to choose to assent
to P because one strives to maintain or promote the union with and love of God that is
charity. In cases of lifeless faith, the motivation to assent is not from charity, and so it
is not love of God but something else that motivates one to choose to assent. Aquinas
identifies one motivation, fear of punishment, so that one chooses to assent to P because
one is afraid of the punishment that will accrue if one fails to do so. There are likely
other motivations beyond servile fear that could lead one to choose to assent.
Regardless of motivation, what is key to faith is that God moves one to choose by grace.
If one has faith (whether lifeless or not), then the act of faith follows from an
established habit of faith. This habit moves the faithful actually to assent to the matters
of faith. The will moves the intellect to assent in faith by a process analogous to other
movements of the intellect to assent. For self-evident propositions, for example, one
‘sees’ that the proposition is true, because it is ‘illuminated’ by the light of reason (one
has p-vision) and this ‘seeing’ moves the intellect to assent. Similarly, those who have
the habit of faith have an infused light of faith, and by this light they ‘see’ that the
proposition is to be believed (they havef-vision), and the habit of faith disposes one
who ‘sees' in this way to move the intellect to assent. The movement in faith initially
resides in the will because the will chooses to assent, and by so choosing, moves the
intellect to move to assent to what it f-sees.
As was mentioned earlier (in section 3. 1.2.4), the assent of faith is held by
Aquinas to produce certitude, because it engenders firmness of adherence to the
proposition assented to. Further, the assent of faith is held to be firmer than that of
perfect scientia or understanding, and faith is held by Aquinas to be infallible. These
latter claims made by Aquinas put faith in a rather extraordinary epistemic position - he
even seems to hold that faith is more epistemically secure than understanding or perfect
scientia. We shall devote the rest of this section to examining these epistemic
properties of faith.
d hat faith should be more firmly adhered to than understanding of self-evident
propositions seems counter-intuitive. When we understand a proposition or when we
have one demonstrated to us so that we have perfect scientia
,
we p-see its truth: we
‘see' that it is true, why it is true, and further, we cannot even entertain the idea that the
truth of the proposition could be otherwise. This would seem to generate certitude of
the highest degree. Faith, on the other hand, being a product of the will choosing to
assent, would seem to have less certitude, particularly since the intellect is not
determined by the object - one who has faith can still continue to entertain intellectually
the idea that the proposition is false. And yet, faith, according to Aquinas, has more
certitude than understanding. Here he explains:
. . . other things being equal, vision is more certain than hearing. But if the thing
that is heard far exceeds the vision of the seer, in this way what is heard is more
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certain than what is seen. Just so someone with little knowledge (scientiae
)
might be more certain ot what he hears from another, who is most learned
(scientissimo), than ot what might seem to him according to his own reason
And much more is a man more certain of what he hears from God, who cannot
tail, than ot what he sees with his own reason, which can fail
.
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What Aquinas here reters to as vision and hearing, we have been discussing as p-vision
and apprehending by testimony. Aquinas seems to be making the following argument:
(ia) it testimony is not more reliable than vision, then assent from vision has
more certitude than assent from testimony
(ib) it testimony is more reliable than vision, then assent from vision has less
certitude than assent from testimony
(ii) The source of assent from scientia is p-vision.
(iii) The source of assent from faith is the testimony of God.
(iv) God is infallible.
(v) P-vision is fallible.
.'. (vi) The testimony of God is a more reliable source than p-vision.
(vii) Assent from faith has more certitude than assent from scientia.
In the passage above, Aquinas provides justification for premises (ia) & (ib): generally
p-vision is more reliable than testimony (which explains why assent from p-vision
generally has more certitude than assent from testimony), but there can be cases in
which one has very weak or limited p-vision
,
while simultaneously having testimony
from a reliable source - and in this case assent from the testimony has more certitude
than from the p-vision. But this reasoning seems unsound. If one has p-vision
,
that is,
one sees why a proposition is true, then it seems one would have understanding of it.
And should one perform a proper demonstration from this, then one would have perfect
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saemia. Even if my perceptiveness were limited, so that many things which are evident
by p-v,sion to others are not so for me, it would seem that when I do have p-vision, 1
will also have certitude, and that this certitude would far exceed that which I would
have from relying on the testimony of any expert. What seems to be true about the case
that Aquinas describes is that the authority of an expert can provide more certitude
about P when we lack p-vision about P, even though P is something for which p-vision
may be possible. The lesson of this case would seem to be that assent based on expert
testimony has more certitude than assent based on a mistaken apprehension that one had
perfect scienlia - when the intellect can’t obtain for itselfperfect scientia
,
then expert
testimony is the best source of certitude available.
Perhaps, however, we can understand Aquinas to be making exactly this point.
When he says, in the passage above, reason can be mistaken, perhaps he is not asserting
what I've presented as: (v) p-vision is fallible; instead, he may be advocating:
(v ) human reason is fallible in self-attributions ofperfect scientia. In the last chapter.
we saw that Aquinas does hold (v'),90 and in the context of matters of faith, the
fallibility of reason appears to be even more common:
Human reason is much deficient in divine things. A sign of this is that the
philosophers, investigating human things naturally, erred in many things and
held opinions (senserunt) contrary to themselves. Divine things had to be
handed down to them in the manner of faith, as being said by God, who cannot
lie, so that there might be indubitable and certain apprehension of God among
men.
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Aquinas's example comparing the expert and one's own reason would work as follows.
Though we are fallible in self-attributions ofperfect scientia
,
the fallibility is not
absolute — we have certain talents and training that make demonstrations about certain
topics infallible (e.g., simple arithmetical demonstrations), but with topics that are well
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beyond our skills or expertise we are very susceptible to attributing perfect scientia
falsely to ourselves - we are quite fallible. In these latter cases, believing on the
authority ol an established expert should yield more certitude than by our own
reasoning. If this is Aquinas s point, then he is not making the argument presented in
(i)-(vii), but this modified argument:
(ia) if testimony is not more reliable than vision, then assent from vision has
more certitude than assent from testimony
(ib) if testimony is more reliable than vision, then assent from vision has less
certitude than assent from testimony
(ii
)
The source of assent from perfect scientia is human reason.
(iii) The source of assent from faith is the testimony of God.
(iv) In all matters, God is infallible.
(v') Concerning matters of faith, human reason is fallible in self-attributions
ofperfect scientia.
(vi') Concerning matters of faith, the testimony of God is a more reliable
source than human reason.
(vii') The assent to matters of faith by means of faith has more certitude than
such assent by means of human reason.
Thus, the assent of faith has more certitude than the assent stemming from human
reason because it is more reliable. The assent of faith is based on God's informing you
of what to believe (via the light of faith which identifies the matters of faith to be
believed), and God never lies and is never wrong, so one can have absolute certitude
that these propositions are true. Assent from human reason, on the other hand, can be
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misplaced - when it comes to matters of the divine, our intellectual capacities are rather
limited, and when we assent to some proposition on the basis of what we think is a
demonstration, we may, in fact, be mistaken.
Notice that in the revised argument above, premise (iii) asserts that the
testimony comes directly from God. If the testimony were through intermediaries,
assent would have certitude only if the intermediaries were infallible, at least in
transmitting God’s message. Aquinas raises this same worry: “to assent to the
testimony of a man or an angel would lead infallibly to the truth only in so far as we
considered the testimony ot God speaking in them.”9 " But how would a person know
that the testimony of a man or an angel is a result of God speaking in them? With the
evidence of signs, for example, that the man or angel performs miracles, one could
know that they serve as God's messenger; however, this leads us back to the veracity
argument, and assent on this basis does not constitute faith. This seems to lead us back
to the dilemma we faced with demonic faith: if we have proof that the testimony comes
from God, we don't have human faith, but if we have human faith, we don't know that
the testimony comes from God, and thus faith would seem to lack certitude.
The key to the certitude of faith is God's grace. Though we may initially
apprehend a proposition on the basis of testimony of other humans (or angels, or
Scripture), our assent is not caused by this testimony, but by some inward cause. If one
has faith formed by charity, then one has a friendship with God, and this serves as a
direct connection to Him, thereby ensuring that what is believed is true. For those who
don't have faith formed by charity, but still have lifeless faith, God still infuses them
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With the light of faith. This illumination of what should be believed comes directly
from God, and again, will guarantee the truth of what is believed.
3.4. Conclusions
faith is a rather extraordinary act, according to the account given by Aquinas.
In order to have faith about some proposition, one does not need evidence that proves
that the proposition is true, and yet faith has certitude and is infallible. It acquires these
characteristics as a result of God's gratuitous grace acting within humans: the grace of
charity brings humans into a special loving relationship with God, and the grace of the
light of faith allows humans to infallibly identify what should be believed. Not only is
it infallible and has certitude, but it has it more so than understanding and perfect
scientia - the ideal epistemic states obtainable by the natural operations of the intellect.
Similar to perfect scientia
,
faith has rather ideal epistemic qualities, but also it is not
clear that many people even have the sort of faith that Aquinas describes.
In order to have faith formed by charity, and thus the virtue of faith, not only
must one have a special loving relationship with God, but the goods one desires must be
properly ordered. According to Aquinas the wayfarer who has charity “makes an
earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things
except in so far as the needs of the present life demand." A weaker form of charity
allows one to give one's “whole heart to God habitually, that is, by neither thinking nor
desiring anything contrary to the love of God ."93 Thus, charity, even among self-
1 19
ascribed Christians, is a difficult state to achieve, particularly since charity is lost should
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one sin.
Lifeless faith requires that one have the light of faith infused by God. Aquinas
holds that this is “common to all members of the Church .”95 However, once someone
disbelieves an article of faith, he becomes a heretic, and the gratuitous grace of the light
of faith is withdrawn. The faithful is one “who inheres in the doctrine of the Church, as
in an infallible rule, assents to all that the Church teaches. If he holds and does not hold
whatever he wants from among what the Church teaches, he does not inhere in the
teaching of the Church as in an infallible rule, but rather by his own will .”96 Once
someone no longer believes even one proposition taught by the Church (which is held to
align with what the light ol faith illuminates), then one loses faith and only has opinion
in what one holds. At first, this condition on faith appears to be excessively stringent:
one who disagrees with the Church that contraception or premarital sex are in fact sinful
would under this account not have faith at all - he merely has opinions. Aquinas is
perhaps not quite as draconian as this in his Quodlibetial Question. “Whether those
listening to different teachers of Theology who have contrary opinions are excused from
sin if they follow the false opinions of their teachers.” In his response to the question.
Aquinas holds that following such opinions are acceptable only if they don't pertain to
“faith or good morals .”97 So some Scriptural interpretations or rules of conduct that
disagree with official Catholic doctrine might not prevent one from having faith;9S
however, Protestant rejections of the sacrament of the Eucharist presumably would
result in one disbelieving, a matter of faith held by the Church, and thus, prevent one
from having faith at all, according to Aquinas’s account .
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The virtue of faith would appear to be a rare and difficult state to obtain. But
even the habit of faith would appear not to be had by a significant number of self-
ascribed Christians, when they disbelieve some proposition pertaining to “faith or good
morals. By Aquinas's account of faith, then, most contemporary self-ascribed
Christians would not seem to have it. nor perhaps ever have. This could be construed as
a virtue of the account: Aquinas does speak of both believing and of opining about
matters ot faith, so perhaps having faith is a lofty goal to which Christians must aspire,
but for most it is something they have not yet achieved. It can also be construed as a
weakness ot the account: many would be inclined to hold that most Christian believers
do, in fact, have faith, and any account which produces a different result must be
incorrect.
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In pointing out the inadequacies of an Intellectualist interpretation of Aquinas.
we earlier cited a number of questions raised by Stump that the Intellectualist
interpretations were incapable of answering:
First, it there is an omniscient and omnipotent God, why would he want human
relationships with him to be based on faith? Why wouldn't he make his
existence and nature as obvious and uncontroversial to all human beings as the
existence of their physical surroundings is? Second, why should having faith be
meritorious, as Christian doctrine maintains it is? And why should faith be
supposed to make acceptable to God a person whom God would otherwise
reject? Finally, why is it that epistemological considerations seem to play so
little role in adult conversions? 01
Aquinas's account ot faith, as I have presented it, allows us to answer these questions.
Stump holds that God would want relationships with Him to be based on faith, and that
taith is meritorius because “faith [is] the beginning of a moral reform of the will, of a
kind that simple knowledge of the propositions of faith by itself could not bring
about.” The account of faith we have given here (which is largely consistent with
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Stump s) easily explains this. We can pursue the virtue of faith, and its component,
charity, and by doing so we not only bring ourselves closer to God. but develop habits
ot increasingly well-ordered desires while diminishing the desire to sin. A faith based
on charity promotes unity with God. whereas simple propositional acceptance of
matters ot faith does not. Stump's answer to the final question is: “On Aquinas's
account of faith, what is happening in such cases (or, at any rate, in the case of true
conversions) is not that the intellect is weighing and judging epistemological
considerations but that the will is drawn to a love of God's goodness and in
consequence moves the intellect to assent to the propositions of faith .” 103 This. too. is
the answer one would expect given our interpretation of Aquinas's account of faith in
this chapter.
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ENDNOTES
1
Certain truths concerning the natural world can fall under the domain ofdemonstration if they exemplify some sort of necessity. For instance, some conclusions
about celestial bodies can be demonstrated because the bodies themselves are
unchanging and thus they have a sort of physical necessity.
2
- Recall that understanding is the epistemic state involving a cognition of the
premises of a demonstration. See section 2.4. 1
.
In order to elucidate what opinion is, he adds that opinion is the acceptance,
i.e., the grasping, ot a proposition that is immediate and not necessary. And this can be
understood in two ways: in one way, so that the immediate proposition in itself is
indeed necessary, but it is accepted by opinion as non-necessary; in another way, so that
it is in itself contingent. For an immediate proposition is one that cannot be proved
through a middle, whether it be a necessary proposition or not. For it has been shown
above that there is no process to infinity in predications, neither on the part of the
middles nor on the part of the extremes. And this was shown not only analytically in
demonstrations, but also logically in general as to syllogisms.
. . . Hence what remains is that some contingent propositions are immediate and
some mediate. I hus, the man does not run, is mediate, for it can be proved through
this middle, the man is not in motion, which is also contingent, albeit immediate. This
acceptance of such immediate contingent propositions is opinion. Yet this does not
mean that the accepting of a mediate contingent proposition is not opinion. For opinion
is related to contingent things, as science and understanding to necessary things.”
“et ad exponendum quid sit opinio, subiungit quod opinio est acceptio, idest
existimatio quaedam, immediatae propositionis, et non necessariae. quod potest duobus
modis intelligi: uno modo sic quod propositio immediata in se quidem sit necessaria,
sed ab opinante accipiatur ut non necessaria; alio modo, ut in se sit contingens. dicitur
enim immediata propositio, quaecunque per aliquod medium probari non potest, sive sit
necessaria sive non necessaria. ostensum est enim supra quod non proceditur in
infinitum in praedicationibus, neque quantum ad media neque quantum ad extrema; et
hoc non solum analytice in demonstrationibus, sed etiam logice communiter quantum
ad omnes syllogismos.
... unde relinquitur quod sit aliqua propositio immediata contingens. sicut, homo
non currit, est mediata; potest enim probari per hoc medium, homo non movetur, quae
etiam est contingens, sed immediata. existimatio ergo talium propositionum
contingentium immediatarum est opinio: sed per hoc non excluditur quin etiam acceptio
propositionis contingentis mediatae sit opinio, sic enim se habet circa contingentia, sicut
intellectus et scientia circa necessaria.” (PA I.44.n5)
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f i- , t
°r Smce [a dialectlcal syllogism] aims at producing opinion, the sole intent
a dialectician is to proceed from things that are most probable, and these are thingsthat appear to the majority or to the very wise. Hence if a dialectician in syllogizing
appens upon a proposition which really has a middle through which it could be provedbut it seems not to have a middle because it appears to be per se known on account of
its probability, this is enough tor the dialectician: he does not search for a middle eventhough the proposition is mediate. Rather he syllogizes from it and completes the
dialectical syllogism satisfactorily.”
quia emm syllogismus dialectics ad hoc tendit, ut opinionem faciat, hoc solum
est de intentione dialectics ut procedat ex his, quae sunt maxime opinabilia, et haec sunt
ea, quae videntur vel pluribus, vel maxime sapientibus. et ideo si dialectico in
syllogizando occurrat aliqua propositio, quae secundum rei veritatem habeat medium
per quod possit probari, sed tamen non videatur habere medium, sed propter sui
probabilitatem videatur esse per se nota; hoc sufficit dialectico, nec inquirit aliud
medium, licet propositio sit mediata, et, ex ea syllogizans, sufficienter perficit
dialecticum syllogismum.” (PA I.31.n4)
5
”... si ergo cuiuslibet veri vel est intellects, vel scientia, vel opinio, et sunt
quaedam vera contingentia, quorum non est neque scientia neque intellects; relinquitur
quod circa huiusmodi sit opinio, sive sint actu vera sive sint actu falsa, dummodo
possint aliter se habere.” (PA I.44.n4)
. . . non enim opinio est solum de his quae sunt contingentia in sui natura; quia
secundum hoc, non omne quod quis novit, contingeret opinari. sed opinio est de his
quae accipiuntur ut contingentia aliter se habere, sive sint talia sive non.” (PA 1.44.n8)
”... quod propositio immediata in se quidem sit necessaria, sed ab opinante
accipiatur ut non necessaria ...” (PA I.44.n5)
7
”... it someone proceeds through middles to immediates in such a way that the
middles are not considered capable of being otherwise, but are considered to behave as
definitions which are the middles through which demonstrations proceed, there will not
be opinion but science.”
”... quod si aliquis per media procedat ad immediata, ita quod ilia media non
arbitretur ut contingentia aliter se habere, sed arbitretur ea sic se habere sicut
dehnitiones, quae sunt media per quae demonstrationes procedunt, non erit opinio, sed
scientia.” (PA 1.44.n9)
8
Potts (1971), starts with the account of belief and opinion from QDV 14. rather
than the account from PA, which leads him to identify some problems for Aquinas's
account of opinion.
9
Recall this division discussed in section 2. 1
.
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He only uses the term fides a handful of times in his PA commentary andhow the term is to be understood is not made entirely clear from the contexts in which
scientia emm cum opmione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem, quiade ratione scientiae est quod id quod scitur existimetur esse impossibile aliter se habere;
de ratione autem opimoms est quod id quod quis existimat, existimet possibile aliter se
’
habere, sed id quod fide tenetur, propter fidei certitudinem, existimatur etiam
impossibile aliter se habere, sed ea ratione non potest simul idem et secundum idem
esse scitum et creditum, quia scitum est visum et creditum est non visum ut dictum
est.” (ST II-II.1.5 ad 4)
12"
“ad similitudinem autem corporalis sensus dicitur etiam circa intelligentiam
esse aliquis sensus, qui est aliquorum primorum extremorum, ut dicitur in vi ethic., sicut
etiam sensus est cognoscitivus sensibilium quasi quorundam principiorum cognitionis.
hie autem sensus qui est circa intelligentiam non percipit suum obiectum per medium
distantiae corporalis, sed per quaedam alia media, sicut cum per proprietatem rei
percipit eius essentiam, et per effectus percipit causam. ille ergo dicitur esse acuti
sensus circa intelligentiam qui statim ad apprehensionem proprietatis rei, vel etiam
etfectus, naturam rei comprehendit, et inquantum usque ad minimas conditiones rei
considerandas pertingit. ille autem dicitur esse hebes circa intelligentiam qui ad
cognoscendam veritatem rei pertingere non potest nisi per multa ei exposita, et tunc
etiam non potest pertingere ad perfecte considerandum omnia quae pertinent ad rei
rationem.” (ST II-II.15.2)
13
Aquinas argues for this in ST II-II.l .5 ad 4.
14 Some who seem to hold this Intellectualist position include Hick (1966),
Penelhum (1977), Plantinga (1983), and Pojman (1986).
15 Kenny (1969), p. 4.
16 Stump (1991), p. 179-80.
1
7
See, for example. Stump (1991) and Ross (1985).
18
“... this act [of faith] proceeds from both the will and the intellect ...” (ST II-
II.4.2)
19
“de causa autem prima hoc est quod potissime scire possumus quod omnem
scientiam et locutionem nostram excedit; ille enim perfectissime deum cognoscit qui
hoc de ipso tenet quod, quidquid cogitari vel dici de eo potest, minus est eo quod deus
est. unde dionysius dicit i capitulo mysticae theologiae, quod homo secundum melius
suae cognitionis unitur deo sicut omnino ignoto, eo quod nihil de eo cognoscit,
cognoscens ipsum esse supra omnem mentem. et ad hoc ostendendum inducitur haec
propositio: causa prima superior est narratione.” (LC prop. 6, n. 43)
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II II 4 8 0^
UmaS considers and responds to this sort of objection. See, for instance, ST
2
1
quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem
contradictionis neque statim per ipsas defmitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis nec
etiam virtute prmcipiorum, sicut est in conclusionibus demonstrationis; determinatur
autem per voluntatem, quae digit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter
aliquid, quod est suthciens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum
intellectum, utpote quia videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire. et ista est
dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia videtur ei decens
vel utile.” (QDV 14.1)
22
What immediately follows is a rather quick and rudimentary account of the
will in Aquinas. For a more detailed account, see Barad (1992), chapter 2; also Stump
(1991), p. 180-183.
P
23
cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in
aliquid.” (ST I-II.8.1)
24 it ,
unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum
et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid
velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum. si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod
non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas
feretur in illud. et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud
solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non
potest non velle, quod est beatitudo. alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum
deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc
considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri
secundum diversas considerationes.” (ST I-II.10.2)
For more on the post-willing process that leads to action, see Barad (1992),
chapter 1
.
26
Following Barad (1992), p. 10, 1 shall refer to this initial movement of the will
(from apprehension to desire) as ‘simple willing.’
27
“alio modo intellectus assentit alicui non quia sufficienter moveatur ab
obiecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem
magis quam in aliam.” (ST II-II.1.4)
Note to the reader: this definition of ‘belief used by Aquinas is a technical
term that does not match the common definition of belief frequently held by
contemporary philosophers. In order to avoid confusion, when I refer to Aquinas’s
account of belief I will italicize the term, in order to distinguish it from ordinary usage.
The reader may also find it curious that an epistemic state has been defined partially in
terms of a sequential process. Aquinas, I believe, would hold that beliefis the epistemic
state constituted by assent - however, it is difficult to characterize exactly what that
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r k’ Wi l.h0U ' describin8 the Process which it was generated. Thus, the definitionthough picking out an epistemic state, appeals to the process by which that state was ’generated, in order to identify it uniquely and more easily.
29 44
cum enim dispositio credentis, ut supra dictum est, talis sit, quod intellects
determinetur ad aliquid per voluntatem; voluntas autem nihil facit nisi secundum quod
est mota per suum obiectum, quod est bonum appetibile, et finis; requiritur ad finem
duplex principium: unum primum quod est bonum movens voluntatem; et secundo id
cui intellects assentit voluntate faciente.
voluntas autem mota a bono praedicto proponit aliquid intellectui naturali non
apparens, ut dignum cui assentiatur; et sic determinat ipsum ad illud non apparens. ut
scilicet ei assentiat. sicut igitur intelligibile quod est visum ab intellect, determinat
mtel lectum, et ex hoc dicitur mentem arguere; ita etiam et aliquid non apparens
intellectui determinat ipsum, et arguit mentem ex hoc ipso quod est a voluntate
acceptatum, ut cui assentiatur. unde secundum aliam litteram dicitur convictio. quia
convincit intel lectum modo praedicto; et ita in hoc quod dicitur argumentum non
apparentium, tangitur comparatio fidei ad id cui assentit intellects.” (QDV 14.2)
et sic fides, in quantum est in nobis inchoatio quaedam vitae aetemae, quam
ex divina repromissione speramus, dicitur substantia rerum sperandarum: et sic in hoc
tangitur comparatio fidei ad bonum quod movet voluntatem determinantem
intellectum.” (QDV 14.2)
31
“et sic etiam movemur ad credendum dictis dei, inquantum nobis
repromittitur, si crediderimus, praemium aetemae vitae: et hoc praemio movetur
voluntas ad assentiendum his quae dicuntur, quamvis intellects non moveatur per
aliquid intellectum.” (QDV 14.1)
32
per fidem autem fit in nobis quaedam apprehensio de quibusdam malis
poenalibus quae secundum divinum iudicium inferuntur, et per hunc modum fides est
causa timoris quo quis timet a deo puniri, qui est timor servilis.” (ST II-II.7.1)
33
Implicit in such an apprehension is the assumption that God exists and
rewards those who have faith. This assumption is a thorny one and is considered in the
first objection raised in chapter 5.5.2.
34
“quandoque vero intellects inclinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum; sed
tamen illud inclinans non sufficienter movet intellectum ad hoc quod determinet ipsum
in unam partium totaliter; unde accipit quidem unam partem, semper tamen dubitat de
opposita. et haec est dispositio opinantis, qui accipit unam partem contradictionis cum
formidine alterius. ... similiter etiam nec opinans, cum non firmetur eius acceptio circa
alteram partem, sententia autem, ut dicit isaac et avicenna, est conceptio distincta vel
certissima alterius partis contradictionis; assentire autem a sententia dicitur.” (QDV
14.1)
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35
Other passages where Aquinas holds that opinion lacks the firmness of
certitude: ST II-II.2.9 ad 2; II-II.2.1; QDV 14.2.
36
“alio modo intellects assentit alicui non quia sufficienter moveatur ab
obiecto propno, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem
magis quam in aliam. et si quidem hoc fit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis,
en opinio, si autem fit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides.” (ST II-II. 1
.4)
^uoc* autem voluntas moveat intellectum ad assentiendum potest contingere
ex duobus. uno modo, ex ordine voluntatis ad bonum, et sic credere est actus laudabilis.
alio modo, quia intellects convincitur ad hoc quod iudicet esse credendum his quae
dicuntur, licet non convincatur per evidentiam rei. sicut si aliquis propheta praenuntiaret
in sermone domini aliquid futurum, et adhiberet signum mortuum suscitando, ex hoc
signo convinceretur intellects videntis ut cognosceret manifeste hoc dici a deo, qui non
mentitur; licet illud luturum quod praedicitur in se evidens non esset, unde ratio fidei
non tolleretur.” (ST II-II. 5. 2)
38
Jenkins (1997), p. 163ff, calls this sort of argument from the evidence of the
credibility of the speaker “credibility arguments”.
39
rhat Aquinas rejects this position is where he makes a mistake about faith,
according to Penelhum ( 1977), p. 152. For more on conclusive evidence for faith see
the section on the Five Ways in chapter 4.
quantum vero ad secundum, scilicet ad assensum hominis in ea quae sunt
fidei, potest considerari duplex causa, una quidem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum
visum, vel persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem. quorum neutrum est sufficiens causa,
videntium enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eandem praedicationem,
quidam credunt et quidam non credunt. et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem,
quae movet hominem interius ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei.” (ST II-II.6.1)
41
See ST II-II.2.1.
“ad tertium dicendum quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium consistit,
sed oportet quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a deo per gratiam ad hoc quod elevetur
in ea quae sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est.” (ST II-II. 6.1 ad 3)
43
“et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a deo
interius movente per gratiam.” (ST II-II.6.1)
44
“Sed notandum, sicut iam dictum est, quod Nicodemus imperfectam
opinionem habens de Christo, confitebatur eum magistrum et haec signa facere
tamquam hominem purum. Vult ergo ei dominus ostendere, quomodo ad altiorem
cognitionem de ipso posset pervenire. Et quidem poterat de hoc dominus disputare; sed
quia hoc fuisset versum in contentionem, cuius contrarium de eo scriptum est Is. XLII,
2: non contendet
,
ideo cum mansuetudine voluit eum ad veram cognitionem perducere,
quasi diceret: non mirum si me purum hominem credis, quia ilia secreta divinitatis non
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potest aliquis scire, nisi adeptus fuerit spiritualem regenerationem. Et hoc est quod dicitm.w quis natusfuerit demo, non potest videre regnum Dei." (Commentary on theGospel ofJohn, III, lect. 1)
^
•11
.•,w
EX
?
Ctly h°W Aquinas holds that Brace moves the will in such a way that the
will still freely assents to faith is not easily understood. Unfortuntely, I don't have
room here to engage in this topic.
sed in fide est assensus et cogitatio quasi ex aequo, non enim assensus ex
cogitatione causatur, sed ex voluntate, ut dictum est. sed quia intellects non hoc modo
terminatur ad unum ut ad proprium terminum perducatur. qui est visio alicuius
intelligibilis; mde est quod eius motus nondum est quietatus, sed adhuc habet
cogitationem et inquisitionem de his quae credit, quamvis eis firmissime assentiat.
quantum enim est ex seipso, non est ei satisfactum, nec est terminatus ad unum; sed
terminatur tantum ex extrinseco. et inde est quod intellects credentis dicitur esse
captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis, et non propriis. ii corinth. x, 5: in captivitatem
redigentes omnem intellectum etc., inde est etiam quod in credente potest insurgere
motus de contrario eius quod firmissime tenet, quamvis non in intelligente vel sciente/’
ad quintum dicendum, quod fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid
imperfectionis. perfectionis quidem est ipsa firmitas, quae pertinet ad assensum; sed
imperfectionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet adhuc motus cogitationis in mente
credentis. ex lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur id quod perfectionis est,
scilicet assentire; sed in quantum illud lumen non perfecte participatur, non totaliter
tollitur imperfectio intellects: et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus ”
(QDV 14.1 ad 5)
48
Penelhum (1977), p. 151-3, holds that if faith is based on inconclusive
evidence (i.e. that the evidence does not determine the intellect), then this would be a
weakness of the account. He holds this, I believe, because he does not see how one can
have certitude without evidence that at least seems conclusive to ground the certitude.
As I discuss next, Aquinas does provide an account of faith that yields certitude without
having conclusive evidence.
49
“sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum
intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda, ad
ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire, altiora vero
intelligibilia intellectus humanus cognoscere non potest nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur,
sicut lumine fidei vel prophetiae; quod dicitur lumen gratiae, inquantum est naturae
superadditum.” (ST I-II. 109.1)
50
“ad tertium dicendum quod lumen fidei facit videre ea quae creduntur. sicut
enim per alios habitus virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi conveniens secundum
habitum ilium, ita etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his
quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis.” (ST II-II.1.4 ad 3)
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51
Aquinas does not say much about q-seeing. Generally, his discussion ofintellectual vision is limited to cases ofp-seeing. I have introduced this notion herebecause it helps illustrate the differences between p-seeing and f-seeing.
52
In PA 1.41.
53
See, for instance, ST II-II.2.9.
54
See, for instance, ST II-II.2.3 ad 2; also III Sent. 23, ii.I ad 4.
ad septimum dicendum, quod certitudo duo potest importare: scilicet
firmitatem adhaesionis; et quantum ad hoc fides est certior etiam omni intellectu et
scientia, quia pnma ventas, quae causat fidei assensum, est fortior causa quam lumen
rationis, quae causat assensum intellects vel scientiae. importat etiam evidentiam eius
cui assentitur; et sic Tides non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et intellects: et exinde
est quod intellects cogitationem non habet.” (QDV 14.1 ad 7)
1 here are also habits of scientia and understanding. See for example, ST I-
si quis ergo in tormam detinitionis huiusmodi verba reducere velit, potest
dicere quod fides est habitus mentis, qua inchoatur vita aetema in nobis, faciens
intellectum assentire non apparentibus.” (ST II-II.4.1)
58
dispositio autem ad bene agendum in illis potentiis animae quae se habent ad
opposita est habitus, ut supra dictum est.” (ST II-II.4.2)
59
See ST II-II.4.2 ad 2.
60
qui quidem in duobus nos adjuvat: in hoc scilicet quod intellectum facit
facilem ad credendum credenda, contra duritiem, et discretum ad refutandum non
credenda, contra errorem.” (Ill Sent 23.iii.2, translated by Thomas Gilby - see Aquinas
(1955), p. 198).
61
“ad decimum dicendum, quod haereticus non habet habitum fidei, etiamsi
unum solum articulum discredat; habitus enim infusi per unum actum contrarium
tolluntur. fidei etiam habitus hanc efficaciam habet, ut per ipsum intellectus fidelis
detineatur ne contrariis fidei assentiat; sicut et castitas refrenat a contrariis castitati.
quod autem haereticus aliqua credat quae sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, non est ex
aliquo habitu infuso, quia ille habitus dirigeret eum in omnia credibilia aequaliter; sed
est ex quadam aestimatione humana, sicut etiam pagani aliqua supra naturam credunt de
deo.” (QDV 14.10 ad 10)
“et ideo, sicut aliquis memorialiter tenens conclusiones geometricas, non
habet geometriae scientiam, si non propter media geometriae eis assentiatur, sed habebit
conclusiones illas tamquam opinatas: ita, qui tenet ea quae sunt fidei, et non assentit eis
propter auctoritatem Catholicae doctrinae, non habet habitum fidei. Qui autem propter
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doctrinam Catholicam alicui assentit, omnibus assentit quae doctrina Catholica habet:
a loquin magis credit sibi quam Ecclesiae doctrinae. Ex quo patet, quod qui deficit in
uno articulo pertinaciter, non habet fidem de aliis articulis: illam dico fidem quae est
habitus infusus; sed oportet quod teneat ea quae sunt fidei, quasi opinata.” (QDC 13 ad
6)
63
respondeo dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem.
uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum fmem. finis
autem potentiae actus est. unde potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod
determinate ad suum actum/’ (ST I-II.55.1)
cum enim credere sit actus intellectus assentientis vero ex imperio voluntatis,
ad hoc quod iste actus sit perfectus duo requiruntur. quorum unum est ut infallibiliter
intellectus tendat in suum bonum, quod est verum, aliud autem est ut infallibiliter
ordinetur ad ultimum fmem, propter quern voluntas assentit vero. et utrumque invenitur
in actu fidei lormatae. nam ex ratione ipsius fidei est quod intellectus semper feratur in
verum, quia fidei non potest subesse falsum, ut supra habitum est, ex caritate autem,
quae format fidem, habet anima quod infallibiliter voluntas ordinetur in bonum fmem.
et ideo fides formata est virtus.” (ST II-II.4.5)
65
For a discussion of why assenting to matters of faith from the virtue of faith is
truth-preserving, see section 3.3.
66
See ST II-II.4.5.
67
“cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad deum secundum quod nobis
suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam
fundari. de qua quidem communicatione dicitur i ad cor. i, fidelis deus, per quern vocati
estis in societatem filii eius. amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas.
unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad deum.” (ST II-
11.23. 1)
68 . • .
“sic igitur caritas patriae, quia replet totam potentialitatem rationalis mentis,
inquantum scilicet omnis actualis motus eius fertur in deum, inamissibiliter habetur.
caritas autem viae non sic replet potentialitatem sui subiecti, quia non semper actu fertur
in deum. unde quando actu in deum non fertur, potest aliquid occurrere per quod caritas
amittatur.” (ST II-II.24.1 1)
69
“nam prirno quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a
peccato et resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent, et hoc
pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur.
secundum autem studium succedit, ut homo principaliter intendat ad hoc quod in bono
proficiat. et hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt ut in
eis caritas per augmentum roboretur. tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc
principaliter intendat ut deo inhaereat et eo fruatur. et hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui
cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum christo.” (ST II-II.24.9)
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70
See ST II-II.7.1.
ad secundum dicendum quod fides etiam informis excludit quandam
impuritatem sibi oppositam, scilicet impuritatem erroris, quae contingit ex hoc quod
intellectus humanus inordinate inhaeret rebus se inferioribus, dum scilicet vult
secundum rationes rerum sensibilium metiri divina. sed quando per caritatem formatur.
tunc nullam impuritatem secum compatitur, quia universa delicta operit caritas ut
dicitur prov. x.” (ST II-II.7.2 ad 2)
72 ST III.76.7
73
HI Sent. 23.iii.3.ii, sol. I
ST II-II.5.2 ad 2. See also the responsio for this article.
75
See ST 1.25.11 ad 1.
76
See ST 1.64.1 ad 5, see also ST II-II.5.2 ad 2.
77
See ST II-II.5.2. Refer back to section 3. 1.2. 3, where I present the veracity
argument based on belief caused by evidence of miracles. Aquinas holds that this sort
of belief is the kind the demons have. See also ST II-II.5.2 ad 1.
78
“••• quod daemones non voluntate assentiunt his quae credere dicuntur, sed
coacti evidentia signorum, ex quibus convincitur verum esse quod fideles credunt ...”
(QDV 14.9 ad 4). See also ST III. 76.7.
79
Hick (1966), p. 21.
80
Penelhum (1977), p. 1 46.
81
Ross (1985), p. 264.
82 Stump (1 99 l),p. 190-91.
“unde et credere quasi aequivoce dicitur de hominibus fidelibus et
daemonibus: nec est in eis fides ex aliquo lumine gratiae infuso sicut est in fidelibus.”
(QDV 14.9 ad 4)
“vident enim multa manifesta indicia ex quibus percipiunt doctrinam ecclesiae
esse a deo; quamvis ipsi res ipsas quas ecclesia docet non videant, puta deum esse
trinum et unum, vel aliquid huiusmodi .” (ST II-II.5.2)
“... licet illud futurum quod praedicitur in se evidens non esset, unde ratio
fidei non tolleretur.” (ST II-II.5.2)
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that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them ...”
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“ad
f®
rtlum dicendum quod hoc ipsum daemonibus displicet quod signa fidei
sunt tarn evidentia ut per ea credere compellantur. et ideo in nullo malitia eorum
minuitur per hoc quod credunt .” (ST II-II.5.2 ad 3)
87
The reader here should note that demonic belief is not the only case thatinvolves this sort of assent. Demonstrations quia that prove causes from their effects(see section 4.4.1 in the next chapter on the Five Ways), as well as demonstrations of
subaltern sciences (see PA 1.25) also yield this form of assent.
88 A second reason to think that Aquinas holds demonic and human faith as
equivocal is that the demons, as fallen angels, have the same kind of intellects as angels
and, in particular, do not reason discursively. They can syllogize, in a way, by seeing
conclusions in the premises, but there is not “movement” of the intellect towards belief
as there is with humans. See, for instance, ST 1.58.3 including replies, and ST 1.58.5.
‘ad secundum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, visio est certior auditu. sed si
ille a quo auditur multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus.
sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo
quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur. et multo magis homo certior est
de eo quod audit a deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione, quae
falli potest.” (ST II-II.4.8 ad 2)
90
See section 2.4.2.
ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens, cuius signum est
quia philosophi, de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes, in multis
erraverunt et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt. ut ergo esset indubitata et certa cognitio apud
homines de deo, oportuit quod divina eis per modum fidei traderentur, quasi a deo dicta,
qui mentiri non potest.” (ST II-II.2.4)
92“
“unde neque hominis neque angeli testimonio assentire infallibiliter in
veritatem duceret, nisi in quantum in eis loquentis dei testimonium consideratur ” (QDV
14.8)
93
“uno modo, sic quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in deum. et
haec est perfectio caritatis patriae, quae non est possibilis in hac vita, in qua impossibile
est, propter humanae vitae infirmitatem, semper actu cogitare de deo et moveri
dilectione ad ipsum. alio modo, ut homo studium suum deputet ad vacandum deo et
rebus divinis, praetermissis aliis nisi quantum necessitas praesentis vitae requirit. et ista
est perfectio caritatis quae est possibilis in via, non tamen est communis omnibus
caritatem habentibus. tertio modo, ita quod habitualiter aliquis totum cor suum ponat in
deo, ita scilicet quod nihil cogitet vel velit quod sit divinae dilectioni contrarium. et
haec perfectio est communis omnibus caritatem habentibus.” (ST II-II.24.8)
94
See ST II-II.24.il.
95 ST II-II.4.5 ad 4
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• f
ma"ltestum est autem quod ille qui inhaeret doctrinae ecclesiae tanquam
lnrallibili regulae, omnibus assentit quae ecclesia docet. alioquin, si de his quae ecclesiad
7n uM
ae VUl
,
1 tCnet Gt qUae VUlt n°n tenet non iam inhaeret ecclesiae doctrinae sicut
imallibili regulae, sed propriae voluntati.” (ST II-II.5.3)
97 o
See Quodlibetal Questions III, q. 4, a. 2.
98
Would, for instance, advocacy for the use of contraceptives fall into this
category? Aquinas is not clear on what counts as relating to “good morals.”
" Although Aquinas holds that the Sovereign Pontiff has the authority to draw
up new creeds (ST II-II. 1 . 1 0), he does not hold that the matters of faith are subject to
the whim of the Church. The truths of faith, being of and from God are substantially
unchanging (ST II-II. 1.7), though the explicit presentation of them is subject to change
and addition by the Church.
100 0n the other hand, Aquinas frequently discusses (see, for instance, ST 1.1.1)
that without faith truths about God would be available only to a few (namely, those
capable of performing and understanding the proofs). This would seem to imply that
truths about God are instead available to many, which would seem to imply that
Aquinas thinks that many do have faith.
101 Stump (1991), p. 179-80.
102
Ibid., p. 207.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERACTION OF FAITH AND REASON
In chapters 2 and 3 we examined Aquinas’s accounts of reason and faith,
respectively. According to Aquinas, scientia (the product of demonstrative reasoning),
faith (the product of believing), and opinion (the product of dialectical or probable
reasoning), can all be placed along one epistemic continuum. Perfect scientia
, as we
discussed in chapter 2, is an epistemic state that involves an apprehension of a
proposition, certitude in the necessity of the proposition, and perfect apprehension of
the truth of the proposition (i.e., an apprehension of why the proposition is true). Faith
involves apprehension of the proposition as well as certitude, but lacks perfect
apprehension of its truth, and opinion lacks both certitude and perfect apprehension of
its truth.
We also saw in chapter 3 that these three epistemic states are mutually exclusive
- one can have faith, scientia
,
or opinion about a proposition, but cannot simultaneously
be in more than one of these epistemic states with respect to any particular proposition.
Since Aquinas holds that faith is necessary for salvation, but reasoning to divine matters
is not,
1
we need to understand what role Aquinas thinks reason does or ought to play for
Christian philosophers or theologians. In this chapter, we will examine Aquinas’s
account of the roles for reason and faith with regard to divine matters. In section 4.1,
we will consider Aquinas’s view that, for certain matters of faith, reason is simply
incapable of providing us with scientia. We will look closely at Aquinas’s discussion
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of the possible eternity of the world as an instance of how he understands reason to be
limited in matters of faith. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, we will consider some roles that
Aquinas does believe reason can play with respect to matters of faith. We will look
closely at Aquinas’s Five Ways (his proofs for the existence of God) in order to
understand better how Aquinas thinks that reason can play a role in faith.
4.1. Limitations of reason in divine matters
Aquinas accepts an Aristotelian account of cognition, and thus, according to
Aquinas, our intellects are seriously limited in what we can know about God.
In brief, Aquinas s Aristotelian account of cognition is roughly as follows.
Objects make impressions on the external senses and these impressions are copied and
transmitted to the intellect as likenesses, or phantasms (phantasmata ). By abstracting
trom these phantasms we can apprehend in the intellect the form and accidents of the
object sensed. What the senses respond to are individual particulars, but what the
intellect apprehends are intelligible species, that is, universals apprehended by means of
abstraction.^ Thus, when we apprehend that humans are rational animals this is a result
of first sensing one or more particular humans, forming phantasms of them in the
intellect, and then abstracting from these phantasms to apprehend the intelligible
species, or form, of a human - and, for instance, that it includes rationality.
Mathematical objects are a special case, yet our apprehension of their forms also
depends on our first sensing particular objects. Mathematical objects, such as triangles,
are only accidentally constituted by their particular matter (e.g., some triangular stone),
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whereas ordinary objects (e.g. Socrates, this house) depend essentially on the matter
that constitutes them, since it is this matter that makes them the particular objects they
are. In the case of mathematical objects, once we abstract away all the accidents
relating to the particular matter, we are left with those accidents, such as quantity, that
depend only on intelligible matter
.
3
Though mathematical objects do not depend
essentially on particular matter, our knowledge of them does, in that we first perceive
sensible objects and abstract from them an intelligible species (e.g., triangles).
These apprehended universals serve as the principles of demonstration, so for
instance, from the universal that humans are rational animals we might be able to
demonstrate that horses are not human
.
4
It we were unable to abstract from phantasms
to the intelligible species of a thing, we would be unable to develop any demonstrations
about that thing, so our ability to have perfect scientia about things depends on our
abilities to apprehend something about these universal essences. According to this
account of cognition, we are unable to have perfect scientia about God, since He is not
composed of sensible matter . 3 Aquinas observes:
For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension (capiendam ) of the
divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of
cognizing (cognitio ) in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the
origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot
be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the cognition (cognitio) of
them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the
human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance;
for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause .
6
We cannot apprehend the essence of God not only because He is not sensible, but also,
as Aquinas observes in the last sentence from the passage above, because His sensible
effects inadequately represent God, their cause. Effects of God are created, finite and
limited, and what we can discern from them by way of abstraction are forms that are
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also limited. But God and His power are unlimited, so the forms abstracted from God’s
effects do not accurately reflect God as He is - that is. they do not reveal His essence.
Thus, in virtue of our current cognitive apparatus,7 we cannot apprehend the essence of
God, and thus, we cannot have perfect scientia of God's essence.
Perfect scientia of divine matters that depend on understanding God’s essence is
unavailable to us, given our cognitive limitations. These limitations also restrict in
principle our ability to haxq perfect scientia of other matters of faith that depend on
understanding God’s essence. For instance, that the world was created with a
beginning, and thus has existed with a finite duration in time, is also something that
Aquinas believes we cannot have scientia about. In the next section, we will examine
Aquinas s treatment ot the creation of the world as a case study in how demonstrative
reasoning is incapable of producing scientia about truths of certain matters of faith.
Later, in section 4.4, we will examine what reason can yield in matters of faith.
4.2. Limitations of reason in the matter of the creation of the world
For early theologians, a key topic involving the intersection of philosophy and
Christian doctrine was the creation of the world. In Hexaemera (treatises on the first six
days of creation (in Genesis 1)), theologians attempted to reconcile the account of
creation given in Genesis with accounts given by philosophers, and frequently, with the
account in Plato's Timaeus. Until the 12
th
century, Plato's cosmogonic account was the
primary philosophical account considered by theologians. 8 Unlike Plato’s, Aristotle’s
views on the origins of the world conflicted with Christian doctrine, particularly in that
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he seems to have embraced the view that the world that was sempiternal. 9 Philosophers
and theologians of the 12th and 13* centuries divided into two camps in response to this
apparent incompatibility between Aristotelian cosmogony and the Christian doctrine on
the creation of the world in time: etemalists (for instance, Siger of Brabant and Boethius
of Dacia, inspired by Averroes) presented arguments which purported to show that the
world had existed forever, and temporalists advocated (either by appeal to doctrine or
arguments) that the world was created in time with a beginning (a view that was part of
the orthodox Catholic doctrine, and held by the late 13'" century theologians Giles of
Rome, Stephen Tempier, Robert Grosseteste, John Pecham. Bonaventure. and Aquinas,
to name a few). 10
The question of the eternity of the world was of great concern to many Christian
philosophers and theologians of the 13 th century. In Collationes in Hexaemeron
,
Bonaventure details three major errors made by philosophers: (1) the etemalist error,
that the duration of the world was everlasting, which led to (2) the error of the unicity of
the intellect, which together with ( 1 ) led to (3) the error of denying happiness and
punishment in the afterlife. Of those who hold these views, Bonaventure says, “These
men, therefore, have fallen into errors, nor have they been ‘separated from the
darkness’; and such errors as these are the very worst. Nor has the abysmal pit been as
yet locked up.” 11
An orthodox response to the etemalist position was to condemn it. In 1270 and
1277, several etemalist positions were condemned in Paris. These etemalist positions
were not to be held or advocated, on pain of excommunication. 12 In contrast, some
Christian temporalist theologians pursued less drastic, and more philosophical
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approaches to etemahst positions. There were three courses of action pursued that did
not conflict with Christian doctrine: (1) deny that Aristotle actually held that the world
was eternal, (2) refute Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) arguments that purported to
demonstrate the eternity of the world, and (3) offer counter-arguments that purported to
demonstrate the temporality of the world. Bonaventure, for instance, was agnostic with
respect to the first, allowing that Aristotle may or may not have argued for an eternal
world, and actively pursued the second and third. By pursuing the latter two.
Bonaventure represented the most common Christian theological position of the period.
Aquinas, on the other hand, embraced the first and second, but not the third, differing
from Bonaventure’s commonly held position.
Aquinas's response to etemahst arguments, despite the common stance that the
etemalist position was a very grave error, was temperamentally rather mild. Although
Aquinas rejected the etemalist position, he did so largely on philosophical grounds, and
did not often make a point of chastising etemalists for their theological errors. In the
Summa theologiae
,
for instance, when Aquinas considers the various arguments
advanced to show that the world has existed forever, he responds with philosophical
rebuttals to the arguments, pointing out the philosophical errors made, and he frequently
appeals to the authority of Aristotle in giving his answers. 13
In contrast, when Aquinas responds to temporalist arguments, his criticisms are
sometimes quite virulent. He often expresses the view that bad arguments advanced in
support of the faith are worse than none at all, and that the temporalists are advancing
bad arguments: “ And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to
demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to
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give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such reasons we believe things
that are of faith .” 14 In the Summa contra gentiles
,
for instance, when he considers
temporalist arguments, he shows that the arguments fail, and the terms he uses in
describing them are particularly negative. He describes these arguments as “lacking
cogency and “weak. 1 Further, Aquinas's only polemical work on the topic, De
aeternitate mundi
,
is not directed at etemalists but at those advancing temporalist
arguments. Of these he comments sarcastically, “Therefore they who do descry such
inconsistency [between eternity and creation] with their hawk-like vision are the only
rational beings, and wisdom was bom with them! 16 Given the concern that many of
Aquinas s contemporaries had with the etemalist error, his mild treatment of etemalists
conjoined with his near-hostility to those advancing temporalist demonstrations is, to
say the least, quite surprising
.
17
Setting aside the more personal nature of Aquinas's attacks on the temporalists,
an important question remains for our understanding of Aquinas’s epistemological
account of faith and reason - why does Aquinas strive so ardently to discount
demonstrations that prove the finite duration of the world, especially since he agrees
with the conclusion, namely that the world is finite in duration? 18 One pragmatic
answer to this question was given above - advancing bad arguments in support of the
faith makes Christian theologians look bad. But Aquinas has a more principled
response to this question: the finite duration of the world is an article of faith, and as
such, is something that cannot be demonstrated; if we are to have certitude about it, it
must be by faith, not by proof. In the next section we examine why Aquinas believes
that the duration of the world cannot be demonstrated.
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4.3. Why the duration of the world cannot be demonstrated
Though Aquinas considers several arguments purporting to prove either the
finite or infinite duration of the world and refutes each in turn, Aquinas has systematic
arguments as to why the duration of the created world cannot be demonstrated. He
finds that neither the temporality nor the etemality of the created world can be
demonstrated, but uses premises in his arguments that will be accepted only by
Christians, so these arguments must be directed towards them. Aquinas considers three
arguments against any possibility of demonstration regarding the eternity or temporality
of the world. These are the argument from faith, the argument from a consideration of
creatures, and the argument from a consideration of God.
4.3.1. The argument from faith
In the Summa theologiae
,
Aquinas considers the position that the eternity of the
world cannot be demonstrated because the non-eternity of the world is an article of
faith. This argument, however, is advanced as part of the sed contra response to the
question, and he does not seem to advance it so much as his own, but as an argument
given on theological authority. In this argument he observes, “The articles of faith
cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of ‘things that appear not' according
to Hebrews 1 1 : 1 ,” |g Presumably, what he means by this is that articles of faith involve
things not seen, that is, things for which we cannot have scientia , and which are thus not
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demonstrable. The argument continues by observing that God's creation of the world in
time is a matter of faith, one revealed to us by Moses, who “prophesied about the past
when he said, ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth.’” He concludes:
“Therefore the inception of the world is known exclusively by revelation. Accordingly
it cannot be proved demonstratively.”
Despite the fact that this argument appeals to scriptural authority (which,
presumably, Aquinas's temporalist peers would respect), most temporalists would
remain unconvinced that demonstrations about the beginning of the world cannot be
given. That the temporality ot the world is an article of faith does not seem to warrant
concluding that matters of faith concerning creation are known exclusively by
revelation. To be sure, Aquinas’s account of faith, as we saw in the last chapter, holds
that faith and scientia are mutually exclusive. However, it does not follow from this
that what is held by faith by one person could not be held by scientia by another. John
Pecham, a contemporary of Aquinas and Bonaventure and a temporalist, holds this
view. He says, “The creation of the world in time, although it is an article of faith, can.
it seems, still be investigated by reason. And this is not in prejudice of the faith,
provided that assent is given to it not because of faith but rather we come to an
understanding of it with the help of faith .”
20
This argument by authority does not seem
sufficient to refute temporalist arguments, and thus it must be bolstered by additional
arguments that show that demonstrations about the duration of the world cannot be
given . 21 The next two arguments, which are Aquinas's own, do this.
143
4.3.2. The argument from a consideration of creatures
One way in which the duration of the world might be demonstrated would be to
consider the essence or nature ot the world (or some creatures in it) and to demonstrate
from this nature that it has either a finite or intinite duration. Such a demonstration,
because it would explain why the duration is as it is (by appeal to the nature of the
entity) would provide us with perfect scientia about the age of the world. Aquinas
argues that no such demonstration could be provided by considering the world (or any
creatures, lor that matter), because the nature of demonstration does not permit such a
consideration. He says, “For the principle of demonstration is the essence (quod quid
est) of a thing. Now everything according to the notion of its species abstracts from
here and now; hence it is said that ‘universals are everywhere and always.’ Hence it
cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone did not always exist.”22 This
passage appeals to Aquinas's theory of cognition and its consequence for
demonstration, as discussed earlier - if we cannot form universals that contain
information about the duration of something, we cannot form demonstrations
concerning its duration.
Some help in understanding this argument is given in De potentia dei. Aquinas
considers whether a creature’s nature necessitates the form it takes once the creature has
been created. He answers in the affirmative, but observes that God can choose which
nature to create:
. . .all existing things have a definite quantity by nature. For, just as the divine
power is not restricted to one quantity rather than to another, so it is not
restricted to a nature (naturam ) requiring a particular quantity rather than to a
nature requiring a different quantity. And so the same question [why the world
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is of some particular size] recurs with respect to nature as to quantity, even
though we should grant that the nature of heaven is not wholly indifferent to
quantity, or that it has no capacity for any other than its present quantity. 23
Consider a world that God could create (for example, our world). Its nature (call it A)
includes a determinate size (i.e. quantity) for the world (let us dub this size a). We can
also consider a different world that God could create, with a different nature (B). and
different size (size (3). If God were to create A, it would be true that A must be of size
cx, and it is also true that if our world has that nature (A), then our world is necessarily
of size ct. But it does not follow that the world that God creates is necessarily size cx,
unless it were impossible for God to create B (or any other alternatives to A with a size
different than a).
On the other hand, Aquinas holds that duration, unlike quantity, is extraneous to
a thing’s nature:
For time, like place, is extraneous to a thing. Consequently even heaven, which
has no capacity for a different quantity or a different accident intrinsically
inhering, has such capacity with regard to place and position, since it has local
motion; and also with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, just as there
is succession in movement and locality. Hence neither time nor locality can be
said to result from the nature of heaven, as was stipulated in the case of quantity.
Thus it is clear that the prefixing of a definite quantity of duration for the
universe, as also of a definite quantity of dimension, depends on the mere will of
God. Accordingly we cannot arrive at any necessary conclusion about the
duration of the universe, so as to be able to prove demonstratively that the world
has existed forever.
24
Here Aquinas argues that time and spatial location, because these change, are not part of
the intrinsic nature of a thing. Thus, even were we to understand the nature of the world
we still would not be able to demonstrate what duration in time it has (or would have,
for a possible nature, were it to exist) since, as Aquinas asserted in the passage from the
Summa theologiae above, “the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing."
We cannot perform a demonstration propter quid from the nature of the world to perfect
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scientia about lts duration because the nature of the world does not contain information
about its duration.
4.3.3. The argument from a consideration of God
Though we cannot have perfect scientia about the duration of the world by
considering the nature of the world, perhaps we could obtain it by considering the
manner in which God creates. As Aquinas observed in the passage from De potentia
dei above, God chooses what natures to create just as he chooses what durations these
objects will have. If for some reason, it was necessary that God, as creator, should
choose a world with a particular (finite) duration, then it might be possible to
demonstrate from this necessity of creation to a conclusion about the duration of the
world. Aquinas argues that if there were to be some reason for God to be limited to
choosing to create a particular nature, it must lie in God’s power. His goodness, or His
will. In De potentia dei he rules out the first two: “...a reason for the definite
disposition of the universe cannot be discerned either on the part of the divine power,
which is infinite, or on the part of the divine goodness, which has no need of created
things, the reason for it must be found in the sheer will of the Creator.”25 God's power
cannot be what limits Him to create this world (with its finite duration), since His power
is unlimited - His power is sufficient to create a different world with an infinite
duration. Similarly, He can’t be constrained to create this world by His goodness, since
His goodness does not require the creation of this or any other world - that is, it is not
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necessary that God create a world of finite duration because of His goodness, since
God's goodness is unaffected by creation.
In the Summa theologiae
, by making an appeal to God’s freedom, Aquinas
argues that the duration of the world cannot be demonstrated:
For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those
things which God must will of necessity, and what He wills about creatures is
not among these, as was said above. But the divine will can be manifested to
man by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is
an object of faith, but not of demonstration or scientia ,26
Because God is free to will as he wishes, unless he is absolutely necessitated to do
otherwise, God was free to make the world eternal if he so wished. But how can we be
sure that God is not necessitated to make the world temporal? Earlier in the Summa
,
Aquinas gives an argument proving that God's will is not necessitated with respect to
created things. God's will has His goodness as its proper object, and thus He
necessarily wills the being of His own goodness. Aquinas adds, “But God wills things
apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end .”27
That is, to the extent that God wills concerning anything outside of Himself, the final
cause of the act of will is God's goodness. Aquinas observes that if anyone wills
towards an end and that end is attainable in some other way than by willing it. then that
act of will is not necessary in order for the end to be obtained: “But we do not will
necessarily those things without which the end is attainable...” Finally, Aquinas
observes, “Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect and can exist without other
things, inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that tor Him
to will things other than Himself is not absolutely necessary.” Thus, the final cause of
God’s acts of will is His goodness, and His goodness can be obtained without acts ol
creation, so no act of creation is necessary for God to perform.
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God s creating a world ot a finite duration was not necessitated by God's act of
creation, for God's power allowed Him to create worlds with other natures (and other
durations), God s goodness allowed Him not to create at all, and God, in willinu to
create, did so freely, since the end of His willing would have been achieved whether or
not He created. There was nothing necessary about God's act of creation, and thus
there can be no necessary first principles about God’s creating by which a
demonstration propter quid could be formed to demonstrate the duration of the world.
4.3.4. Another type of demonstration of the duration of the world
In the last two sections we considered two ways in which the duration of the
world might have been demonstrated: from a consideration of the nature of the world
itself, and from a consideration of God's creative act. Concerning God's creative act,
no demonstration propter quid is possible since we cannot have any understanding of
the immediate premises concerning God that would be necessary for demonstration
propter quid. Because God's essence is unknowable to us, we cannot demonstrate
conclusions that follow from His essence. Further, we cannot demonstrate them from
what must necessarily be true of God's act of creation (and hence, subject to perfect
scientia), since it is not necessary that God create at all, much less that He create a
world of any particular duration. We also cannot construct a demonstration propter
quid about the duration of the world because if we examine the essence of the world
itself, the universals that we abstract from our experience of the world do not contain
information about its duration in time, and thus we have no immediate principles about
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the world’s duration from which to construct such a demonstration. Though Aquinas
has ruled out demonstrations propter quid
.
he has not yet ruled out demonstrations quia
,
some proof that shows that the world must be eternal or temporal but not why. Van
Steenberghen raises precisely this difficulty for Aquinas:
He well knows that besides the kind of demonstrations which Aristotle proposes
as [demonstration propter quid], there are other types of valid demonstration: for
instance, demonstrating a cause from an effect [demonstration quia], the only
kind of demonstration which makes it possible to prove God's existence. He
should have shown that no type of demonstration can enable one to prove that
the world began . 28
Demonstrations of causes from effects are a species of demonstration quia, the
sort of demonstrations that produce scientia quia
,
that is, knowledge that the conclusion
is true but not knowledge why it is true . 29 We cannot have perfect scientia about the
duration of the world, since we cannot see why the world should have the duration it
does. We might be able to have scientia quia about the duration of the world if we were
able to infer from our observations of the world, of creation or of duration in time, that
this world must have been created in a certain way (for instance, with a finite duration).
Though Aquinas does consider and rebut demonstrations quia in favor of a finite world
throughout his works, he does not systematically rule them out until De aeternitate
mundi.
This polemical text, which is clearly aimed at Christian theologians
,
30
is
primarily concerned with demonstrations quia for a finite duration of the world - if a
demonstration can be provided that shows that it is impossible for the world to be
infinite in duration, then such a demonstration would also show that the world must be
finite in duration. Such a deductio ad impossible31 would, if successful, prove that the
world has a finite duration, and thus establish the correctness of the temporalist
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position. Aquinas, following distinctions previously made in De potentia c/e/,32
observes that there are two ways in which an eternal, created world can be impossible.
“Now if it is said that this is impossible, this will be said either [1] because God could
not make something which always existed, or [2] because, even if God could make it, it
could not be made. That God lacks the power to create an eternal world is rejected,
since, as we observed before, God can create any nature, and natures don't entail their
durations - thus God has the power to create a world with an infinite duration.
However, if such a world could not be made (not as a limitation of God’s power, but as
some problem with such a world), then it would follow that this world (which has been
made) must be finite in duration. There are, Aquinas says, only two reasons why a
world of infinite duration might not be able to be made: “... either [2a] because of a
lack of passive potency, or [2b] because of incompatibility in the concepts involved.”34
One reason to think that a world of infinite duration could not be made would be
that there could be no appropriate passive potentiality, that is, no matter from which a
world ot infinite duration could be made. Under Aristotelian metaphysics, substances
are created when form (the active principle) informs matter (the passive potency). One
problem with a world of infinite duration would seem to be that, since the world has
existed forever, there would seem to be no time prior to the world's existence for there
to be passive potency from which the world is made. Aquinas appeals to angelic
creation to explain that creation does not require passive potency - he explains that
angels are not made out of matter (they have no passive potency), yet they are capable
of being made by God. This would be one way in which an infinite world could exist -
if it were created in some manner like the angels, then no prior passive potency would
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be required. 35 Aquinas also considers the heretical position that there could have been
eternally existing passive potency from which the world was made. Though this view is
heretical,
36
Aquinas observes that such an account (which an Aristotelian etemalist
might advance) is nevertheless metaphysically possible, and thus, such a world would
be capable of being made.
The last way [2b] in which a world of infinite duration might be shown to be
impossible would be to show that there was a contradiction involved in a created,
eternal, world. The contradiction can be expressed in the form of a demonstration:
( 1 ) For any x, if the concepts involved in x are incompatible, then x is impossible
(2) The concepts The world has existed forever’ and The world was created by
God' are incompatible
(3
)
A world created by God that has existed forever is impossible
This argument (if successful) counts as a demonstration quia because the conclusion
would be necessarily true, and hence we would have certitude that a created eternal
world could not exist. However, the argument cannot count as a demonstration propter
quid
, because, as Aquinas argued in the previous sections, our knowledge of the truth of
(2) (if we indeed have such knowledge) is not ultimately a result of understanding the
essence of the world or of God’s act of creation. By proving that creation and infinite
duration are incompatible, we can conclude that the world is finite in duration.
Aquinas's goal is to show that premise (2) is false, and thus that the syllogism above is
not a demonstration at all. He says, “The whole question comes to this, whether the
ideas, to be created by God according to a thing’s entire substance, and yet to lack a
beginning in duration, are mutually repugnant or not.”
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Aquinas asserts that there are only two ways in which the concepts in (2) could
be mutually incompatible.38 He says, “...a contradiction could arise only ... because an
efficient cause must precede its effect in duration, or because non-existence must
precede existence in duration ...”39 In order to show that (2) cannot be true, Aquinas
proceeds to argue that the concepts are not incompatible in either of these ways.
These two possible proofs of premise (2) can be summarized as follows:
(a) All efficient causes are prior in duration to their effects
(b) If God is the creator of the world, then God is the efficient cause of the world
.
.
(c) If God is the creator of the world, then God’s efficient cause is prior in duration
to the existence of the world
(d) If something is prior in duration to x, then x has not existed forever
(e) If God is the creator of the world, then the world has not existed forever
(f) All things that are made from nothing have non-existence prior in duration to
existence
(g) If God is the creator of the world, then the world is made from nothing (ex
nihilo )
.'. (h) If God is the creator of the world, then the non-existence of the world is prior in
duration to its existence
(i) If something is prior in duration to x, then x has not existed forever
(j) If God is the creator of the world, then the world has not existed forever
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Aquinas’s rejects the principle (a) that all efficient causes must precede their
effects in time. Though he agrees that all efficient causation that produces its effect by
motion (motum) precedes the effect in time, he claims that efficient causes that produce
effects instantaneously need not precede their creation in time. Thus, God's act of
creation needn't precede the created being in time, if God acted instantaneously. To
understand why God could have acted instantaneously in creating the world, we turn to
Aquinas s account of creation in the Summa theologiae
.
40
In the ordinary causation
resulting in motion (that is, change), there is change from a former state to a latter state.
Woodworkers change wood into furniture, nature changes seed into animals, etc. But,
according to Aquinas, creation is not a real change, merely a change in how we think of
something. When something is created there is not a pre-existing thing that was
changed; instead, with creation the entire substance, both form and matter, is produced.
C hange transforms something that exists, but creation produces a new existent where
previously there was nothing. When things are produced by creation rather than
change, becoming and being are simultaneous - there is no time between a match
becoming lit and its being lit, or between a mind forming a concept and having one.
This is because the causal act of creation involves no intermediary - no stuff that needs
to be transformed. “In things of this kind, what is being made, is; but when we speak of
their being made, we mean that they are from another, and that previously they did not
exist. Hence, since creation is without motion, a thing is being created and has been
created at the same time .”41 God creates the world. He does not change something into
the world; thus, his efficient causation of the world would not be prior in time to it, but
rather, can be simultaneous with it.
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In the second argument, the claim is that the world is made from nothing. If the
world is made from nothing, or non-existence, then non-existence precedes existence in
duration, and thus, the world has had a beginning in duration. The argument holds that
the world is madefrom some N (namely ‘non-existence’), so N must have preceded the
world. Since the world is preceded by N, the world can't have existed forever. Aquinas
has two responses to this line of argument. Aquinas’s first response is that the first
premise is not necessarily true because ‘made from nothing' could mean something
other than the world is made from non-being. Aquinas quotes Anselm in order to
explain the error,
... [tor something to be said] to have been made from nothing, is
reasonable it we understand that the thing was, indeed, made, but that there was nothing
from which it was made. In a like sense we may say that, when a man is saddened
without cause, his sadness arises from nothing. In this sense, therefore, no absurdity
will follow if the conclusion drawn above is kept in mind, namely, that, with the
exception of the supreme essence, all things that exist were made by it out of nothing,
that is, not out of something.”42 The temporalist is confused in holding that ‘the world
was created from nothing' requires the following interpretation: 3x (w was created from
x) and x is non-existence. But, as Aquinas points out, it is possible for the proposition
‘the world was created from nothing' to be interpreted as: ~ 3x (w was created from x),
that is, ‘the world was not created from something.’ And since this is a possible
interpretation of creation ex nihilo, nothing at all is logically entailed to have preceded
in duration the existence of the world, and hence one cannot demonstrate that the world
had a beginning in duration.
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In Aquinas' second response to the argument, he concedes we might wish to
assert that creation ex nihilo be understood to mean that the world was made from non-
being
.
43
Even if we were required to interpret creation ex nihilo in this way, it does not
follow, Aquinas argues, that non-being precedes the world in duration. That is, even if
the world is created from non-being, it needn't come after non-being in time. Being
created from non-being could be understood temporally, but it also could be understood
as expressing a conceptual priority. Created beings are nothing before they are made to
exist - their existence depends wholly on their being made — so if uncreated natures are
not made to exist, they won t exist. Aquinas says, “But a creature does not have
existence except from another; regarded as left simply to itself, it is nothing; prior to its
existence, therefore, nothingness is its natural lot. ... We maintain that its nature is such
that it would be nothing if it were left to itself
. .
.
"
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By an analogy with the
illumination of the moon,4 " Aquinas explains why this fact about created natures shows
that they could he eternal in duration. Suppose that the moon were always illuminated
by the sun - that is, suppose the light of the sun (and the existence of the moon) were
eternal and that the sun was always shining on the moon. The moon in this case would
have always been illuminated. However, the moon, of its own nature, is not illuminated
- it is dark, and only receives illumination from a light source. If the light source were
removed, the moon would become dark. In this sense, we could talk of the moon being
made light from darkness, that is, it is by nature dark, while at the same time, could hold
that no darkness of the moon preceded in time its illumination. Similarly, Aquinas
argues, we can conceive of created beings in the same way - they are by nature nothing,
and it is from this nature, this non-being, that an existent creature is made. The non-
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existent nature of a thing does not precede the created, existent thing in time, just as the
darkness ot the moon (in the case presented) would not precede its illumination in time,
rather, since the creature is by nature nothing, its non-being is conceptually prior to its
being made, similar to the case in which a by-nature-dark moon is conceptually prior to
the moon’s being illuminated. Thus, even if we interpret creation ex nihilo as creation
from a non-existent nature, it does not logically follow that such a nature must precede
existence in time, and thus we cannot demonstrate that ‘the world is made from
nothing and the world has existed forever' are incompatible.
By showing that the first premise of each ot these two purported demonstrations
quia is in tact not necessarily true, Aquinas shows that these temporalist arguments can
provide no scientia concerning the age of the world. However, Aquinas seems only to
have shown that these two sorts of arguments fail to work - his response to them
doesn t obviously rule out the possibility of constructing another kind of argument that
an eternal world is self-contradictory
.
46 And yet Aquinas seems to claim confidently (in
the passage quoted earlier) that a contradiction could arise only if the cause precedes its
effect or if nothingness precedes existence in time. The source of Aquinas's confidence
that only these two cases could yield a contradiction is not clear. If Aquinas thinks that
these two arguments are the only reasonably good ones advanced, then he hasn't in
principle ruled out that other arguments for a contradiction are possible, and thus hasn't
ruled out the possibility that a world of finite duration could be shown by a
demonstration quia. There is some reason to interpret Aquinas in this way: after
presenting and rejecting the arguments against infinite duration due to precedence in
time, Aquinas appeals to the authority of Augustine and other Church fathers as well as
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philosophers in that these people also saw no contradiction in an eternal created world.
This seems to imply that Aquinas holds that since these arguments don't work, and
since authorities have found no contradiction, there is none to be found. Thus, by this
reasoning, Aquinas would hold that no contradiction can be (would be?) found in a
created, eternal world.
Under this interpretation of Aquinas, his argument that an eternal world is not
self
-contradictory is rather weak, since it merely seems to show that no one has, at least
thus far, proven that it is self-contradictory. As an interpretation of Aquinas, this is
unsatisfying, because it is uncommon for Aquinas to rely on authority in order to draw a
conclusion to a philosophical argument. Instead, Aquinas typically will first prove his
point, and then will appeal to authority in order to bolster his position, rather than
appeal to authority in order to justify his conclusion. If Aquinas thinks there is no
contradiction in an eternal world, either he thinks so because no one has been able to
demonstrate one, or else he has a more principled reason why no contradiction could be
found. The latter option is philosophically stronger and more consistent with Aquinas’s
own philosophical practices. It seems that if we can easily interpret Aquinas this way,
we ought to.
In his arguments from a consideration of creatures and of God, Aquinas shows
that the duration of the world is neither demonstrable by a consideration of its final
cause (i.e., God's intention in creating the world), nor of itsformal cause (i.e., the
nature of the world itself). In De aeternitate mundi
,
Aquinas considers only two
possible arguments for the incompatibility of a created world and an eternal world - that
some cause must be prior in time to the world’s existing or that non-being must be. In
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rebutting the first, Aquinas gives a treatment of the efficient cause of the world, namely
how God creates the world, and shows how a finite duration of the world cannot be
demonstrated from it. In rebutting the second, Aquinas considers the material cause of
the world, namely that from which the world is made, and also shows how a finite
duration ol the world cannot be demonstrated from it. In his arguments from creatures
and from God in the Summa theologiae and his responses to these two arguments in De
aetermtate mundi, Aquinas has shown that no demonstration about the duration of the
world can be given by considering final, formal, efficient and material causes. This list
is exhaustive, and thus, in responding to the two arguments in De aetermtate mundi.
Aquinas has ruled out the possibility of any explanation involving necessary causes of
the world s duration, and hence, any demonstration of it.
Without some ability to demonstrate causally the duration of the world, we can
have no scientia about its duration. Whether the world is finite or infinite in duration
then must be held either by opinion or faith. The arguments that Aquinas presents to
show that temporalist arguments cannot be demonstrations are largely philosophical
(they extensively employ an Aristotelian metaphysics), but they do include premises
that would be accepted only by Christians. As such, these arguments can persuade only
Christians and must therefore be directed towards them. Arguments made by etemalists
(who are clearly advocating a heretical and thus, presumably, non-Christian view), are
not treated quite so systematically by Aquinas. Because Aquinas has faith (and thus
certitude) that the world is not eternal, he can be sure that all etemalist demonstrations
are wrong. Aquinas’s approach to these is more piecemeal, but also wholly
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philosophical - he points out the philosophical errors made in etemalist demonstrations
and rebuts them one at a time.
4.4. The role of scientia in divine matters
As we saw in the last section, Aquinas takes great pains to show that the world,
which as a matter of faith is held to have had a beginning and a finite duration in time,
cannot be demonstrated to be such. Aquinas’s position is fairly controversial, and his
position is strongly criticized by theologians of the period
.
47 Why Aquinas so
strenuously defended such a theologically controversial position is not immediately
clear. A further, and perhaps more perplexing mystery, is why Aquinas strongly
attacked temporalists (with whom he agreed that the world was finite in duration) who
tried to demonstrate the truth of their position, while maintaining a rather mild response
to etemalists who tried to prove a heretical position.
A ready response to these questions would be to hold that Aquinas’s
epistemology required this position. According to Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of
cognition and his Aristotelian epistemological account of scientia
,
the human mind is
simply incapable of proving truths about the duration of the world (and, presumably,
truths about the other articles of faith). This philosophical result corresponds nicely
with Aquinas's account of faith as an epistemic state concerning “things that appear
not" and which is incompatible with scientia - if we simply cannot have scientia about
divine matters, then the faith we do have about them (particularly since it is
epistemically stronger than the other option, opinion), would seem to be epistemically
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reasonable. Under this interpretation, Aquinas is forced to take on the temporalist
mainstream because he is theologically as well as epistemologically obligated to do so.
This interpretation runs into difficulties, however, when we consider that there
are, according to Aquinas, some matters of faith that can be demonstrated. The
existence of God, for example, seems to be a matter of faith that Aquinas himself
demonstrates in his famous Five Ways. If faith concerns what cannot be proven, then it
seems odd that Aquinas would prove that God exists, and further, that He is simple, etc.
These proofs would seem to undermine the epistemological motivation for taking on the
temporal ists that was suggested by the interpretation above. Further, if epistemological
considerations led Aquinas to conclude that the duration of the world (or the Trinity, or
the Incarnation, etc.) could not be demonstrated, then why is it that similar
considerations did not lead Aquinas to conclude that the existence of God (or His
simplicity, etc.) also could not be demonstrated? To say the least, it seems odd that
Aquinas would so tenaciously argue against the demonstrability of a created, finite
world, while at the same time demonstrate other matters of faith. The Five Ways
represent a special, interesting case concerning the role reason plays in faith for
Aquinas. In the next section, we turn to a detailed examination of the Five Ways, in
particular focusing on how Aquinas uses them with respect to faith, and how his
approach to the existence of God differs from that taken with the duration of the world.
160
4.4.1. Reason and scientia of the divine: The Five Ways
Near the beginning of the Summa contra gentiles
,
Aquinas makes clear that
some matters concerning the divine are subject to reason while others are not:
There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths
about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God
is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to
reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths
about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the
light of the natural reason. 9
Aquinas goes on to explain that we cannot have scientia about certain truths about God
due to the limitations of our cognitive apparatus, as was discussed above (in section
4. 1 ). Though Aquinas holds that we cannot have perfect scientia about God (because
we cannot form any demonstrations from God’s essence), he does claim that we can
have scientia quia concerning God - that is, we can have scientia that God exists by
forming demonstrations from effects to their divine cause.
Now, in arguments proving the existence of God, it is not necessary to assume
the divine essence or quiddity as the middle term of the demonstration. ... In
place ol the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle term, as in demonstrations
quia. It is from such effects that the meaning of the name God is taken. For all
divine names are imposed either by removing the effects of God from Him or by
relating God in some way to His effects.
It is thereby likewise evident that, although God transcends all sensible things
and the sense itself, His effects, on which the demonstration proving His
existence is based, are nevertheless sensible things. And thus, the origin of our
knowledge in the sense applies also to those things that transcend the sense. 50
From this, Aquinas proceeds to present five ways in which the existence of God is
proven via a demonstration quia - in the first, for instance, he proceeds from an effect,
namely that something is in motion (and that this motion is evident to the senses), and
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from this effect, demonstrates the existence of its ultimate cause, the unmoved mover,
i.e. God.
This account presented in the Summa contra gentiles does not provide an answer
to the puzzles raised at the beginning of this section, however. Aquinas strenuously
argues that we can have neither perfect scientia nor scientia quia about the duration of
the world in time, and this would seem to be motivated by the argument from faith -
theological commitments would seem to require that faith is of things unseen. Yet,
here, Aquinas clearly holds that, concerning God, we can have scientia quia that He
exists (though not perfect scientia).
51 We seem to have an unresolved puzzle in
Aquinas - either matters of faith cannot be demonstrated at all (the theological
commitment of the argument from faith), in which case Aquinas should hold that we
cannot demonstrate God s existence; or some matters of faith can be demonstrated and
others cannot, and we need to understand which are demonstrable and which are not
(and also why Aquinas bucked the commonly held position by holding that the duration
of the world is one of those matters that cannot be demonstrated).
Some Aquinas scholars resolve this puzzle by arguing that the Five Ways were
never presented as demonstrations for the existence of God; rather, they either prove the
existence of some entity (an unmoved mover, uncaused causer, etc.) that may or may
not be God, " or they are intended to reveal truths not about God, but about the nature of
existence, causation, etc .
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Aquinas does clearly seem to claim that he is demonstrating
the existence of God, so before we entertain such interpretations, we should see whether
the puzzles raised can be resolved while taking Aquinas’s claims about the Five Ways
at face value. In his later, and more mature work, the Summa theologiae
,
Aquinas does
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seem to provide additional grounds for understanding why some matters of faith can be
demonstrated and others cannot.
In the Summa theologiae
,
Aquinas considers the objection that the existence of
God cannot be demonstrated, for faith is of things unseen and demonstration produces
scientia. Aquinas's response creates a distinction between two kinds of divine matters:
The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known
(nota) by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles
{pi cieambula) to the articles; tor taith presupposes {praesupponit) natural
cognition (cognitionem ), even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection the
perfectible. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a
proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of
being scientifically known and demonstrated
.
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As we see here, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of matters of faith — articles
and preambles. Preambles are those matters of faith which can be known by natural
reason, articles those known only by faith. The preambles also seem to be prior to the
articles - they somehow come before the articles, just as “faith presupposes natural
cognition, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection the perfectible.”
One way of interpreting the preamble/article distinction that should be avoided
is a logical one. Since the preambles are prerequisites for the articles, and since
believers who cannot demonstrate the preambles must presuppose them, it would seem
natural to conclude that Aquinas is characterizing a logical rather than epistemic
distinction between the preambles and the articles. For example, I cannot believe that
God is triune without believing that God exists. When I say that my belief that God is
triune presupposes my belief that God exists, it seems natural to infer that I am calling
attention to a logical relation between these two statements. Under this interpretation,
the preambles are distinguished from the articles because in order for the articles to be
true, the preambles must be true (though not vice-versa).
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However, the passages in Summa contra gentiles clearly point to an epistemic
rather than a logical distinction. In chapter 9, Aquinas notes that the truth of things is
not twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our
knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine
things. Further, in chapter 3, when Aquinas first introduces the concept of the twofold
truth of divine things, he goes on to discuss how angelic natural knowledge is greater
than that of humans, implying that the dividing line between knowable and not-
knowable for angels would be different than it is for human beings. If the twofold truth
of divine things in the Summa contra gentiles corresponds to the distinction between
preamble and article, then the distinction is clearly made on epistemic, not logical
grounds, for the distinction is drawn in different places for angels and humans.
I hat the difference between preamble and article is meant to be epistemic seems
borne out in the Summa theologiae as well. After defining articles of faith as being
enumerated on epistemic grounds, Aquinas discusses two ways in which the articles of
faith can be considered.
...the formal account of the object of faith can be understood in two ways. One
way, on the part of the very thing believed. And in this way the formal account
of all believable things is one, namely, the first truth. And in this way articles
are not distinguished. The formal account of believable things can be taken in
another way, on our part. And in this way the formal account is that the
believable is something not seen. And in this way the articles of faith are
distinguished, as has been said.^
On the part of the formal object of faith, that is, God, not only is there no logical
distinction between articles, but there would be no logical distinction between articles
and preambles - each truth about God entails and is entailed by the others (and strictly
speaking, cannot be distinguished from the others). The second way of considering
articles is from our point of view, and in this way the preambles would be distinguished
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from the articles for they would be seen (by those who have proven them) whereas the
articles would be unseen - but this is an epistemic distinction.
A distinction between preambles and articles would give Aquinas room to
wriggle out of the puzzle raised earlier. The solution would proceed as follows: even
though faith is of things unseen, faith concerns articles* and the existence of God can
be demonstrated because it is a preamble. At this point, Aquinas' solution to our puzzle
is not very satisfying because it remains exposed to the obvious objection that, if
anything, “God exists" is central to faith. In order for the article/preamble distinction to
be a valuable solution to our puzzle, we need to understand better why Aquinas counts
some propositions as articles and others as preambles. We take this up in the next
section.
4.4.2. The existence of God as a part of faith
The Five Ways, Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God, are taken by many
philosophers to be intended to provide some sort of epistemic justification for faith.
This could provide a ground lor counting God's existence as epistemically distinct from
articles of faith. If faith needs epistemic justification, it is perhaps to be found in
demonstrable preambles — whereas faith itself is concerned with indemonstrable
articles. The interpretation might go something like this - faith without some sort of
rational justification is unreasonable and epistemically inappropriate, and Aquinas
presented the Five Ways as a means of providing just such a rational justification for
faith. Anthony Kenny expresses exactly this position, in The Five Ways
:
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f
ems that 11 belief in the existence of God cannot be rationally
justified, there can be no good reason for adopting any of the traditional
monotheistic religions. A philosophical proof of God's existence from the
nature of the world would not be the only form such a rational justification
might take: a man might, for instance, come to accept the existence of God
through believing something in the world to be a revelation from God
... Those
philosophers and theologians who still consider belief in God to need rational
justification frequently offer the arguments of Aquinas as such a justification
.
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If the Five Ways were Aquinas's attempt to rationally justify faith, and if these proofs
are unsound, then faith would tail to be made reasonable by them. A great deal of work
in philosophy has been devoted to understanding and attacking or defending the
soundness ot the Five Ways, presumably precisely because they are seen (if sound) to
provide epistemic justification for faith . 58
Given my interpretation ot Aquinas’s account of faith, we run into an immediate
problem in interpreting Aquinas this way, for faith is not had by means of proof and yet
Aquinas, as is well known, offers five proofs for the existence of God. Further, he
clearly identifies his proofs as demonstrations quia (which produces scientia quia),
59
and I have argued in the last chapter that faith could not be scientia quia. This difficulty
is compounded when we consider numerous claims Aquinas makes such as “it is
impossible to have faith and scientia about the same thing.”60 It would seem that one
cannot have faith about matters for which one has a proof, such as the existence of God.
This seems, to say the least, a peculiar result of Aquinas’s account of faith as I have
interpreted it. In contrast, many interpreters of Aquinas take his proofs to be the basis
for beliefs in the existence of God . 61 But if I am right and the Five Ways are not
intended by Aquinas to be the basis of faith, then what are they for?
There is some disagreement among Aquinas scholars about what the Five Ways
actually prove, but the following claims are clearly found in Aquinas: Aquinas provides
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demonstrations quia"2 (a demonstration from effects to causes) that establish or at least
are related to the existence of what Christians call God," and the result of these
demonstrations is not an article of faith because it is known by natural reason.64 but
instead is a “preamble to the articles”
(,pmeambulum)
,
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though if these preambles were
not known by natural reason, they could be held by faith. 66
Aquinas makes it quite clear that the preambles can be assented to by either of
two epistemic means: demonstration quia or faith, but for a given person one cannot
have both faith and demonstration of a preamble. 67 There would seem to be four
epistemic scenarios when it comes to preambles: (1) a person first demonstrates the
preambles and later comes to have faith in them, (2) a person first has faith in the
preambles and later comes to demonstrate them, (3) a person has faith in the preambles
and never demonstrates them, or (4) a person demonstrates the preambles and never has
faith in them, for Aquinas, (1) is impossible (assuming the demonstrations have not
been undermined68 ), for one cannot go from scientia that something is true, to a lack of
scientia (as would be required to have faith) that it is true. Of the remaining three
possibilities, only one seems a likely scenario for how the Five Ways are to be used: (3)
is ot no interest here, for it would not seem to bear any relevance to our trying to
determine the purpose of the Five Ways and (4) seems highly unlikely as an explanation
for the Five Ways, for Aquinas would not propose proofs for the sake of people who
might believe in God through proofs rather than faith, since he thinks that faith is
necessary for salvation
60
and that belief motivated by proof is without merit. 70 Thus, it
would seem that Aquinas introduces the Five Ways for the sake of those who already
have faith in the preambles. This is borne out by Aquinas's claims about the purpose of
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the Summa theologiae. In the prologue, he claims that the work is a work of sacred
doctrine (sacra doctrina) intended for the instruction of beginning theology students, all
of whom would presumably have faith in the preambles (e.g. in the existence of God.
etc.).
Why should the faithful need or want proofs for what they already believe? The
Five Ways appear to be demonstrations of philosophical (or natural) theology, in which
Aquinas argues to theological conclusions (e.g. that God exists) without employing any
revealed truths in his arguments. This interpretation, that the Five Ways are intended to
be a project in philosophical theology leaves something to be desired. For, in question
1, immediately preceding the Five Ways, Aquinas clearly holds that sacred doctrine
(which is the enterprise of the Summa theologiae) is a science in which demonstrations
proceed from divinely revealed truths, 71 rather than a science in which demonstrations
proceed to divine truths. If the Five Ways are to be understood as part of an enterprise
of philosophical theology, then we are confronted with the worry of needing to
understand why Aquinas sets up the Summa as a project of sacred doctrine, and then
immediately proceeds to do philosophical theology.
This tension in Aquinas is not easily resolved. In question 1, Aquinas does seem
to hold that philosophical theology is different from sacred doctrine:
Sciences are differentiated according to the different natures of knowable things.
For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion - that
the earth, for instance, is round; the astronomer by means of mathematics (that
is, by abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which are dealt with in the
philosophical sciences, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not
also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence
theology which pertains to sacred doctrine differs in genus from that theology
which is part of philosophy. 72
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From this passage, it would seem that the Five Ways, as a product of natural reason,
would be part of philosophical theology, not sacred doctrine. But in the prologue to
question 2, in which Aquinas introduces the Five Ways, he clearly seems to think that
the Five Ways are part of sacred doctrine: “Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is
to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the
beginning ot things and their last end ... we must consider whether God exists ...”73
The Five Ways, because they are known by natural reason, don’t seem to be a part of
sacred doctrine, and yet Aquinas clearly seems to hold that the existence of God (shown
by the Five Ways) is the first thing sacred doctrine must consider. How are we to
resolve this apparent conflict?
Interpreters have not been unified in how to understand Aquinas on this issue. 74
At the risk of entering a centuries-old debate, I offer the following interpretation. 7 ^
Immediately prior to presenting the Five Ways, Aquinas describes exactly what he is
doing:
When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes
the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence. This is
especially the case in regard to God ... 76
Aquinas here holds that in demonstrations of the Five Ways, a posteriori effects serve
in place ot definitions. In question 1, Aquinas discusses the usefulness of such an
approach:
Although we cannot know of God what He is, nevertheless in [sacred] doctrine
we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition,
in regard to whatever is treated of in this doctrine concerning God, even as in
some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its
effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause. 77
Because God’s essence is ineffable, Aquinas holds that we cannot know what God is;
however, by means of demonstrations from effects, we are able to consider things about
169
God - for instance, that He is an unmoved mover. Consideration of these things is. as
we saw in the prologue to question 2 (above), instrumental in achieving the goals of
sacred doctrine. If we understand the premises of the Five Ways to be primarily part of
one of the philosophical sciences, then we can understand why Aquinas uses the Five
Ways, a product of natural reason, in a work concerned with revealed theology. He
says:
This science [i.e. sacred doctrine] can in a sense take from the philosophical
sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its
teaching clearer. For it takes its principles not from other sciences, but
immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not take from other
sciences as from the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
handmaidens; just as the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply
their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due
to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intellect, which is
more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed
the other sciences), to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of
this science.
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The Five Ways, though they seem to prove that God exists, more importantly
lor a student ol sacred doctrine, help the student consider God in new ways. For
instance, the First Way proves from the existence of moving things the existence of an
unmoved mover. Aquinas recognizes that these proofs are employed by philosophers as
well as Christian theologians
79
- these arguments do not seem to prove clearly that a
uniquely Christian God exists, which seems to be why the conclusion of each argument
is not about the existence of God but about the existence merely of some entity. The
First Way, for instance, concludes with “Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first
mover which is moved by no other.”80 That the First Way seems to prove only the
existence of an unmoved mover is unproblematic for Aquinas, for the Five Ways, as I
have argued, are intended for those who already have faith. For the faithful student of
sacred doctrine who already believes that the Christian God exists, this unmoved mover,
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the creator of all motion, is, of course, God Himself. And this is why Aquinas
concludes the First Way with the observation, “And this [the unmoved mover] everyone
understands to be God.” Each of the Five Ways has this form - an entity is proven to
exist, and this entity is then identified (without proof) as God. Without an implicit
appeal to faith, these proofs do not demonstrate the existence of the Christian God. and
thus they do not and cannot justify faith. Their importance is in what they allow the
faithful to learn about God. The First Way, for instance, reveals to the student of sacred
doctrine that God is unmoved, that He started motion without moving, and that motion
requires God. From the unmoved mover argument, we learn some additional truths
about God and creation. The Five Ways (and other demonstrations) provide an
opportunity for students of sacred doctrine to understand better the matters of faith that
they already accept
.
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In these proofs, reason investigates what faith already accepts to
be true.
For Aquinas, a further reason for studying proofs of what one already believes is
that they provide for personal improvement. Studying these proofs helps to promote the
contemplative life, because it helps train the intellect and helps remove obstacles to
contemplation of the divine - namely those erroneous arguments offered against the
faith. “ Further, the study of them “turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and
tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails ... It also helps to remove the
desire of riches ... It also helps to teach obedience
.
..”
84
For those whose lives are
devoted to the service of God, Aquinas cautions that these proofs should be pursued
only insofar as doing so aims at sacred doctrine. Otherwise, those who pursue reason
run the risk of becoming impious . 84
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If, as I have argued, the proofs of the existence of God do not serve as an
epistemic justificatory precursor to faith, nor does the existence of God serve as a
logical presupposition of the articles of faith, then what exactly does Aquinas mean
when he labels the existence of God (and other demonstrable conclusions) preambles -
that is, in what sense do they presuppose the articles of faith? As 1 argued in the
previous chapter, taith, according to Aquinas, is an epistemic state independent from
scientia - faith neither depends on scientia, nor vice versa. However unique faith is. it
occupies a place on an epistemic spectrum ranging from opinion to scientia - as a part
ot this epistemic scale, faith is as much a component of reason as is scientia. Recall
that reason, for Aquinas, “denotes a transition from one thing to another by which the
human soul reaches or arrives at cognition of something else.”85 Faith, in this way, is as
much an act of reason as scientia. Understood in this way, then, faith is presupposed by
natural cognition in that our natural reasoning powers serve as a necessary pre-condition
for having faith at all (as well as for scientia and opinion), just as human nature is a
necessary pre-condition for grace and the existence of a substance is a necessary pre-
condition for its being perfected. The difference between article and preamble, then, is
that articles of faith require our having faith in order to count them as being known (that
is, cognized with certitude), whereas preambles do not require faith, but merely the
exercising of our natural reasoning powers (that is, our ability to perform
demonstrations).
The existence of God, as well as other demonstrable proofs, are distinguishable
from articles of faith in that they don't require faith in order for them to be known (that
is, to have scientia about them). It does not follow from this, however, that matters of
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faith, such as the existence of God. concern things that are seen, for faith, as it is
defined by Aquinas, requires that we neither see why nor that a proposition is true, but
merely/-see that it is to be believed. When we have faith about God's existence, the
truth of this proposition is unseen; when we see the truth of God's existence (through,
for example, the Five Ways), we no longer have faith about it.
4.4.3. The puzzle of the duration of the world resolved
My interpretation of the Five Ways and of the preambles shows that the Five
Ways do not undermine the argument from faith posited earlier. Faith, for Aquinas, is a
cognitive state that essentially requires that its object be unseen, and the duration of the
world, unlike the existence of God, is an article of faith, that is, knowable only by
means of faith. But why, returning to the puzzle posed earlier, is Aquinas so adamant
that the duration of the world is an article of faith, especially considering the
controversy surrounding this view? Although Aquinas identifies in the Summa contra
gentiles a twofold mode of truth about what we can know about God, and in the Summa
theologiae, he refines this distinction to one of preambles and articles, he does not
provide a systematic account of which propositions count as preambles and which as
articles. Theologically, there does not seem to be great significance to some proposition
being counted as a preamble versus as an article. That God exists, or is one, is
demonstrable and thus a preamble, but that the world was created with a beginning in
time is not, at least according to Aquinas. But nothing of great theological importance
seems to rest on Aquinas’s position on whether the duration of the world is an article or
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preamble no heresy or theological error seems to follow from allowing that the
duration of the world could be demonstrated (even if it has, at least so far, not been).
The problem Aquinas has with this view, then, must be philosophical.
Aquinas s most exasperated response to temporalist proofs is in his De
aeternitate mundi, as we saw earlier (in section 4.3.4). In this polemical treatise.
Aquinas is primarily concerned with the arguments that the world could not be eternal
because either God s efficient causation of the world was temporally prior to it, or the
non-existence of the world was temporally prior to it. Aquinas's response to these
arguments, and his exasperation with their proponents, is due to the philosophically
limited views these arguments advance. The Aristotelian causation implied by the first
account is too limiting for Aquinas's purposes. If he allows that efficient causes must
always be temporally prior to their effects, his Christian-Aristotelian synthesis is
deprived of the ability to posit creation as a miraculous and special form of causation.
Further, according to Aquinas this view of causation is philosophically just plain wrong,
as his counter-examples of instant illumination are intended to show. If, on the other
hand, he allows that non-existence must temporally precede existence, as the Neo-
Platonic temporalists argue, then Aquinas becomes constrained in his ability to use an
Aristotelian metaphysics in support of his theological endeavors. In each case, the
temporalists, by asserting that they can demonstrate that the world is finite in duration,
have, at the same time, limited the metaphysical options available to Aquinas. This, I
believe, is why he finds these arguments so tiresome, and why he attacks them so
vigorously - they, at root, challenge the validity of Aquinas’s approach of freely
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employing a modified Arislotelianism to help understand and explain theological
problems.
4.5. Probable reasoning about divine matters
In addition to providing demonstrations about divine matters, Aquinas clearly
employs reasoning (and sometimes proofs) to refute arguments against faith, as he does
when he argues against each of the purported demonstrations advanced in favor of the
eternity of the world. Aquinas also observes a mode of argumentation that can be
employed even for matters for which we can know only by faith:
... there are certain probable (verisimilis ) arguments that should be brought forth
in order to make divine truth apparent (manifestandam ). This should be done
for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting
those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would
rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our
acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.
As we saw with the Five Ways, in the case of preambles, demonstrations can be
provided for the faithful that help them investigate truths that they already believe. So
too, can probable arguments be given for the same purpose. These arguments, if they
were not being provided to those who already had faith, would merely result in opinion,
since their premises are merely probable - that is, they are not necessarily true. Thus,
Aquinas warns, we should not offer them to non-believers, since they may recognize
that these arguments are not compelling (they don’t yield certitude) and may seem
weak, if used for apologetics. In the case of the duration of the world, though Aquinas
strenuously argues that no demonstration is possible, he does find some probable
arguments persuasive, as for instance, the following.
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of thinSs the end of God’s will is His own goodness as it is
manifested in His effects. Now, His power and goodness are made manifest
above all by the fact that things other than Himself were not always in existence.
or this fact shows clearly that these things owe their existence to Him, and also
is proof that God does not act by a necessity of His nature, and that His power of
acting is infinite. Respecting the divine goodness, therefore, it was entirely
fitting that God should have given created things a temporal beginning
.
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Since God s end in creating is the manifestation of his goodness, anything that reveals
that goodness is fitting (but not necessary) to that end. Finite temporal created beings,
imply, to Thomas, an infinite, eternal creator. By reasoning from the temporal
existence of the world, we come to comprehend God better. This comprehension is not
scientia, for many of the premises in the above argument are merely probable, and not
necessary (e.g., that divine power is made manifest by the creation of finite temporal
beings), and it is not clear that anyone would have any reason for believing the premises
to be true, except as they are matters of faith that have already been accepted.
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contradict faith and thus he has certitude that the conclusions of these demonstrations
must be false. Aquinas could have left his response at that, but seems keen on helping
to eliminate the philosophical errors that led to these demonstrations, which helps
explain his careful, temperamentally mild, philosophical rebuttals to the etemalist
arguments.
14
“fidei articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, quia fides de non
apparentibus est, ut dicitur ad hebr. xi.” (ST 1.46.2 sed contra)
20
“creatio mundi ex tempore quamvis sit articulus fidei, tamen ratione, ut
videtur, potest investigari. Nee hoc est in praeiudicium fidei, dum no propter rationem
fidei assentitur, sed merito fidei ad eius intelligeniam pervenitur.” (Quaestiones de
aeternitate mundi
,
q. 2, responsio) Though Pecham here merely states that the question
of the eternity of the world can be “investigated” ( investigari) by reason (something
which Aquinas also accepts), he has a stronger claim in mind - he actually goes on to
demonstrate that the world cannot be eternal (something Aquinas does not think can be
done).
21
Aquinas also has an argument from authority to help convince the etemalists
that no demonstration of the age of the world can be given. He points out that the
arguments given by Aristotle which appear to prove that the world is eternal, are not, in
fact, intended to be demonstrations. He gives three reasons for thinking this:
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First, because, both in Physics VIII and in De Caelo 1 he advances some
SeThem sf df
'
laxagoras
' Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons torefute the . Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the
es imony o t e ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading
what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says in Book I of the Topics that there
eternal (STI 46
°f WhlCh We d° not have Proofs ’ such as ’ ‘whether the world is
As Aquinas points out, one does not appeal to the testimony of the ancients (in
the case of the argument from faith, these include Gregory and Moses, and in this case
Aristotle) to give a demonstration. So by Aquinas's own standards, the argument from
raith has not yet proven that we cannot demonstrate the age of the world, but has merely
given us reasons to believe that such demonstrations may not be available to us.
22’ “dem°nstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. unumquodque autem,
secundum rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hie et nunc, propter quod dicitur quod
umversaha sunt ubique et semper, unde demonstrari non potest quod homo, aut caelum
aut lapis non semper fuit.” (ST 1.46.2)
23
"Nee obstat, si dicatur quod tabs quantitas consequitur naturam caeli vel
caelestium corporum, sicut et omnium natura constantium est aliqua determinata
quantitas, quia sicut divina potentia non limitatur ad hanc quantitatem magis quam ad
illam, ita non limitatur ad naturam cui debeatur tabs quantitas, magis quam ad naturam
cui aba quantitas debeatur. Et sic eadem redibit quaestio de natura, quae est de
quantitate, quamvis concedamus, quod natura caeli non sit indifferens ad quambbet
quantitatem, nee sit in eo possibilitas ad abam quantitatem nisi ad istam ” (DPD 3.17)
'‘Nam tempus est extrinsecum a re, sicut et locus; unde etiam in caelo, in quo
non est possibilitas respectu alterius quantitatis vel accidentis interius inhaerentis, est
tamen in eo possibilitas respectu loci et situs, cum locabter moveatur; et etiam respectu
temporis, cum semper tempus succedat tempori, sicut est successio in motu et in ubi;
unde non potest dici, quod neque tempus neque ubi consequatur naturam eius, sicut de
quantitate dicebatur. Unde patet quod ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet quod
praefigatur universo determinata quantitas durationis, sicut et determinata quantitas
dimensionis. Unde non potest necessario concludi aliquid de universi duratione, ut per
hoc ostendi possit demonstrative mundum semper fuisse.” (DPD 3.17)
25
“unde, cum nee etiam ex parte divinae potentiae quae est infmita, nee divinae
bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis universi sumi possit,
oportet quod eius ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut si quaeratur, quare
quantitas caeli sit tanta et non maior, non potest huius ratio reddi nisi ex voluntate
producentis.” (DPD 3.17)
26
“voluntas enim dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi circa ea quae absolute
necesse est deum velle, talia autem non sunt quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est.
potest autem voluntas divina homini manifestari per revelationem. cui fides innititur.
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^
e
^
mUndum incoePlsse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel scibile ” (ST
1.46.2)
27
finem ” (ST
& ^^^ inqUantUm ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in
28
29
Van Steenberghen (1980), p. 23.
See section 2.4 for Aquinas’s account of demonstration and scientia quia.
30
See note 1 7, above.
31 William de la Mare, criticizing Aquinas in 1278/9, uses this term to describe
these sorts of arguments. See Hoenen (1990), p. 48.
32
See DPD3.14.
33
si autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, vel hoc dicetur quia deus non potuit
facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi deus posset facere ”(DAM 1)
34
“si autem dicatur quod hoc non potest fieri, hoc non potest intelligi nisi
duobus modis, vel duas causas veritatis habere: vel propter remotionem potentiae
passivae, vel propter repugnantiam intellectuum.” (DAM 2)
35 And this would seem to conform to the orthodox position of the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo.
36
Heretical because such a passive potency is prior to creation, and thus,
uncreated. And thus there would be something that God did not create.
37 *
“in hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a deo secundum totam
substantiam, et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem. vel non.”
(DAM 3)
38
Aquinas does not seem to consider in DAM that (2) could be true because one
of the concepts to be conjoined is itself self-contradictory, thus either The world has
existed forever' or The world was created by God’ would be self-contradictory.
Perhaps he does not consider this because he feels he has already resolved this
possibility in earlier texts. Clearly, all Christians will reject out of hand as heretical the
view that The world was created by God' is self-contradictory (and Aquinas shows that
this is not self-contradictory by arguing that God created the world in ST 1.44.1). Our
discussion of the argument from a consideration of creatures above does seem to show
that an eternal world is not self-contradictory: the nature of the world, as Aquinas has
argued, does not contain its duration of existence, and thus having an infinite duration
would seem to be compatible with the essence of the world. Another approach to
asserting the self-contradictory nature of a world with infinite duration centers around
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arguments that show an absurdity in there being an actual number of infinite dayshese sorts of arguments are not dealt with systematically, but one by one (see for
example, SCG 11.38), and thus, I shall not discuss them in detail here. Some scholars
find Aquinas s responses seemingly inconsistent (see Van Steenberghen
( l VoU), p. 16-18) or unsatisfying (see Kovach ( 1 976), p. 1 75- 1 76).
39
“si emm repugnant, hoc non est nisi propter alterum duorum, vel propter
utrumque: aut quia oportet ut causa agens praecedat duratione; aut quia oportet quod
non esse praecedat duratione.’' (DAM 3)
40
See ST 1.45.2 ad 2-3.
“et in his, quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, et prius
non ruisse. unde, cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est ” (ST
1.45.2 ad 3)
“tertia, inquit, interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum
intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum, per similem
significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa, dicitur contristatus de
nihilo. secundum igitur hunc sensum, si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est. quia
praeter summam essentiam cuncta quae sunt ab eadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, idest non ex
aliquo; nihil inconveniens sequetur.” (DAM 6). In this passage Aquinas is quoting
Anselm from Monologium, 8. The same position expressed in Aquinas’s own words
can be found in SCG 11.38 ad 2.
Perhaps such an assertion would be driven by theological concerns, for
instance, if there were reason to think that other interpretations of creation ex nihilo
would be heretical.
44 u
“esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio; sibi autem relicta in se considerata
nihil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi nihilum quam esse, nee oportet quod propter hoc
sit simul nihil et ens, quia duratione non praecedit: non enim ponitur, si creatura semper
fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nihil sit: sed ponitur quod natura eius tabs esset quod esset
nihil, si sibi relinqueretur.” (DAM 7)
Actually, Aquinas uses for his example the illumination of air, but he also
observes that his argument works even more clearly with the illumination of the planets.
I'll discuss the illumination of the moon, rather than of the air, since it sounds odd to
modem ears to talk about illuminated and dark air.
46
For instance (as was noted in footnote 38 above), that an eternally created
world is impossible because any actual infinite is impossible.
47
For instance, in 1278-9, not long after Aquinas’s death, the Franciscan
William de la Mare wrote a scathing critique of Aquinas views, Correctorium Fratris
Thomae. In this work de la Mare holds that Aquinas’s views that the articles of faith
(including that the world was created with a finite duration) cannot be proven, is false.
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is contrary to Scripture, the Saints and the doctors, nourishes doubt and is harmful
er than conducive to faith, and the arguments Aquinas gives are neither
philosophically nor theologically viable. (For an examination of de la Mare'sC orectorium, see Hoenen (1990).)
48
chapter 5.
For a more thorough discussion of the epistemic reasonableness of faith
,
see
49 u . .
est autem in his quae de deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus, quaedam
namque vera sunt de deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut deum
esse trinum et unum. quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest,
sicut est deum esse, deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi
demonstrative de deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.” (SCG 1.3 n2)
“in rationibus autem quibus demonstratur deum esse, non oportet assumi pro
medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco
quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex
huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis deus. nam omnia divina nomina’
imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine dei
ad suos effectus.
patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius
tamen ellectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum deum esse, sensibiles
sunt, et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt ”
(SCG 1.12 n8-9)
1
In SCG 1.14 ff, Aquinas provides additional and different ways in which we
can have scientia quia about God. In these chapters, rather than arguing from effects to
causes, as with the Five Ways, he argues by way of “remotion”; that is, he proves truths
about God by showing what God is not.
52 Norman Kretzmann (1997), p. 88, for instance, observes that the arguments
lor the existence of God really only prove the existence of a metaphysical entity
Kretzmann calls 'alpha.' Later arguments by Aquinas fill out the Christian character of
this entity. Similarly, see Davies (1992), p. 26.
Though many interpret the Five Ways as proving the existence of the
Christian God, or at least of some entity (an unmoved mover, uncaused causer, etc.),
some have argued that the Five Ways are not intended to prove the existence of an
entity, rather, they establish something not about God but about other things, such as
truths about natural causation (see, for instance, Fogelin (1990)) or the nature of finite
being (see the discussion of Mascall’s views in Kinnick (I960))
54
“ad primum ergo dicendum quod deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per
rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de deo, ut dicitur rom. i non sunt articuli fidei, sed
praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut
gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se
182
demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi
capit.” (ST 1.2.2 ad 1)
ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non
ad secundum dicendum quod ratio formalis obiecti fidei potest accipi
duplKUtcr. uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae. et sic ratio formalis omnium
credibilmm es t una
.
scilicet veritas prima. et ex hac parte articuli non distinguuntur. alio
°d
.°P°teSt aCCipi tormalls ratl° credibihum ex parte nostra, et sic ratio formalis
u n,
e
^ “I f n0n ViSUm - et ex hac parte articuli fidei distinguuntur. ut visum est.”(b 1 11-11. 1 .6 ad 2)
56
That faith is primarily concerned with articles
II-II. 1.6-7.
is advanced by Aquinas in ST
57
Kenny (1969), p. 4.
58
Typical of this view is that held by Clark (1961). He says, “Now, if the
cosmological argument (leaving the ontological argument out of consideration) is
invalid, either Christianity has no rational foundation, or a meaning for reason must be
found that is independent of Thomistic philosophy.” (p. 35)
59
See ST 1.2.2
60
See QDV 14.9.
61
Jenkins (1997) conveniently cites several texts that offer the Evidentialist
Interpretation. (See his footnote 14 on p.252). They are: Hick (1966), p. 20-1;
Penelhum (1977), p. 145; Plantinga (1983), p. 40-7; and Pojman (1986), p. 32-40. I add
to this list Kenny (1969), p. 4, who also very clearly advocates an Evidentialist line.
62 ST 1.2.2: Demonstration ... through the effect ... is called a demonstration
quia; ... Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be
demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.”
ST 1.2.3: “The existence of God can be proved in five ways. ... Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands
to be God. ... Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which
everyone gives the name of God.
. . . Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of
some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. ... Therefore
there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness,
and every other perfection; and this we call God. ... Therefore some intelligent being
exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”
64 ST 1.2.2 ad 1 : “The existence of God and other like truths about God, which
can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith ...”
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That the Five Ways are preambles to the articles of faith is often taken to be
evidence that Aquinas considered them to be a rational justification for faith Howeverthe priority suggested by the gambles is ambiguous - it could mean that prior to one'shaving faith one must have proof of the existence of God; or it could mean that the
existence ot God is necessarily prior to one’s having faith. What Aquinas says in the
remainder of the passage quoted above seems to suggest this latter interpretation: “For
aith presupposes natural knowledge, just as grace does nature and all perfections which
ey per ect. Just as grace necessarily depends on a nature (for without natures God
has nothing to which he can give His grace), so too does faith depend on (the object of)
natural knowledge, in the sense that in order to have faith it is necessary that God (the
object of natural knowledge) must exist. The analogy with grace does not work,
however, if the passage is interpreted so that faith is understood to require a prior
natural knowledge of God.
ST 1.2.2 ad 1
. ... there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a
proof, from accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being
scientia and demonstrated.”
67
See ST II-II.1.5.
68
For example, we might undermine a demonstration previously held by
forgetting it, or by some other mental defect by which we fail to see the truth of that
which previously was evident to us.
69
See ST II-II.2.4.
70
See ST II-II.2.10.
71
See ST LI. 8.
72"
"ad secundum dicendum quod diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem
scientiarum inducit. eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta
quod terra est rotunda, sed astrologus per medium mathematicum, idest a materia
abstractum; naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum. unde nihil
prohibet de eisdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod
sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod
cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis. unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam
pertinet, differt secundum genus ab ilia theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.” (ST
1.1.1 ad 2)
“quia lgitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est dei cognitionem
tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium
rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est manifestum; ad
huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes
... primo considerandum est an deus sit ...”
(ST 1.2 prol.)
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ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum. necesse
est uti effectu loco defmitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc maxime
contingit in deo.” (ST 1.2.2 ad 2)
ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet de deo non possimus scire quid est.
utimur tamen eius effectu, in hac doctrina, vel naturae vel gratiae, loco defmitionis ad
ea quae de deo in hac doctrina considerantur, sicut et in aliquibus scientiis philosophicis
demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco defmitionis
causae.” (ST 1.1.7 ad 1)
78
ad secundum dicendum quod haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a
philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad maiorem
manifestationem eorum quae in hac scientia traduntur. non enim accipit sua principia ab
alns scientiis, sed immediate a deo per revelationem. et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis
tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut
architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari. et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur
eis, non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellects
nostri; qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae)
cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia
traduntur.” (ST 1. 1 .5 ad 2)
79
Though he does not credit the First Way to Aristotle in ST, he does so
explicitly in SCG 1.13.
80
The other Ways conclude similarly, see ST 1.2.3.
8
1
For others who have also argued that the five ways primarily serve to aid
understanding of God see Velecky (1994), p. 63ff; W. J. Hankey (1987), p. 42ff; and
Davies (1992), p. 26.
87
“ The proofs might also play some role in converting unbelievers by removing
obstacles that prevent them from having faith - for instance, the belief that God cannot
exist. See ST II-II.2.10 ad 2, SCG 1.9.
83
In ST II-II. 188.5.
84
See ST II-II. 188. 5.ad 3.
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ratio vero discursum quemdam designat, quo ex uno in aliud cognoscendum
' 5 I) SC— 21 discuss.cn of
86
-'sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae
vensimiles tnducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad
adversaries convmcendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficient^ eos magis in suo errore
tcr'rTro
aeSt,mareW nos Pr°Pter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire ”(oUj 1.9 n
.2)
87
"finis emm divinae voluntatis in rerum productione est eius bonitas inquantum
per causata mamfestatur. potissime autem manifestatur divina virtus et bonitas per hocquod res aliae praeter ipsum non semper fuerunt. ex hoc enim ostenditur manifeste quod
res aliae praeter ipsum ab ipso esse habent, quia non semper fuerunt. ostenditur etiam
quod non agit per necessitatem naturae; et quod virtus sua est infinita in agendo, hoc
ig! tur conven i enti^simurn fuit divinae bonitati, ut rebus creatis principium durationis
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CHAPTER 5
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: AQUINAS’S RECONCILIATION OF FAITH
AND REASON
5.1. An Aristotelian epistemology
As we discussed in chapter 2, Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian framework for his
epistemology. This is particularly significant when we try to understand and evaluate
Aquinas’ solution to the problem of faith and reason. A Christian philosopher who is
concerned about charges that faith is epistemically irresponsible may attempt to develop
accounts of faith and reason in order to defend epistemic compatibilism. 1 Compatibilist
solutions to the problem of faith and reason run the risk of appearing to be ad hoc,
particularly if the accounts of faith and reason that are provided seem motivated more
by apologetics than by developing an adequate account of religious epistemology.
Epistemic compatibilism can be easily had, but at the risk of being philosophically
uninteresting. Consider, as an example, the following solution to the problem of faith
and reason.
Suppose we stipulate that faith is a special case of ordinary belief: faith is belief
justified by the evidence of miracles and by the evidence adduced by creation scientists.
Suppose further that 1 claim that the results of modem scientific inquiry that seems to
contradict the claims of faith (e.g., the theory of evolution), have no better evidence in
support of them than does faith, and in fact, the evidence for evolution is less “strong”
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than the evidence for creation science. When two accounts (evolution, creation science)
conflict, as many scientific theories do, it is (we might claim) epidemically responsible
to believe the one which has the strongest evidence, which in this case would seem to
be creation science. Faith under this story would be epistemically responsible, and we
might also hold that scientific approaches to matters pertaining to the divine would also
be epistemically responsible, if the science weren't so bad (if, for example, scientists
didn t keep neglecting the evidence in favor of creation science and against evolution).
In order to defend such a solution to faith and reason adequately, we'd need to establish
the truth of a number of claims — that there is evidence of miracles and for creation
science, that such evidence exceeds that of evolution, etc. But there is an underlying
and more fundamental problem with this solution and others like it - it seems to assume
an epistemology that guarantees epistemic compatibilism. Under this hypothetical
solution, faith and reason turn out to be compatible - in fact, they appear to be
fundamentally the same: faith is beliefjustified by sufficient evidence, and so is reason
(or science). But surely this solution is inadequate for precisely the same reason it
succeeds in establishing epistemic compatibilism - we don’t really think that faith and
reason (or science) are basically the same.
When Aquinas adopts Aristotle's epistemology and his conditions for scientia
and demonstration, opinion and probable arguments, Aquinas avoids the worry that his
account of reason is an ad hoc construction motivated by apologetics. Aristotle’s
philosophy represented a major source of tension between faith and reason (in this case,
philosophy) in the 13 th century. Aristotelian incompatibilists were inclined to favor
Aristotle over Christian faith, theist incompatibilists, the reverse. As a compatibilist
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solution, starting with Aristotle immediately deprives secular critics of the ability to
charge Aquinas of employing an ad hoc epistemology for the sake of Christian
apologetics. 2 Using an Aristotelian epistemology is not merely a means to avoid
criticism tor Aquinas, however. We can infer from his extensive employment of
Aristotelian notions in his responses to theological questions that Aquinas found
Aristotle to be largely correct in a significant number of philosophically and
theologically relevant areas. I have discussed how using Aristotelian epistemology
helps Aquinas avoid some ready criticism that might be leveled against other solutions
to the problem of faith and reason. The main question remains: How exactly did
Aquinas use Aristotle's epistemology, and what role did it play in his solution?
As discussed in chapter 2, Aquinas adopts Aristotle's account of scientia from
the Posterior Analytics. Aquinas, following Aristotle, recognizes that perfect scientia is
the ideal form of knowledge, and that it has three components - cognition, certitude and
perfect apprehension of the truth. Aquinas also accepts Aristotle's account of opinion
(and its variants - doubt, suspicion, etc.), and notes that opinion lacks certitude and
perfect apprehension of the truth. Thus far, Aquinas’s epistemology is Aristotle’s.
Aquinas notices however, that there is room for a possible third epistemic state between
scientia and opinion - one which has certitude but lacks perfect apprehension of the
truth, namely, the epistemic state Aquinas calls credere and I have been referring to as
belief(distinct from ordinary non-italicized ‘belief). 3 The job for Aquinas is to explain
how Christian faith is that epistemic state that Aristotle apparently overlooked (or could
not foresee). If Aquinas can adequately explain not only that belief is possible, but that
the Christian view of faith conforms to it, then he will have succeeded in
189
“Aristotelianizing” faith. This represents a great advance in establishing the epistemic
compatibilism of faith and reason, since it establishes that faith as well as reason (as
exemplified by scientia and opinion) occupy positions on an epistemic spectrum - a
spectrum established by philosophers who were not motivated by Christian apologetics.
5.2. An Aristotelianized faith
As discussed in chapter 3, Aquinas picks out beliefas the epistemic state in
between scientia and opinion. Beliefhas certitude, as does scientia
, though it lacks
perfect apprehension of the truth, and opinion lacks both. Perfect apprehension of the
truth, that is, understanding what causes something to be true and why these causes
make something true, is a result ot intellectual vision — what I characterize in section
3.1 .2.4 as perfect- or p-vision. This intellectual vision, which is a cognition illuminated
by the natural light of reason, is the ability to ‘see’ that and why something is true. For
instance, we see that self-evident truths (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction) are
true, and in seeing that they are true, we are compelled to assent to them. Further, the
assent is accompanied with certitude - we are unable to conceive that the truth of the
proposition could be otherwise - that is, we conceive the proposition as being
necessarily true. Aquinas observes that beliefas well as opinion lack such intellectual
vision - the sorts of things about which we have beliefor opinion are not those which
we see to be true.
With opinion, we accept the truth of a proposition without having any certitude
of it - not only do we not see why the proposition is true, we also do not comprehend
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that the proposition couldn’t be false. With belief on the other hand, though we don’t
see why the proposition is true, we do hold that it couldn't be otherwise. In cases of
belief because we lack p-vision, our assent to the proposition is not compelled by our
seeing that the proposition is true. If the intellect is not compelled to assent by the
object (the proposition), then, Aquinas reasons, it must be compelled by something else.
When it is compelled by the will (in a special way), we have belief The will compels
the intellect to assent, according to Aquinas, through the following process: we
apprehend some proposition and apprehend that assenting to the proposition would be
good for us; from these apprehensions we begin to desire to assent to the proposition,
then choose to assent, and finally do assent
.
4
What gives faith its certitude and what differentiates it from scientia
,
according
to Aquinas, is that the belief is a result of grace, not of evidence. The faithful do not
come to believe matters of faith because conclusive evidence has been presented to
them - if that were the case, then these people would have scientia
,
not faith. In order
for someone to have faith that some proposition is true, that person cannot have
compelling evidence of its truth. Instead, the will moves the intellect to assent, and the
will is helped to move by the grace of God. Though faith lacks the compelling evidence
of scientia, it has an alternate route to certitude. Along with God’s grace comes an
interior light of faith, analogous to the light of reason. Just as the light of reason
illuminates propositions so that we can ‘see’ that they are true (p-seeing), the light of
faith illuminates propositions so that we can ‘see’ that they are something that we ought
to believe (f-seeing). Once they see what is to be believed
,
and have a will that is
prepared by grace to choose to believe such propositions, the faithful do so believe.
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And their faith has certitude because the source of the light of faith and the grace that
helps guide the will both come from God, the most reliable source of truth there is.
Thus, the certitude of faith differs in an important way from the certitude of
scientia. Aquinas says:
Certitude can mean two things. The first is firmness of adherence, and with
reference to this, faith is more certain than any understanding [of principles] and
scientific knowledge. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a
more powerful cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of
understanding or scientia. The second is the evidence of that to which assent is
given. Here, faith does not have certainty, but scientia and understanding do. It
is because of this, too, that understanding has no discursive thought/
There are two different types of certitude, the certitude of faith is a firmness of
adherence to a proposition resulting from the process of grace-aided belief, and the
certitude of scientia is an evidence that compels assent. What they have in common is
that the intellect is determined to one side of a contradiction, that is, those who have
faith as well as those who have scientia equally hold that what they believe cannot be
false. If each type of certitude is reliable, then the certitude of faith and the certitude of
scientia are epistemically on a par. And thus Aquinas can hold faith to be on the same
Aristotelian epistemological spectrum as scientia and opinion.
5.3. Limitations of reason
Thus far we have seen how Aquinas construes faith to fit into the epistemology
established by Aristotle. This does not, in itself, provide a solution to the problem of
faith and reason. Just as Aristotelian mathematicians would hold other mathematicians
to be epistemically irresponsible should they construct an opinion-based (rather than
scientia-based) mathematics, so philosophers could hold the faithful to be epistemically
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irresponsible for believing on faith what they should instead believe by means of
demonstration. Aquinas blunts such criticisms by arguing that natural reason is
inherently limited in its abilities to understand many matters of the divine, and. at least
when scientia is impossible, having faith about these matters is epidemically the best
we can do. Aquinas shows that faith is epistemically responsible at least for
propositions that natural reason cannot demonstrate, which I shall call the Scope
Strategy.
I he details of the Scope Strategy to defend faith was discussed at length in
chapter 4. Briefly, the strategy is to argue that the scope of natural reason is limited
when it comes to divine matters. As was discussed in that chapter, we observed that
Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian account of cognition, a move which blocks criticism of
Aquinas as having developed an ad hoc account of cognition for the sake of
apologetics. Using this Aristotelian account, Aquinas argues that we cannot have any
understanding about the divine essence and because of this, perfect scientia about any
divine matters is unavailable to us, because we cannot know why God did something
without first knowing God, and this we can t do. The truth of some divine matters,
however, we can infer, but only so as to acquire scientia quia. From effects we can
deduce their causes (thus performing a demonstration quia), and thus know that the
causes exist, but not why the causes brought about the effects. If we are careful
Aristotelian scientists, we will then see that natural reason can lead us to scientia that
God exists, and also that He is an unmoved mover, etc. We will also see that natural
reason cannot lead us to scientia about certain other divine matters, including the
Christian mysteries, but also including the duration of the universe. Aquinas' Scope
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Strategy in a nutshell is this: he employs Aristotelian accounts of epistemology and
cognition and shows that according to such accounts, natural reason is limited in the
scope of what it can generate scientia about. For any proposition P that falls outside the
scope of natural reason, if P can be had by faith, then one can have certitude that P, and
thus, it would appear that the best epistemic state a human could have vis-a-vis P would
be faith. 6 This achieves a degree of epistemic compatibilism between faith and reason,
for even if faith were generally found to be epistemically inadequate when had instead
of reason (such a position will be considered in the next section), at least in cases where
reason cannot go, having faith would seem to be epistemically responsible. Even for
divine matters that are accessible to natural reason, Aquinas thinks that it would be
epistemically responsible still to have faith about these matters. This approach I call the
Pragmatic Strategy.
In many places throughout his writings, Aquinas expresses the view that one
ought to have faith about provable divine matters. His reasons for holding this view
are: (1) because proofs about divine matters require a great deal of other knowledge,
scientia about such matters would come only late in life; (2) many don't have the time,
inclination or mental ability to perform such proofs; and (3) philosophers have often
made mistakes when reasoning about the divine. 7 Aquinas's concern here is that
without faith, a significant number of people will lack the appropriate sorts of beliefs
needed for salvation - pragmatically, faith is preferable to natural reason. This strategy
also would seem to satisfy Alston’s account of practical rationality discussed in chapter
1 . Recall that for Alston, a person is counted as a practically rational believer (and in
this way counted as epistemically responsible) who has belief-forming practices that
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satisfy the following conditions: (i) they do not lead to massive inconsistencies, (ii)
there is no reason to think them unreliable, (iii) there are no alternative practices (that
we know of) that are more reliable, and (iv) changing to some other practice would be
massively disruptive and difficult. It taith indeed yields certitude, then faith
immediately satisfies (i) and (ii). Aquinas in (3) above (and discussed in detail in
section 3.3), holds that faith is more reliable than natural reason, when it comes to
divine matters, and thus his account satisfies (iii). Finally, I take it that, in order to save
the most number of people we can, and given Aquinas’s observations ( 1 ) and (2), to
shift from requiring people to believe on the basis of faith to believing on the basis of
proofs of natural reason would be massively disruptive and difficult, thus his account
satisfies (iv). So it would appear that even though some matters of faith are accessible
by natural reason, the faithful are practically rational when they believe those matters on
faith alone, and, at least to this extent, are epistemically responsible in their beliefs.
5.4. Faith and reason are compatible
A common mistake in interpreting Aquinas is to conclude that the Five Ways set
out to prove the existence of God in order to provide rational justification for faith. If
we construe rational justification as we did in section 1.2.1, then faith (understood as
that Aristotelianized unique epistemic state) is not rationally justified. Recall that in
that chapter, a belief P was counted as epistemically responsible and rationally justified
just in case there was sufficient evidence for P. And a belief that P was held to have
sufficient evidence if P was either: foundational (i.e. properly basic) or believed on the
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basis ot foundational beliefs that inductively, deductively or abductively supported P.
Faith fails to satisfy either of these conditions. First, faith does not seem to be properly
basic, tor faith is a result of a complex process of grace and the will moving the intellect
to assent. Properly basic beliefs do not require any support for them - like self-evident
beliefs, when we apprehend them, we see that they are true, and accept them as such.
Not so with the beliefs of faith. 8 Second, believing by faith is not believing on the basis
of some evidence from which one deduces the truths of faith. The Five Ways at first
appear to provide such evidence - for instance, from the evidence that something is
moving, we deduce that God exists. One might think that our belief that God exists is
therefore rationally justified by the proofs based on such evidence. Flowever, as I
argued in chapters 3 and 4, the Five Ways cannot have been given in order to provide
this sort of rational justification forfaith - for faith is of things unseen, that is, it is only
when we lack a proof for P can we have faith that P.
On the other hand, the Five Ways can be used to provide rational justification
for certain sorts of belief.
9
There can be those that believe that God exists without
having faith (understood as Aquinas does). These persons, if they believe on the basis
of some sort of proof (whether it be the Five Ways, or from the evidence of miracles,
etc.), can presumably count themselves as rationally justified in believing that God
exists. Proofs of the existence of God (and other sorts of proofs or evidence) can thus
be advanced to justify beliefs about divine matters, and many contemporary
philosophers of religion concern themselves with whether or not such proofs or
evidence do, indeed, provide sufficient justification for some religious beliefs.
Aquinas’s epistemic compatibilism, however, is not this. Aquinas did not seek to show
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that beliefs concerning divine matters were epistemically responsible; rather, his
concern was to show thatfaith was. And faith, strictly speaking, is not justified,
because faith lacks sufficient evidence for assent. (Recall the passage from QDV 14
quoted above [in section 5.2] in which Aquinas recognizes that faith lacks the certitude
of evidence that scientia and understanding have.)
Another role tor the Five Ways and other proofs could be to establish truth
compatibilism. If the Five Ways were taken to be successful, then the truth of at least
the existence of God can considered to have been established - secular truth
incompatibilism would no longer be a viable response to the tension between faith and
reason. Aquinas does seem to speak as if the Five Ways are indeed proofs that establish
the existence of God, and further, that these proofs are advanced to remove obstacles
to the faith." Aquinas seems to advance them, at least in part, so that proofs against the
faith (e.g., the problem of evil) have a counterpart. Once the truths of faith are
established as at least possible, then one will be more easily motivated to rebut
disproofs against faith. And, of course, Aquinas will hold that all such disproofs of
articles of faith are erroneous or not actually demonstrations. In section 2.4.2, we
surveyed a number of ways in which arguments could fail to be demonstrations, in
section 3.3, we saw how Aquinas argued that natural reason is often deficient in divine
matters, and in chapter 4, we examined some ways in which reason was incapable of
demonstrating conclusions about the divine. Considerations such as these give Aquinas
the confidence to believe that disproofs of matters of faith must fail. Armed with (what
he considers to be) successful proofs of matters of faith, Aquinas can confidently hold a
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truth compatibilism - that is, that the truths of faith are fully compatible with the truths
that result from reasoning, since any incompatibility will be a result of error.
Aquinas seems to hold to a different standard for rational justification than the
one advanced in section 1.2.1 and discussed in earlier paragraphs. The chapter 1
account assumes that a belief P is rationally justified if and only if there is sufficient
evidence for P. By this standard of rational justification, faith is not justified, because,
as Aquinas holds, faith lacks this degree of evidence. It seems, however, that according
to Aquinas, it is not evidence that yields rational justification but certitude - the
apprehension that some proposition is necessarily true. What distinguishes opinion
from scientia and understanding is certitude - the latter two states have it, the former
does not. Understanding has certitude because it is properly basic, we simply ‘see’ (that
is we p-see ) that what we understand cannot be otherwise. Scientia derives its certitude
from demonstrations (deductive inferences) from propositions which, ultimately, are
grounded in propositions we understand. This model of understanding and scientia
does seem to conform to the version of Classic Foundationalism we laid out in chapter
1.2.A:
(CF) S's belief that P is epistemically responsible if and only if there is
sufficient evidence for P. There is sufficient evidence for P if and only if
either:
(1) P is properly basic (i.e., P is self-evident, incorrigible or evident
to the senses for S), or
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(2) P is believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are
epistemically responsible and that support P deductively,
inductively or abductively.
Understanding satisfies condition (1), and scientia (2). For Aquinas, however, faith also
has certitude, and it has this certitude despite a lack of evidence. Faith is neither
properly basic, nor is it evidentially supported by properly basic propositions, yet faith
has certitude. And certitude ot faith is clearly held by Aquinas to be sufficient for
epistemic responsibility, since Aquinas holds that faith, with its certitude, is at least, if
not more, reliable than scientia (see, for instance, section 3.3).
Classic foundationalism is thus too limiting an account of epistemic
responsibility, because faith, due to its certitude, should count as epistemically
responsible. Rather than Classic Foundationalism, Aquinas seems rather to hold a
position closer to the following, let us call it Faith-Inclusive Foundationalism: 12,13
(FIF) S's belief that P is epistemically responsible if and only if S has certitude
that P. S has certitude that P if and only if either:
(1) S p-sees that P is true (that is, S understands P: S sees by natural
reason that P is true, why P is true and needs no further evidence
in support of P [and P is properly basic]), or
(2) S f-sees that P is true (that is, S sees by the light of faith that P is
to be believed
,
and S assents to P on this basis - S has faith that
P), or
(3) P is believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are
epistemically responsible and that support P by demonstration.
14
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Why should we be inclined to favor FIF over CF? As was discussed in section
3. 1.2.4, the role of evidence in the operation of the intellect is to move the intellect to be
settled to one side of a contradiction. According to Aquinas, this settling, or
determination, is certitude. And it is in virtue of having this certitude that scientia can
be seen to be necessary, itself a necessary condition for distinguishing scientia from
mere opinion. Evidence, then, is instrumental for certitude, but it is certitude, the
determination ot the intellect to one thing, that is the epistemically relevant factor in
scientia. The movement ot the will in faith also determines the intellect to one thing,
and this is why faith also has certitude. Seeing by the light of faith and by the light of
natural reason are two means by which the intellect is steered to certitude, but it is only
with certitude that an epistemic state becomes “respectable” - that is, becomes more
than mere opinion. FIF, then, is preferable to CF for two reasons: first, it acknowledges
that it is certitude, not evidence, that is the epistemically interesting aspect of scientia
and understanding; second, it notes that there are two means of achieving such certitude
- via the intellect by p-seeing and via the will and grace and by f-seeing.
If we count FIF rather than CF as the correct version of foundationalism, then
we can count faith as rationally justified. Those who are inclined to cringe when
justification is separated from evidence will recoil from describing Aquinas's faith as
rationally justified. So be it. Even if faith is not to be counted as rationally justified, it
seems clear that Aquinas’s faith, at least under an Aristotelian epistemology, should not
be counted as epistemically irresponsible. If Aquinas’s account is correct, then what
gives scientia its epistemic credentials is certitude - because faith has certitude, it, too,
should be counted as equally epistemically responsible. Because faith does not violate
200
the epistemic norms of reason, Aquinas seems to have achieved an epistemic
compatibilism between faith and reason.
By employing an Aristotelian epistemology and account of cognition, and
introducing an Aristotelianized faith, Aquinas also achieves an epistemic compatibility
between faith and reason along the lines of Plantinga's version of epistemic
responsibility as having warrant. Recall from section 1.2.3 that according to Plantinga,
a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive
faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment
that is appropriate to S s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is
successfully aimed at truth. Aristotle s account of cognition nearly guarantees that
our faculties will, under ordinary circumstances, function properly, and will be
successfully aimed at the truth. For, according to Aristotle, our faculties are determined
teleologically, and nothing exists naturally that cannot perform its proper function. As
Aquinas observes in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics:
... the desire to know belongs by nature to all men.
... each thing naturally desires its own perfection. ... since the intellect, by
which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and
becomes them actually only through scientia ... so each man naturally desires
scientia just as matter desires form.
... each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation ... Now
the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he
differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to
understand, and therefore to possess scientia.
... a natural desire cannot exist in vain.
16
Aquinas (following Aristotle) holds that natural faculties and functions are, by
definition, incoherent if their function is, in principle, unobtainable. A faculty with a
certain specific function F, exists in order to achieve F (achieving F is its final cause).
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If F is in principle unobtainable, that is, if the natural desire of the faculty (to achieve F)
could never be achieved, then the natural desire of F would he in vain - the faculty
would have a final cause that could not be a final cause - and this is incoherent. 17 The
proper function of man is to understand and reason, and the final cause of the
understanding and reasoning is the truth, so, in order for our intellectual faculties not to
be in vain, we must be capable of using them to achieve the truth; in fact, they must be
designed so that with them, we can achieve the truth. As Aquinas says.
Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as
the Philosopher says. ... as regards its proper object the intellect is always true;
and hence it is never deceived of itself, but whatever deception occurs must be
ascribed to some lower power, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we
see that when the natural power ofjudgment is free we are not deceived by such
images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. 18
Thus when the intellect is operating under its own power, that is, when it is functioning
properly, it designed to aim at the truth - the operations of the Aristotelian intellect
thus, under Plantinga’s account, have warrant.
By fitting faith into an Aristotelian epistemology and cognition, Aquinas is able
to argue that faith has the same sort of warrant that understanding and scientia have. As
discussed in the detailed account of faith in chapter 3, the account holds that both the
will and the intellect are involved in the act of faith. In the case of faith, unlike cases of
understanding or scientia , the will moves the intellect to be determined to one thing,
that is, to certitude. At root, however, the act of faith is an act ol intellect, and just as
the final cause of scientia and understanding is the truth, so too with faith. Just as
scientia and understanding have warrant, so too and for the same reasons, will taith
have warrant. The difference between faith and scientia is that the latter will be
functioning properly when its power is not impaired by a lower power, such as the
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imagination. Faith, on the other hand, functions properly when the will is moved by
grace, and directed by the light of faith (rather than a will directed by other motives or
for other reasons). 20 God’s role in faith presumably ensures that faith is functioning
properly; thus we may presume that, for Aquinas, faith will always have warrant. If we
understand faith and scientia to be success terms (as I think Aquinas does), then they
each, by definition, have warrant, for when the intellect is not properly aimed at the
truth or when we fail to function properly (either in the manner of reasoning or in our
relation to God), we are always left with, at most, mere opinion. To say of someone
that he has scientia or faith is to imply proper function and a state that grasps the truth,
that is to say, that these states always have warrant.
We see, therefore, that Aquinas reconciles faith and reason according to each of
the three ways outlined in chapter 1 for epistemic compatibilism. 21 He finds faith to be
epistemically responsible because it is practically rational to believe - faith seems a far
more efficient and effective means of forming beliefs about propositions concerning
God and His actions. If, following Aquinas, we accept a Faith-Inclusive
Foundationalism, then faith would also seem to be rationally justified. Even if we do
not accept FIF, faith fromf-seeing seems at least epistemically responsible because it
has certitude. Finally, because faith is an act of the intellect of a similar sort to scientia
and understanding, each will be epistemically responsible because each has warrant. As
I have also suggested, the Five Ways would appear to ground claims of truth
compatibilism. Finally, though I shall not discuss it here, it is quite clear that Aquinas
holds that there is moral compatibilism between faith and reason. Aquinas finds there
to be value in our natural reason, even in reasoning about divine matters, and Aquinas
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certainly holds that faith will not be immoral. It appears then that Aquinas holds faith
and reason to be fully compatible.
5.5. Objections and replies
As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, solutions to the problem of faith
and reason run the risk of being ad hoc if the account of reason and/or faith that is
provided seems motivated primarily by apologetics. By employing the account of
epistemology and cognition of the leading reason-based threat to Christianity at the
time, Aquinas avoids the charge of advancing this sort of ad hoc solution. However,
precisely for employing Aristotle’s (pagan) epistemology, Aquinas runs into criticism
from his fellow theologians, both Medieval and more recent. In the next section we will
look at Christian responses to Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of reason. In section
5.5.2, we will raise more general philosophical problems with Aquinas’ solution to the
problem of reason and faith.
5.5.1. Christian responses to Aquinas’s account of reason
Two key elements in Aquinas's epistemic compatibilism between faith and
reason are his use of the Scope Strategy, in which he limits the scope ot what reason can
grasp, and his modification of Classic Foundationalism into what I have termed Faith-
Inclusive Foundationalism, in which beliefs count as rationally justified not because
they have sufficient evidence, but because they have certitude. Fach ot these elements
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relies significantly on Aristotelian philosophy. In order to limit the scope of reason,
Aquinas employs an Aristotelian account of cognition (in chapter 4, 1 show how he uses
this account to argue that reason cannot prove the duration of the world). In support of
his certitude-based toundationalism, Aquinas employs an Aristotelian epistemology in
which certitude plays a crucial role in picking out epistemically responsible states.
Aquinas’s account of reason based on an Aristotelian cognition/epistemology was. by
no means, universally accepted among Medieval Christian theologians, and aspects of
Aquinas’s account of reason would certainly seem inappropriate to later philosophers
that no longer accepted Aristotelian accounts of cognition or epistemology.
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, long unavailable to the Latin West, was
translated into Latin in 1 159, and Robert Grosseteste appears to have written the first
full commentary on around 1225. I have provided, in chapter 2, my interpretation of
scientia as Aquinas understood it from his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. I
have argued that what was key to this concept, particularly for his solution to the
problem of faith and reason, was that scientia was composed of three cognitions:
apprehension, certitude and perfect apprehension of the truth. In contrast with Aquinas,
each Medieval philosopher who wrote at any length on Aristotelian scientia appears to
have differed with Aquinas, at least slightly, in how scientia and demonstration are to
be understood. It would take far too long to survey the differences between Aquinas's
account of scientia and that of his contemporaries and later scholastics, particularly
since much has already been written on the subject."
3
Instead, I shall claim that the
basic outline of Aquinas’s epistemology became a commonly held view, at least until
the waning years of Aristotelianism and the rise of new approaches to natural
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philosophy and logic after around 1600. My support for this claim will be thinly
documented here, though I think evidence for later views that are fundamentally
congruent with Aquinas s is easily found. I offer only one bit of evidence here for my
claim.
In 1 589, during his first teaching position at the University of Pisa, Galileo
himself wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics. As William Wallace argues,24
Galileo's commentary was largely cribbed from lectures by his professor Paulus
Vallius. As excerpts from the Vallius lectures (plagiarized and published by Ludovico
Carbone) show, the account of Aristotelian epistemology that Galileo learned, and in
turn, presumably taught, was, though perhaps more nuanced, fundamentally unchanged
from Aquinas’s account. What follows are a number of passages concerning the
Vallius-Carbone text that exemplify the similarity between the late 16 th-century
interpretation of scientia and demonstration and Aquinas's account that I provided in
chapter 2.
Vallius-Carbone define evidence as a certain clarity and perspicuity whereby an
argument or sign is able to elicit conviction in the intellect, much the way in
which a visible object seen at a proper distance and under appropriate light
elicits conviction in the power of sight. It is not the same as certitude, since one
can have certitude without evidence, as in divine faith, but one cannot have
25
evidence without an accompanying certitude.
Vallius-Carbone define certitude as a firmness of the intellect in knowing that
eliminates doubt or wavering about the knowledge obtained; it differs from truth
in that truth can be accompanied by doubt whereas certitude cannot. There are,
moreover, two kinds of certitude: one is said to be extrinsic because, although
the intellect gives its assent, it does so prompted by a command of the will; the
other is intrinsic because the intellect gives assent on its own, forced as it were
by the evidence presented or by its own reasoning, so that only a person
deprived of the natural light would hold the contrary. The two certitudes differ
in various ways: the extrinsic type can be false, as in the case of unfounded
human faith, whereas the intrinsic cannot; the extrinsic necessarily depends on
the will, whereas the intrinsic can actually be opposed to the will; the extrinsic
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does not invoke the natural light ot the intellect, whereas the intrinsic does; and
the extrinsic lacks evidence, whereas the intrinsic depends on it. 26
[Quoting Vallius-Carbone:] Demonstration is a syllogism composed of
necessary propositions wherefrom something is concluded necessarily and
evidently through causes or effects. Note here that there are three kinds of
demonstration: one is said to be most perfect and most powerful (potissima)\ a
second is demonstration of the reasoned fact (propter quid); a third,
demonstration of the fact (quia). Three functions are attributed to
demonstration. The first is to show the existence of an effect and its reason
why, as is done in most powerful demonstration. The second is to manifest the
cause of a thing, and demonstration of the reasoned fact does that. The third is
to show the existence of a cause through an effect, and that is what is done by
demonstration of the fact.27
The careful reader will note that these views of Vallius-Carbone/Galileo do not match
those of Aquinas’s precisely. However, they are sufficiently similar to justify, I believe,
the claim that Aquinas’s accounts of scientia, demonstration, and certitude were widely
acceptable to Medieval and later theologians and philosophers. If views quite similar to
Aquinas's were part of the 16
th
-century logic curricula, then Aquinas’s views were not
(at least until 1600) considered particularly controversial.
Even if I am correct in holding that it was the case that Aquinas’s interpretation
of Aristotelian scientia and demonstration was not particularly radical, his embracing of
Aristotelian cognition engendered a significant amount of controversy. Recall the brief
account of cognition I advanced in discussing the eternity ot the world in chapter 4,
which I repeat again here.
In brief, Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of cognition is roughly as follows.
Objects make impressions on the external senses and these impressions are copied and
transmitted to the intellect as likenesses, or phantasms (phantasmata). By abstracting
from these phantasms we can apprehend in the intellect the form and accidents ot the
object sensed. What the senses respond to are individual particulars, but what the
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intellect apprehends are intelligible species, that is, universals apprehended by means of
abstraction." 8 Thus, when we apprehend that humans are rational animals this is a result
of first sensing one or more particular humans, forming phantasms of them in the
intellect, and then abstracting from these phantasms to apprehend the intelligible
species, or form, of a human - and, for instance, that it includes rationality.
This power that we have of apprehending intelligible species is that of the agent
intellect (intellects agens). Our intellect has both a passive and active component.
The intellect is passive, in part, for its ability to receive. Just as the senses passively
receive impressions of objects, the passive intellect receives likenesses from these
impressions. But these impressions are corporeal, and thus the intellect must actively
make these impressions intelligible (that is, turn them into phantasms), so that they can
become, as a result of abstraction, species that are intelligible. Our agent intellect is the
power that converts the raw matter of thought into the intelligible species that we
apprehend - it is not only a power, but active, in that it draws us from passively
receiving information to actively apprehending it. As Aquinas argues:
But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things subsist apart from
matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, it follows
that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not
actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potency to act except by
something in act; just as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible.
We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things
actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions.
And such is the necessity for positing an agent intellect. 24
This view of cognition was sometimes vehemently rejected by Medieval
theologians who preferred a more Augustinian/Avicennan account ot cognition.
.
.
. .
. 30
Timothy Noone neatly summarizes one mam contrasting position.
Augustinisme avicenissant involves the following claims: 1 ) God is identified as
the agent intellect spoken of by Aristotle and is further thought of as functioning
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as the Intelligentia agens of Avicenna; 2) the human mind is essentially passive
and is identified with the intellectus possibilis of Avicenna and Aristotle; and 3)
human intellectual knowledge involves seeing things in the intelligible world
under the light of divine illumination, although the mature Bacon allows some
role for innate ideas in this process. 31
The main difference between Aquinas's account of cognition and the
Augustinian/Avicennan account is that the agent intellect is a power of man in the
former and a power of God in the latter. This difference has serious repercussions for
philosophy and theology. Under Aquinas’s account of cognition, intelligible species
can be known by the unaided human intellect - we can have understanding and scientia
about these matters. (However, our intellectual powers in discerning the natures of
things is often weak: “But, our cognition [cognitio] is weak to such a point that no
philosopher would be able to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly. Thus one
reads that one philosopher spent thirty years in solitude that he might know
(cognosceret ) the nature of a bee.” ) Part and parcel of this account of cognition is a
rejection of separate Platonic forms as unnecessary. 33
On the other hand, the Augustinian/Avicennan account of cognition embraces a
Platonic account of forms, or similar variations thereof (Bonaventure, for example,
holds them to be ideas in God, identical with his essence34 ). God illuminates these
forms or ideas for us so that we can “see” them. Because the agency involved in
understanding is God’s, it follows that the human mind is incapable, without divine
illumination, of understanding even the truths of natural philosophy. According to this
view, our intellects are naturally inadequate for understanding. Once we think with the
aid of divine illumination, we can finally understand. But without illumination, and
further, without faith, we cannot understand.
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The mind has, as it were, eyes of its own, analogous to the soul's senses. The
certain truths of the sciences are analogous to the objects which the sun’s rays
make visible, such as the earth and earthly things. And it is God himself who
illumines all. ... Having eyes is not the same thing as looking, and looking is not
the same as seeing. The soul therefore needs three things: eyes which is can use
aright, looking and seeing. The eye of the mind is healthy when it is pure from
every taint of the body, that is, when it is remote and purged from desire of
mortal things. And this, faith alone can give in the first place . 35
Augustine characterizes the natural (unilluminated) state of the intellect as needing
“healing." According to Augustine, only once the eye of the mind has been healed, we
are capable of understanding. This healing is accomplished by joining with God - that
is by faith:
Reason is the power of the soul to look, but it does not follow that every one
who looks, sees. Right and perfect looking which leads to vision is called
virtue. For virtue is right and perfect reason. But even looking cannot turn eyes
already healed to the light unless these three things are present: faith that
believes that the object to which our looking ought to be directed can, when
seen, make us blessed; hope which is assured that vision will follow right
looking; love which longs to see and to enjoy.
Once one has healed the eye of the mind, and is capable of looking and seeing, there is,
in principle, no reason why God could not reveal any truth about any created thing.
Thus, for example, the finite duration of the world could be proven, were one properly
illuminated by God when constructing the demonstration. A second consequence is
that, though the Five Ways could perhaps serve as demonstrative grounds for beliefs in
divine matters, according to Aquinas (but not, however, as grounds for faith), they
cannot serve as grounds according to the Augustinian account - for the intellect without
faith would presumably be too damaged and unilluminated so that scientia about God's
existence would be impossible under these circumstances. Finally, faith is an operation
of the intellect according to Aquinas, and is, in principle, independent of other
operations of the intellect ,
37
but for the Augustinian account, faith is presumably a
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precursor to any operation of the agent intellect - that is, any ability to have
understanding or scientia of intelligible species.
The Augustinian/Avicennan account of cognition then, should be seen as a
serious competitor to Aquinas’s Aristotelian account, one which, if held, would block
Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason. Aquinas's insertion of faith into
the Aristotelian epistemology of understanding and scientia appears, as I have argued,
to have been fairly well received, and seems to have had a long-lasting influence.
Aquinas’s account of cognition, particularly the roles of the active and passive intellect
seem to not have had such influence. As I have discussed above, and Noone (1999) and
Kuksewicz (1982) observe, the 13 th century saw strong challenges to Aquinas’s
account, both from the Augustinian/Avicennan camp and from Aristotelian
modifications of Aquinas’s account. Philosophers and theologians of the 14th and 15 th
centuries, though concerned with human cognition, were less so with the human soul
and its faculties, particularly that of the agent intellect. Accounts of Ockham, Peter
Auriol, Durand, et. al., essentially changed the nature of the subject, developing non-
. • . . T8 . . .
Thomistic accounts of cognition. Recall that Aquinas' Scope Strategy relied on his
account of cognition, but his certitude-based foundationalism does not. Were we to
reject Aquinas's Aristotelian account of cognition, we might have to abandon one part
of the solution to the problem of faith and reason (essentially that part discussed in
chapter 4), but could still maintain, on Aquinas's behalf, an epistemic compatibilism
between faith and reason.
34
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5.5.2. Philosophical problems with Aquinas’ solution
In this section, I shall consider three philosophical objections to Aquinas's
reconciliation of faith and reason. By no means are these objections exhaustive of the
possible criticisms of Aquinas's account; they are, perhaps, the most immediate.
First objection. Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason fails
because it does not adequately establish that faith is epistemically responsible, because
faith is epistemically circular. This objection is presented by Terence Penelhum;
Thomas seems to be telling us both that one cannot believe in God unless one
believes certain propositions about him, and that when one believes these
propositions in faith, one accepts them as coming from him. But there is an
obvious circularity about holding both together. One cannot accept a given
proposition as coming from God unless one believes that God exists and has
spoken; but one cannot (can one?) believe that God exists and has spoken
because these propositions come from God. Surely at some stage one’s assent
has to be based on something less explicitly part of the faith than this, or how
could it all begin?
40
Reply to the first objection. In response to the objection that faith is
epistemically circular, two solutions are commonly advanced. The first, that the
existence of God is not held on faith, but by proof (e.g., by the Five Ways) would seem
to be a successful response to the objection. This response acknowledges that faith by
itself is epistemically unjustified; fortunately, we have demonstration to provide us with
epistemic foundations for belief. Proofs establish and justify the existence of God, and
once we believe that God exists, then we are justified in believing what God reveals,
namely, the articles of faith. This response to the objection is not Aquinas's, and as I
argued in chapter 4, the Five Ways were not intended to justify faith. Since, as Aquinas
points out, most believers are incapable of understanding proofs for the existence of
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God (at least until late in life), a consequence of this response would be that the faith of
most Christians is irrational, a result that Aquinas would certainly not accept.
A second response to the objection, made famous by Alvin Plantinga, is to hold
that belief in the existence of God is properly basic. Recall the formulation of Classic
Foundationalism presented earlier in this chapter. Plantinga rejects CF because what it
counts as properly basic is too limited.
But many propositions that do not meet these conditions are properly basic for
me. I believe, for example, that I had lunch this noon. I do not believe this
proposition on the basis of other propositions; I take it as basic; it is in the
foundations of my noetic structure. Furthermore, I am entirely rational in so
taking it, even though this proposition is neither self-evident nor evident to the
senses nor incorrigible for me .
41
Plantinga proceeds by arguing that much in the same way ‘I had lunch this noon’ is
properly basic, so too, because one might experience God, for that person, ‘God exists'
is properly basic .
42
Plantinga's claim that ‘God exists’ can be properly basic is a
controversial one, and a great deal has been written both in favor and against it, and I
leave it to the interested reader to explore the contemporary literature on the subject.
What is of particular interest to me here is whether the view that ‘God exists' is
properly basic can serve as a viable (though controversial) response on behalf of
Aquinas to the charge of epistemic circularity. We turn now to this issue.
I argued earlier that Aquinas did not accept CF, but rather, a foundationalism
based on certitude.
(FIF) S’s belief that P is epistemically responsible if and only if S has certitude
that P. S has certitude that P if and only if either:
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( 1 ) S p-sees that P is true (that is, S understands P: S sees by natural
reason that P is true, why P is true and needs no further evidence
in support of P [and P is properly basic]), or
(2) Sf-sees that P is true (that is, S sees by the light of faith that P is
to be believed
,
and S assents to P on this basis - S has faith that
P), or
(3) P is believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are
epistemically responsible and that support P by demonstration.
The analogue to the Plantingan move for FIF would be to argue that the Christian
faithful believe that 'God exists’ with certitude, and thus such beliefs are epistemically
responsible. This move at first seems unpromising. To say that we p-see that 'God
exists' is true is to say that the proposition is understood - a position held by Anselm,
but rejected by Aquinas. 43 To say that wzf-see that 'God exists’ seems to reintroduce
the circularity objection - to f-see this proposition would seem to be epistemically
circular. As to the third condition, to believe 'God exists’ on the basis of prior faith
seems incoherent, and to believe it on the basis of what we p-see amounts to proving
that God exists, which amounts to the first response to the objection, one which we have
already rejected. However, for similar reasons as those for which Plantinga rejected
CF, we should perhaps reject FIF, at least as it is currently formulated.
As discussed in section 2.3.1, Aquinas does seem to leave room for allowing one
to have certitude about propositions concerning contingent matters. And in the Five
Ways, Aquinas seems to allow that of propositions that are evident to the senses one
also can have certitude. This would seem to suggest that FIF is missing a fourth
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condition, one in which S s belief that P has certitude about contingent or sensible
matters. Exactly how to formulate this additional condition is difficult, particularly
since Aquinas is never very clear on exactly how or to what extent sensible evidence
provides certitude.44 However, following Plantinga’s reasoning, it seems plausible to
hold that “I had lunch this noon' is a proposition about which one would have firm
adherence and be determined to its truth, and thus would be a proposition about which
one could have certitude. Similarly, then, it seems plausible that one could have
certitude about ‘God exists’.
Whether or not Aquinas actually embraced this view is hard to determine. The
best source for Aquinas’s position is found in his reply to an objection very similar to
this first objection in De veritate 14. I include here the objection and Aquinas's reply.
Obj. 9. That God exists is an object of faith (credibile ). However, we do not
believe (credimus) this because it is acceptable to God, for no one can think that
something is pleasing to God unless he first thinks that there is a God to whom it
is pleasing. Hence, the judgment by which one thinks that God exists precedes
the judgment by which he thinks something is pleasing to God. Nor can the
former cause the latter. But we are led to believe something which we do not
know through that which we believe is pleasing to God. Therefore, that God
exists is believed (creditum
)
and known (scitum ).
Ad 9. Someone can begin to believe what he did not believe before but which
he held with some hesitation. Thus, it is possible that, before believing in God,
someone might think that God exists, and that it would be pleasing to God to
have him believe that He exists. In this way a man can believe that God exists
because such a belief pleases God, although this is not an article of faith, but
preliminary to the article, since it can be proved by demonstration.
4 ^
The objection here seems to pick out the epistemic circularity that we've identified as
the first objection, and offers as a solution the first response that we rejected above -
that in order to avoid the circularity ‘God exists' must be scientifically known. In
response, Aquinas seems to allow that prior to faith one can accept that God exists with
some hesitation (existimatio debilis ), and also believe that accepting His existence
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would please God. Such a person does not yet have faith, because ‘God exists’ is
accepted only hesitantly, although presumably this person could come to have faith (or.
alternatively, could come to demonstrate that God exists). John Jenkins offers a useful
analogy in order to help explain what Aquinas has in mind with this response.
This is similar to the case in which a person, George, say, who first has a
suspicion that he has a long-lost relative. Uncle Harry, subsequently comes to
the firm conviction that such an Uncle Harry exists when he receives a letter
from him. George does not, of course, believe Uncle Harry that he exists, but he
does come to the firm conviction that Uncle Harry exists because he has taken
the communication as genuine. My suggestion is that in a similar fashion one
comes to a firm conviction that God exists because one believes that he has
received a genuine revelation from God .46
If we interpret Aquinas in this way (as I am inclined to do), then Aquinas seems to
provide a response to the objection of epistemic circularity very similar in spirit to
Plantinga’s. We first conjecture and hold, as an opinion only, that God exists. Then,
God ‘speaks' to us in providing the grace that aids the will in assenting to the articles of
faith, and in providing the light of faith - this ‘communication’ is taken by the believer
to be genuine, and as a result, the believer comes to believe with firm adherence and
certitude what was previously only opined. Faith produces two sorts of certitude: first,
the certitude that what is to be believed is necessarily true; second, the certitude that it is
indeed God that reveals (via the light of faith) these truths. ‘God exists’ then, is not
something that is illuminated by the light of faith, and thus the charge of epistemic
circularity is avoided; rather, by experiencing the light of faith one directly experiences
God and comes to believe in God's existence with certitude, where previously there was
only opinion .
47
In concluding the response to this objection, I would like to point out an
important difference between my interpretation of Aquinas ottered above and that ot
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Plantinga. Plantinga holds, as I do, that Aquinas believes that "God exists’ is basic, but
for importantly different reasons. I interpret "God exists’ as basic for those who have
faith because God’s role in faith reveals His existence to the faithful. Plantinga, on the
other hand, interprets Aquinas as holding that "God exists’ as accompanying more
mundane experiences:
The heavens declare the glory of God and the skies proclaim the work of his
hands: but not by way of serving as premises for an argument. Awareness of
guilt may lead me to God; but it is not that in this awareness I have the material
for a quick theistic argument: I am guilty, so there must be a God. ... I don’t
take my guilt as evidence for the existence of God, or for the proposition that he
is displeased with me. It is rather that in that circumstance - the circumstance of
my clearly seeing my guilt - I simply find myself with the belief that God is
disapproving or disappointed.48
Now Plantinga may well be right in claiming that these sorts of experiences provide a
basic belie! in the existence of God; however, I do not think such a view is attributable
to Aquinas. The grounds for attributing this view to Aquinas depend on the claim
frequently made by Aquinas that: “To know that God exists in a general and confused
way is implanted in us by nature ...”44 (Plantinga quotes this very passage at the outset
of the chapter for his passage quoted above.) Plantinga seems to interpret the innate
knowledge of God referred to in the quoted passage as an innate capacity for knowing
God’s existence, and various experiences (watching the heavens, guilt) activate this
capacity. The knowledge, though activated by experience, is due to an implanted
capacity, and thus is basic.
1 want to resist Plantinga' s interpretation for two reasons. First, because it
places the locus of the certitude of the existence of God in rather mundane experiences,
rather than in faith. Faith, as I argued above, carries with it awareness (and certitude) of
God’s existence, and this is, in part, what makes faith so special. Although the presence
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of God may not seem important for unformed faith, recall that faith formed by charity
involves a relationship between the believer and God. In order for such a relationship to
exist, God must be present to the believer, and so it makes sense to say that faith
presents God to the believer. Second, Plantinga’s interpretation relies on Aquinas’s
view that we have innate knowledge of God, but I want to suggest that Aquinas did not
actually have this view. When Aquinas speaks of innate ‘knowledge’ he uses
cognoscere and its cognates, a term which, I have argued, should not be translated as
‘knowledge’ but ‘cognition.'" 0 To have a general and confused innate cognition that
God exists is merely to have a sense that God exists, and would not seem to justify
belief in God's existence. I may have a confused sense on some particular afternoon
that it will rain, but my lack of meteorological knowledge coupled with my previous
inattentiveness to indicative signs of rain would seem to indicate that to hold strongly a
belief that it will rain would be irrational. Similarly, it would seem, if I were to have a
general and confused cognition of God's existence when I look at a beautiful sunset
while lacking any demonstration for His existence and also lacking faith, to then firmly
believe in God would also be irrational. That cognoscere should be translated as I am
proposing, rather than as ‘knowledge’, is further supported by Aquinas's response
following the one quoted above. In his response to ST 1.2.1 objection 1, Aquinas says
that we have a general and confused cognoscere of God’s existence. In his response to
objection 2, in which he rejects Anselm’s ontological argument, Aquinas notes that
some believed God to be a body. That Aquinas first points out that we have a confused
cognoscere of God's existence, and then observes that some believed God to be a body
would strongly seem to suggest that cognoscere should be translated merely as
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‘cognition" and not as 'knowledge'. This interpretation seems further confirmed by
what Aquinas says in DV 14.10:
Our understanding does not have a natural determination to matters of faith in
the sense that it should know (cognoscat) them naturally, but it does in some
sense have a natural ordination to a knowledge (cognoscendci) of them in so far
as nature is said to have an ordination to grace by reason of a divine decree. 51
Second objection. Since one cannot tell whether one believes according to the
light of faith or not, faith cannot produce certitude. Here is the argument: as was
discussed in section 3.2.1, Aquinas holds that a heretic who refuses to believe even one
article of faith loses the habit of faith and believes matters relevant to faith not
according to the light of faith, but according to some personal, human standard of
judging. But presumably at least some of these heretics still think that their beliefs are
formed according to the light of faith - at least some heretics still think of themselves as
properly believing Christians. Heretics of this sort cannot tell the difference between
believing by faith and believing without faith, and thus faith is phenomenologically
indistinguishable from mere opinion. But if one cannot be sure whether or not one has
faith (that is, whether one is a heretic of this sort), then faith cannot provide certitude.
A second, related argument can be given in light of my response to the first objection.
As Robert Audi presents it:
And imagine a cult, say of the Great Oz, who is so conceived that he cannot be
God under another name. Suppose its votaries made similar claims about the
existence of a natural tendency to form basic Ozistic beliefs and they argued that
Hebraic-Christian (and other) influences have prevented widespread realization
of this tendency. They might also maintain that they have Ozian experiences in
which they are directly aware of Oz.
... How comforting should it be to know that one's basic religious beliefs have a
favorable epistemic status if incompatible, even outlandish, religious beliefs, can
also have it?'
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Nothing, in principle, would seem to prevent Ozians (or Muslims, etc.) from claiming
for themselves a light of faith by which they believe with certitude and by which the
existence of God is properly basic. But supposing that Ozian beliefs are incompatible
with Christian beliefs, it seems that neither the Ozians nor the Christians can reasonably
claim that their beliefs have certitude.
Reply to the second objection. As was discussed at the end of section 3.4,
Aquinas' stringent account of faith would seem to have the consequence that few self-
ascribed C hristians do, in tact, have faith. For, as Aquinas claims (and as is pointed out
in the objection above), someone who disbelieves even one article of faith lacks faith.
Let us accept this consequence of Aquinas's account. 53 Thus, most self-ascribed
Christians do not have faith. Yet, according to the objection, many still think that they
believe according to the light of faith, and that they have faith. I think that Aquinas
would reject this last claim, and thus stop the objection in its tracks here. Those who
truly have faith accept all articles of faith according to the light of faith, but according
to Aquinas, anyone who disbelieves an article of faith must be deciding for himself, on
the basis of his own will and judgment, what to accept and what not to accept/ 4 When
these sorts of believers think that they believe according to the light of faith, they are
simply wrong. Their error does not suggest that believing according to one’s own will
and judgment cannot be distinguished from believing according to the light of faith;
rather, it shows that some may claim to believe by the light of faith either facetiously or
out of ignorance. Consider the following analogy. Some people (undergraduates in
introductory philosophy come to mind) make claims such as, ‘That the number of stars
in the sky is infinite is knowable a priori.' That some falsely claim that propositions
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are a priori does not show that one cannot, in principle, tell the difference between a
priori and a posteriori claims. Rather, it merely shows that those who make the
erroneous claims do not know what they are talking about. Similarly, those self-
ascribed Christians who disbelieve some article of faith yet claim to believe according
to the grace of God and the light of faith, don't know what they’re talking about -
they're making empty claims about their belief formation.
Another analogy to help explain how those who disbelieve one article of faith
lack faith is considered by Aquinas in the Summa theologiae, when he considers the
following objection:
Furthermore, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so also he
obeys in following the commandments of the law. But a man can be obedient to
some commandments and not to others. Therefore he can have faith concerning
some articles and not others . 55
In his response to this objection, Aquinas observes that someone who does not obey all
the commandments does not really obey God. To obey God is to be driven by the
motive to obey God completely. One who obeys some but not all the commandments is
really being driven by various proximate motives which select which commandments to
obey. Just as selective obedience to God is not really obedience, similarly, selective
belief in articles of faith is not really faith. Whatever it is that motivates a person to
disbelieve an article of faith, and thus embrace error, also might mask that person's self-
realization that this is what is occurring - and this is why such people still think that
they believe according to the light of faith.
As for Ozians, or Muslims or other religious groups in competition with
Christians, I think that Aquinas would deny that such groups appeal to belief according
to a light of faith. Here, I think, Aquinas's claim is meant to be factual - Christians
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believe according to the light ot faith; Muslims don t. In Stunmci contra gentiles
,
Aquinas contrasts the way in which Christians and Muslims come to believe. He sees
as the greatest miracle of Christianity the fact that vast numbers of people, both simple
and learned, have flocked to the Christian faith despite adversity and persecution, and
coming to believe truths that exceed reason, and belief that is neither coerced nor
enticed by the promise of pleasure. In other words, the Christians believe by faith and
through God. For Muslims, on the other hand, the motives for belief are different;
On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines
proceeded in a way that is opposite to this. The point is clear in the case of
Mohammed. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the
concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that
were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure.
In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. ... Mohammed
forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms/ 6
Whether or not his assertions about Islam are correct, Aquinas clearly seems to believe
that Muslims believe on the basis of motives that are not those corresponding to his
account of faith. Muslims (and presumably, members of all other religious groups) do
not have faith and do not believe by the light of faith - should they claim to do so, they,
SI
like the heretics discussed above, claim falsely.'
Third objection. Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason fails
because it relies on an inaccurate epistemology, as presented by Kenneth Konyndyk;
One of the more serious objections to Aquinas' solution to the problem ot
conflicts between faith and science is its reliance on an unacceptable
epistemology and an antiquated view of the sciences. Aquinas links a certain
deductive structure of science, proceeding as it were axiomatically from
postulates and first principles (axioms?), with an epistemology of science or
theory ofjustification. Thus we know scientifically and fully justifiably because
we see the links between the claim under consideration and the first principles.
some claims that one would have thought were per se nota and candidates for
axioms or postulates have been shown to lead to notorious logical paradoxes. ...
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In short, it appears that it will not work to try to get an axiomatic structuring of
science to coincide with the sort of theory of justification that Aquinas wants.
Because Thomas’s arguments for compatibility are based on this structure,
rejection of the structure means that certain key premises in his arguments must
be rejected/ 8
Reply to the third objection. Anachronistic objections such as this are, in some
sense, unfair to Aquinas. Aquinas's project was to provide a solution that reconciled
faith with the standards of philosophical reason at the time in which he wrote, which
were exemplified by Aristotle. In this dissertation, I have tried to present Aquinas’
solution to the reconciliation of Christian faith with Aristotelian reason, and have
suggested in section 5.5.1 above that his solution was prima facie well-received in that
its main elements seem still to have been in place at least as late as when Galileo wrote.
In this context, Aquinas’ solution is impervious to objections of the sort given above.
However, we might also wish to evaluate the adequacy of Aquinas’ solution in the
current climate of tension between faith and reason. By this standard, Aquinas’ solution
clearly fails, relying as it does on an outdated epistemology, as Konyndyk rightly
observes. On the other hand, the main thrust of Aquinas’ solution might yet find some
purchase in the current debate. In contemporary discussions of religious epistemology,
faith is often taken to be un- or under-evidenced belief, whereas science is taken to
involve beliefs with sufficient evidence. By such an account, faith clearly seems to be
epistemically irresponsible since it lacks sufficient evidence. However, we can jettison
Aristotelian epistemology and still adopt Aquinas's account of faith. Faith,
fundamentally for Aquinas, is something that has certitude without evidence.
Contemporary science has given up on certitude — beliefs of science are no longer held
with scientia , but inductively and contingently. Aquinas's faith, in comparison, is a far
stronger and more reliable epistemic state than contemporary scientific belief, so it
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would seem that we could still argue for epistemic compatibilism between faith and
contemporary science, particularly it we adopt some version ot the Scope Strategy that
limits the scope of what science can discern, such as that suggested by Evelyn Fox
Keller (see endnote 14 in chapter 1).
5.6. Concluding remarks
In this dissertation, I have attempted to provide a detailed account of precisely
how Aquinas reconciles faith with Aristotelian reason. Such an exegetical enterprise is
important for several reasons. First, Aquinas was the first to provide a thorough and
systematic reconciliation between faith and reason. His exercise is both historically
significant and influential to later philosophers and theologians. Further, such a
thoroughly developed solution may serve as a useful standard by which contemporary
reconciliations of faith and reason should be developed.
54
Second, as a significant
figure in the history of philosophy, Aquinas deserves to be understood correctly. In
providing a detailed account of Aquinas's views, I have made my case for correcting a
number of common but erroneous interpretations of Aquinas. Finally, though much has
been written on Aquinas’s account of faith, his account of reason, of the eternity of the
world, and of the Five Ways, my enterprise is the first that I am aware of that tries to
provide a complete account of Aquinas’s views, bringing together disparate passages by
Aquinas that are relevant to faith and reason and synthesizing them into a unified and
comprehensible whole. I hope that I have achieved these goals in writing this
dissertation.
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ENDNOTES
Recall from chapter 1 that epistemic compatibilism is the position that one can
be epistemically responsible in believing propositions pertaining to the divine on the
basis both of faith and reason.
2
Though, as we shall see in section 5.5.1, Aquinas's use of an Aristotelian
account of cognition earns him some severe criticism from fellow theologians.
3
I presume that Aquinas never entertained a fourth possible epistemic state: one
has perfect apprehension of the truth but lacks certitude. Certitude establishes that a
proposition is true and could not be otherwise (i.e., is necessary), perfect apprehension
of the truth reveals why. I assume that Aquinas thought it obvious that if you knew why
something was necessarily true, you'd automatically know that it was necessarily true.
Though it is clear that Aquinas thinks that belief (credere
)
has certitude (“But
the act of believing has firm adherence to one alternative, in which the believer agrees
with the knower (sciente ) and the one who understands.” (ST II-II.2.1), I am not clear as
to what other instances may count as beliefother than faith. Given that faith is my
particular interest here, I shall limit my discussion to faith in particular, rather than
belief in general.
5
“ad septimum dicendum, quod certitudo duo potest importare: scilicet
firmitatem adhaesionis; et quantum ad hoc fides est certior etiam omni intellectu et
scientia, quia prima veritas, quae causat fidei assensum, est fortior causa quam lumen
rationis, quae causat assensum intellectus vel scientiae. importat etiam evidentiam eius
cui assentitur; et sic fides non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et intellectus: et exinde
est quod intellectus cogitationem non habet." (QDV 14.1 ad 7)
6 As Aquinas points out, those who have experienced the beatific vision, angels,
and God are capable of having p-vision of certain divine matters that we, as ordinary
mortal humans are not. See, for instance, ST 1.57.3.
7
“.
. . it is necessary for man to accept in the way of faith not only the things that
are above reason, but also the things that can be known by reason. And this for three
reasons. First, so that man might come more quickly to the apprehension ot divine
truth. The body of knowledge that has the task of proving that God exists and other
such things about God, is proposed to men for learning last, many other sciences being
presupposed. And so man could not come to the apprehension of God during his life
except after a long time. Second, so that the apprehension of God be more common.
Many cannot make progress in the study of knowledge, either because of dullness ot
wit; or because of other occupations and the necessities of temporal life; or even
because of laziness in learning. All of them would be entirely cheated of the
apprehension of God unless divine things were proposed to them in the manner ot faith.
Third, on account of certainty. Human reason is much deficient in divine things. A
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sign of this is that the philosophers, investigating human things naturally, erred in many
things and held opinions contrary to themselves. Divine things had to be handed down
to them in the manner of faith, as being said by God, who cannot lie, so that there might
be indubitable and certain apprehension of God among men.” (ST II-II.2.4)
8
This is an oversimplification. As I argue in the response to the first objection
in section 5.5.2 below, there is a sense, I think, in which faith is properly basic.
9
Though I do not believe that this is the intended purpose of these proofs. See
chapter 4.
10
See ST 1.2.2.
11
See ST II-II.2.10 ad 2.
1 ^
I should note that Aquinas does not explicitly argue for epistemic
responsibility or rational justification. Although I think this account is consistent with
the views held by Aquinas, he did not seem particularly concerned with explicitly
developing an account of epistemic justification.
13
See Stump (1991-11) for an interesting survey of views on Aquinas as a
Foundationalist. Stump does not believe that Aquinas accepts CF, but it seems that she
would also reject Aquinas as holding FIF. Her positions depends on a substantially
different approach and interpretation to Aquinas’s epistemology than my own, and for
this reason, I do not have the room to rebut her views here.
14
There seem to be three sorts of certitude had by derivative means. Perfect
scientia is acquired when one demonstrates from propositions understood to
conclusions. Scientia quia
,
on the other hand, is had when one demonstrates from
propositions intellectually assented to, but not understood (for example, propositions
known to be true because proved by some other scientist or proved in the past, or
propositions evident to the senses, e.g., something is moving). The science of sacred
doctrine involves demonstrations from propositions that dxef-seen to conclusions that
are proven, but not themselves seen.
15
Plantinga (2000), p. 1 56.
16
“proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest
ad sciendum.
cuius ratio potest esse triplex: primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res naturaliter
appetit perfectionem sui. unde et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut imperfectum
appetit suam perfectionem. cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id quod est, in se
consideratus sit in potentia omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi per scientiam,
quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de anima: sic
naturaliter unusquisque desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.
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secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam propriam
operationem. sicut calidum ad caletaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur. propria
autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis
differt. unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per
consequens ad sciendum.
tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est, ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc
enim uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. unde et motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut
probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem coniungit principio. substantiis autem separatis,
quae sunt principia intellects humani, et ad quae intellects humanus se habet ut
imperfectum ad perfectum, non coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum: unde et in hoc
ultima hominis felicitas consistit. et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam. nee
obstat si aliqui homines scientiae huic studium non impendant; cum frequenter qui
finem aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter
difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias occupationes. sic etiam licet omnes homines
scientiam desiderent, non tamen omnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia ab aliis
detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam propter
pigritiam vitant laborem addiscendi. hoc autem proponit aristoteles ut ostendat, quod
quaerere scientiam non propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec scientia, non est vanum,
cum naturale desiderium vanum esse non possit.”(M 1. 1.1
-4)
17
See ST 1.77.3 - powers are ordered to their acts, and acts of active powers are
distinguished by their ends; thus powers are essentially distinguished and determined by
their ends.
1 s
“manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est
malum eius, ut dicitur in vi ethic. ... manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod
intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. unde ex seipso nunquam
decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel
aliquo huiusmodi. unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum,
non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in
dormientibus.” (ST 1.94.4)
19
See ST II-II.4.2.
20
See ST II-II.6.1.
21
However, it may be that Aquinas's approach seems to us to be an adequate
reconciliation of faith and reason only if we accept an Aristotelian account of
epistemology and cognition. This issue will be taken up later in the third objection in
section 5.5.2 below.
22
Dates from Serene (1982), p. 498.
23
For a good survey of Medieval views on scientia , see Serene ( 1 982). Marrone
(1990) also has a useful survey of views held by theologians in Paris shortly following
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Aquinas's death. Adams (1987), chapter 14, provides a particularly detailed look at the
views of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Ockham, et. al.
“4
Wallace (1992), p. xiii. All claims interpreting Galileo which follow are from
this source.
25
Ibid., p. 95.
26
Ibid., p. 96.
27
Ibid., p. 65.
28
For Aquinas’s account of cognition, see ST 1.84. See also Kretzmann (1993).
29
“sed quia aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine
materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur
quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles
actu. nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus
fit in actu per sensibile in actu. oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte
intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a
conditionibus materialibus. et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” (ST
1.79.3)
30 . ...
For variations on and criticisms of Aristotelian cognition, see Kuksewicz
(1982) and Pasnau (1997).
31 Noone (1999), p. 68.
T9
“Sed cognitio nostra adeo debilis est quod nullus philosophus potuit perfecte
inuestigare naturam unius musce; unde legitur quod unus philosophus fuit triginta annis
in solitudine ut cognosceret naturam apis.” ( The Sermon-Conferences ofSt. Thomas
Aquinas on the Apostles ’ Creed
,
1.4.)
33
See ST 1.79.3,1.84.1.
34
See Quinn (1973), ch. 7.
35
Augustine, Soliloquies VI, 12.
36
Ibid., VI, 13.
37 However, Aquinas acknowledges that from faith and the gratuitous grace of
God, we can acquire the gifts of understanding and scientia - basically improvements in
our ability to understand and to demonstrate.
38
See Kuksewicz (1982), p. 628.
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39 x tNo theist solution to the problem of faith and reason will be fully adequate
that has an account of faith in which nobody has it. Although Aquinas avoids the
charge of an ad hoc solution from the side of secular philosophy by largely employing
the account of reason in vogue among philosophers at the time, he would still be
vulnerable to criticism from theists, were he guilty of developing an empty account of
faith merely to show that it was epistemically compatible with Aristotelian reason.
Criticism of Aquinas s account of faith, at least among Aquinas's peers and later
Medieval theologians, is hard to pinpoint - in part, perhaps, because few Medieval
theologians seem to have provided nearly as thorough an account of faith as did
Aquinas (and thus, there are few points of contrast), and further, because Aquinas took
pains to show that his account of faith matched the characterization given in Scripture in
Hebrews 11:1, “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things
that appear not.” As far as Aquinas’s account of faith holds that faith lacks sufficient
evidence (things that appear not), and that faith is the ground for salvation (the
substance of things hoped for), presumably no Medieval theologian would disagree with
him. Further, that Aquinas's account of faith held that it is a result of a free choice of
will, which deserves merit for such faith, while at the same time having certitude: these
are positions that would be welcomed by the orthodoxy. As to exactly how the
statement in Hebrews is to be explained by an account of faith, Aquinas has done so,
but it is very difficult to see precisely how this account was received (in part for the
reasons mentioned above). An interesting research project, but one far too lengthy for
this dissertation, would be to examine how Aquinas’ specific and detailed account of
faith was actually received. After the Medieval era. and continuing to this day there are
numerous theological interpretations of faith that conflict in some way with the account
given by Aquinas. My training in theology is inadequate, however, to attempt to
provide useful explanations of these various views, to show how they contrast with
Aquinas’s, or to defend Aquinas’s account in light of these latter day competitors. 1
leave it to the more theologically trained reader to evaluate Aquinas's account herself.
(I shall note, however, that given his position as a Doctor of the Catholic Church, his
enormous influence on the Dominican order, and serving as the inspiration for latter-
day Thomists, his account of faith would seem not to be too objectionable to many
Christians.)
40
Penelhum (1977), p. 141.
41
Plantinga (1983), p. 60.
42
Plantinga (1983), p. 81, acknowledges that, strictly speaking, what is properly
basic is some proposition like ‘God is speaking to me’ which entails ‘God exists'.
Since the latter proposition is derived from the former, it is not basic; however, we can
talk of the latter as being properly basic in most circumstances without running into
trouble.
43
In ST 1.2.1.
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Formulating this condition is also difficult tor contemporary religious
epistemology. Audi (1986), p. 148-9, constructively discusses a number of useful
characteristics that could plausibly be claimed to hold of basic beliefs, but precise
criteria for properly basic beliefs has yet to be successfully defended, to my knowledge.
Obj. 9. praeterea, deum esse, est quoddam credibile. non autem credimus
hoc eo quod sit deo acceptum: quia nullus potest exstimare aliquid esse deo acceptum,
nisi prius existimet esse deum qui acceptat; et sic existimatio qua quis existimat deum
esse, praecedit existimationem qua quis putat aliquid esse deo acceptum, nec potest ex
ea causari. sed ad credendum ea quae nescimus, ducimur per hoc quod hoc credimus
esse deo acceptum. ergo deum esse, est creditum et scitum.
“ad nonum dicendum, quod aliquis potest incipere credere illud quod prius non
credebat, sed debilius existimabat; unde possibile est quod aliquis antequam credat
deum esse, exstimaverit deum esse, et hoc esse ei placitum quod credatur eum esse, et
sic aliquis potest credere deum esse, eo quod sit placitum deo. quamvis etiam hoc non
sit articulus; sed antecedens articulum, quia demonstrative probatur.” (QDV 14.9 ob 9
& ad 9)
46
Jenkins (1997), p. 199.
47
Although I favor this interpretation of Aquinas (as does Barad [1992], p. 70.
and Pojman [1986], p. 36), there is not much textual evidence to support it. The
quotation from QDV 14.9 seems to support this interpretation, even though Aquinas’s
response to the objection is by no means clear; and there seems to be little other
evidence to either confirm or disconfirm this interpretation.
48
Plantinga (2000), p. 175.
49
“ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere deum esse in aliquo communi,
sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet deus est
hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter
desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. sed hoc non est simpliciter
cognoscere deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere petrum,
quamvis sit petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo,
existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud." (ST 1.2.1 ad
1). See also SCG III. 38.1 and Aquinas's Inaugural Lecture of 1256 (see Aquinas
(1988)
.
p. 356).
50
See chapter 2, endnote 1
.
51
“ad quartum dicendum, quod ad ea quae sunt fidei, non naturaliter
determinate intellects quasi ea naturaliter cognoscat; sed quodammodo naturaliter
ordinatur in ipsa cognoscenda, sicut natura dicitur ordinari ad gratiam ex divina
institutione.” (QDV 14.10 ad 4)
52 Audi (1986), p. 164-5.
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53
Whether or not such a stringent standard for faith is an advantage or failing of
the account is an issue of theology, and so I shall not take it up here.
54
See ST II-II.5.4, also 5.4 ad 1.
“praeterea, sicut homo obedit deo ad credendum articulos fidei, ita etiam ad
servanda mandata legis. sed homo potest esse obediens circa quaedam mandata et non
circa alia, ergo potest habere fidem circa quosdam articulos et non circa alios ” (ST II-
II. 5.3 ob 3)
6
*’hi vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet
in mahumeto qui camalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium camalis
concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia,
voluptati camali habenas relaxans, in quibus in promptu est a camalibus hominibus
obediri. documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter
sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et
falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. signa etiam non adhibuit supernatural iter facta, quibus
solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae
non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit
se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. ei
etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio
crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus
ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. nulla
etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: quin potius
quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione depravat, ut patet
eius legem inspicienti. unde astuto consilio libros veteris et novi testamenti suis
sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos falsitatis argueretur. et sic patet quod eius
dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt ” (SCG 1.6 n.4)
57
Should some religious group have motivations for their beliefs that more
closely resemble those that Aquinas claims on behalf of Christians, then the second
objection could be reinstated. It seems clear, however, that Aquinas holds that the
Christian religion is the only extant one which have motives for belief that are
compatible with having faith. I am not clear whether Aquinas held that believers of
Greek Orthodox Christianity had faith or not, but if so, then presumably the differences
between views held by Greek Orthodox believers and Catholic views were not
differences centering around the articles of faith.
58 Konyndyk (1995), p. 17. In addition to his criticism of the axiomatic structure
of science, Konyndyk criticizes Aquinas for finding no significant epistemic conflict
between faith and opinion, since opinion is based on merely probable reasoning (p. 18).
However, as Konyndyk observes, nearly all contemporary science fits under opinion by
Aquinas’s epistemology, and to say that faith and contemporary science have no real
tension because faith has certitude whereas contemporary science is merely probable
does not seem to dissipate the tension between the two adequately at all.
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Plantinga (2000) is a good example ot the sort of thorough, systematic
solution that I am talking about. Efforts like Plantinga' s, unfortunately, are few and far
between.
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